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The integration of sUAS in commercial airspace is complicated and faces many challenges to 
ensure a safe and secure incorporation into the National Airspace System (NAS). This research 
analyzes the interconnectedness between the air traffic controller and the sUAS through HF 
implications when sUAS enter the NAS.  To mitigate negative consequences in the integration, it 
examined the human performance of the controllers, the sUAS operators, commercial pilots, and 
the equipment.  This study used a quantitative research approach from both the Software 
Hardware Environment, Liveware, and Liveware (SHELL), and the Swiss Cheese models (SCM) 
for analysis of UAS sightings that are part of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) UAS 
sightings reports and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Aviation Safety 
reporting System (ASRS). This identified the HF that could cause human errors during sUAS 
integration in the NAS.  The study found that there is a gap in the knowledge for understanding 
human error from the controller perspective in the integration of sUAS in the NAS; however, 
work is being done to mitigate these errors and ensure safe integration for all stakeholders.  The 
study highlighted possible human errors that air traffic controllers could make if further research, 
education, and training were not conducted to mitigate errors.  The study revealed that further 
collaboration is needed to mitigate Air Traffic Control (ATC) centered human errors. It also 
recommended that the Safety Management System (SMS) program continue development in 
sUAS.  Finally, it is recommended that research continue by the FAA and NASA with the ASRS 
and UAS sightings reporting to include the Remote Identification (REMOTE ID) requirements.   
 Keywords: unmanned aerial systems (UAS), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), National 
Airspace System (NAS), air traffic controllers, human factors, human errors, safety management 




I would like to dedicate my dissertation to my husband first, my Ph.D. chair second, then 
my family and all my friends who continually encouraged me on my path.  I could not have done 
this without the immense support everyone gave me.  I am also grateful for my faith in God, 
which, in prayer, I was often reminded of all the love and support I had in this endeavor.  I am 




I would like to express my appreciation for my dissertation chair, Dr. Ian R. McAndrew.  
His guidance and commitment to me throughout my journey was the staying force I needed to 
complete my Ph.D.  He was always there assisting me.  I am grateful for your commitment and 





TABLE OF CONTENTS  
LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................................... ix 
LIST OF FIGURES .........................................................................................................................x 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................12 
Background of the Study .............................................................................................................. 16 
Problem Statement ........................................................................................................................ 17 
Purpose of the Dissertation Study ................................................................................................. 18 
Significance of the Study .............................................................................................................. 19 
Nature of the Study ....................................................................................................................... 19 
Hypotheses/Research Questions ................................................................................................... 21 
Research Method .......................................................................................................................... 21 
Conceptual or Theoretical Framework ......................................................................................... 22 
Definitions of terms Acronyms and Abbreviations  ..................................................................... 28 
Assumptions .................................................................................................................................. 30 
Scope ............................................................................................................................................. 30 
Limitations .................................................................................................................................... 31 
Delimitations ................................................................................................................................. 31 
Chapter Summary ......................................................................................................................... 32 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW .......................................................................................33 
Status of UAS Integration into Commercial Airspace .................................................................. 34 
Concept of Operations for Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Traffic Management ..................... 37 
Federal Aviation Administration Evolution of Regulations for UAS in Commercial Airspace .. 40 
Government Accountability and Management of Safety Risks for sUAS ................................... 44 
vii 
 
Civil Applications of Unmanned Aerial vehicles ......................................................................... 47 
Medical ...................................................................................................................................... 48 
Commercial Delivery ................................................................................................................ 49 
Need for Current Analysis of Accidents and Incidents to Include FAA Sightings Reports ..... 56 
Cyber Threat from Drones ............................................................................................................ 57 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 60 
Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 62 
CHAPTER 3: METHOD ...............................................................................................................64 
Problem Statement ........................................................................................................................ 64 
Purpose of the Dissertation Study ................................................................................................. 65 
Research Questions ....................................................................................................................... 65 
Research Design............................................................................................................................ 66 
Research Method and Design Appropriateness ............................................................................ 67 
Population, Sampling, and Data Collection Procedures and Rationale ........................................ 68 
Population Sampling ................................................................................................................. 68 
Data Collection and Instrumentation ......................................................................................... 68 
Procedures ................................................................................................................................. 70 
Reliability and Validity ................................................................................................................. 73 
Data Analysis ................................................................................................................................ 75 
Ethical Considerations ................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 
Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 75 
CHAPTER 4: RESULTS ...............................................................................................................77 
Pilot Study ..................................................................................................................................... 78 
viii 
 
Results of Analysis of Reports ...................................................................................................... 80 
Aviation Safety Reporting System ............................................................................................ 80 
FAA UAS Sightings Reports .................................................................................................... 89 
Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 101 
CHAPTER 5: Findings and recommendations ............................................................................103 
Limitations .................................................................................................................................. 105 
Findings and Interpretations ....................................................................................................... 106 
Central Critical Research Question ......................................................................................... 107 
Study Taxonomy ......................................................................................................................... 113 
Recommendations ....................................................................................................................... 115 
Regulation Changes for sUAS Operations .............................................................................. 117 
Risk Management through Safety Management Systems (SMM) .......................................... 124 
Expanded Training to include UAS Human Factor/Air Traffic Situations for Controllers .... 126 
Expanded Taxonomy research with SHELL, SCM and Other Methodologies ...................... 126 
Public Positive Perception and We are all One Sky ................................................................ 128 
Emerging Technologies for sUAS .......................................................................................... 128 
Cyber Security ......................................................................................................................... 133 
Recommendations for Future Research ...................................................................................... 134 
Original Contribution to Knowledge .......................................................................................... 135 
Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 136 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................138 
APPENDIX A: ASRS NASA Report forms……………………………………………………151 
APPENDIX B:  ASRS NASA REPORT FEBRUARY 2019 .....................................................160 
ix 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1  Selected UAS Sightings from Government Agencies 2013-2017 .................................. 46 
Table 2 FAA Incremental Approach for developing a regulatory Framework for sUAS ............ 47 




LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1. Airspace classification (FAA Safety, n.d.). ................................................................... 23 
Figure 2.  Airspace classification (FAA, n.d.). ............................................................................. 23 
Figure 3.  Air space guidance for small UAS operators (FAA n.d.). ............................................ 24 
Figure 4.  UAS use (GAO 18-110, n.d.). ...................................................................................... 24 
Figure 5.  The Swiss cheese model (SCM) of human causation.  Adapted from Reason (1990). 26 
Figure 6.  SHELL model by Hawkins (1987) featuring the liveware-centered interface. ............ 26 
Figure 7.  The SHELL model 2017 adopted for the computer-automation/information of the 
STARS TRACON. ........................................................................................................................ 27 
Figure 8.  Tower controller human factors SHELL analysis based on the model by Hawkins 
(1987) but modified to depict the liveware-liveware team interface (2019). ............................... 27 
Figure 9.  Conceptual framework for critique of identified air traffic control human factors that 
could be preventing safe integration of unmanned aerial vehicles into the National Airspace 
System. .......................................................................................................................................... 28 
Figure 10.  Future NAS UAS operations (FAA, The Future of the NAS, 2016). ........................ 35 
Figure 11.  Projected UAS growth. ............................................................................................... 38 
Figure 12.  UTM operations in context of airspace classes (FAA, 2020e). .................................. 39 
Figure 13. Person reporting........................................................................................................... 83 
Figure 14. Person reporting........................................................................................................... 84 
Figure 15. Altitude of UAS. .......................................................................................................... 84 
Figure 16. Conflict report. ............................................................................................................ 87 
Figure 17. Most often reported HF involved. ............................................................................... 88 
Figure 18. All human factors cited. .............................................................................................. 88 
xi 
 
Figure 19. The FAA registrations of recreational and commercial sUAS as of October 31, 2017  
(GAO, 18-110). ............................................................................................................................. 92 
Figure 20. FAA UAS U.S. sightings............................................................................................. 93 
Figure 21. FAA UAS USA top ten states. .................................................................................... 93 
Figure 22. UAS 2014 sightings by California cities. .................................................................... 94 
Figure 23. UAS 2014 sightings, average number by California cities. ........................................ 94 
Figure 24. Texas UAS sightings FYQ1 2021. .............................................................................. 95 
Figure 25.  Size comparison of Texas compared to California. .................................................... 95 
Figure 26. FAA UAS U.S. sightings FY2020Q4.......................................................................... 96 
Figure 27. FAA UAS U.S. top ten sightings FY2020Q4.............................................................. 96 
Figure 28. Top ten UAS U.S. sightings FY2020Q4. .................................................................... 97 
Figure 29. UAS Texas Sightings FY2020Q4. .............................................................................. 98 
Figure 30. UAS Florida sighting FY2020Q4. ............................................................................... 98 
Figure 31. NASA concept of UTM (GAO 18-110, 2018) .......................................................... 120 
Figure 32. National UTM architecture (FAA, 2020e). ............................................................... 121 
Figure 33. Operational context of UTM services (FAA, 2020e). ............................................... 122 
Figure 34. FAA SMS components (UAST, 2020). ..................................................................... 125 
Figure 35. The STRIDE threat taxonomy. .................................................................................. 127 






CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) interest and use has been growing, and the Federal 
Aviation Admiration’s (FAA) aerospace forecast for fiscal years 2020-2040 sees a continued 
robust growth.  They also stated, “A UAS consists of an unmanned aircraft platform and its 
associated elements, including communication links, sensors, software and power supply that are 
required for safe and efficient operation in the National Airspace System (NAS)” (Federal 
Aviation Administration, 2020, p. 41).  The small model UAS/recreation fleet is growing.  It was 
at 1.32 million UAS in 2019 and is expected to be about 2.5 million by 2024 with an average 
growth rate of about 2%.  The non-model commercial rate of growth over a five-year period is 
expected to be about 17%.  Additionally, the number of remote pilots is expected to grow by 
almost 20% in five years (“FAA Fact Sheet,” 2020).  This growth means safety and security 
policies and procedures must keep up with the growth. 
UAS have been represented by the terms “drones,” “unmanned aerial vehicles” (UAV), 
remotely piloted aircraft systems” (RPAS) and small UAS (sUAS) that will all be used 
interchangeably in this research.  Additionally, the current COVID-19 pandemic accelerated the 
use of many types of operations outside of the military including drones, and the fast-paced 
changes in regulation and use are noteworthy.  Some of these areas include delivery of goods 
(both medical and non-medical), search and rescue, agriculture, and hobbyist activities 
(Simonsen, Hartung, Brejndal-Hansen, Sorensen, Sylvester-Hvid, and Klein, 2019).  UNICEF 
believes that drones could be used medically and confirm that drones have been used in 18 
countries for delivery and transportation purposes during the COVID-19 pandemic (United 
Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund, 2020).  This growth in use of drones for many 




in many areas of aviation.  Manufacturers worldwide can offer diversity in UAS platforms due to 
significant increases in research and innovation in technologies in the field (Simonsen et al. 
(2019).     
  Current literature recognizes this growth in numerous areas and places a strong emphasis 
on safe integration into the FAA airspace.  Safe integration must consider human factors (HF) 
especially as they relate to air traffic controllers. The Unmanned Aircraft Safety Team (UAST), 
which is using a collaborated approach between government and industry to ensure safe 
operations recommends using a safety management systems (SMS) approach in UAS operations 
integration. (Unmanned Aircraft Safety Systems, 2019).  The UAST   support of collaboration 
has focus on the SMS four components, and the fact that SMS is a part of an established global 
program for safety in the NAS.  It is also a structured method for individuals and organizations to 
make sound safety risk management decisions (UAST, 2020). 
Additionally, Cardosi and Lennertz (2017), in their Department of Transportation and 
Federal Aviation Administration report, discuss that for successful integration of unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAV)’s or unmanned aircraft systems (UAS)’s in the National Airspace System 
(NAS), the identification of UAV/UAS/drone HF risks must be identified and mitigated.  Their 
study identified risks brought forward in examining data from the Aviation Safety Reporting 
System (ASRS) by controllers, pilots, and operators of UAVs.  Their research also identified 
some recommendations and next steps for continued safe operation in the NAS (2017).  Once the 
data gathered in this research were analyzed, the recommendations were evaluated, and 
additional recommendations were made to ensure the NAS has safety and security as high 
priorities in the incorporation of UAS in the NAS.  This growth in numbers of UAS in the NAS 




class aircraft.  These UAVs were allowed to operate routinely in the NAS, thus increasing the 
impact to air traffic control (ATC; Kamienski & Semanek, 2015).  Currently there are many 
more applications of drone use in the air transportation industry. 
The FAA defines HFs as: 
Multidisciplinary effort to generate and compile information about human capabilities 
and limitations and apply that information to equipment, systems, facilities, procedures, 
jobs, environments, training, staffing, and personnel management for safe, comfortable, 
and effective human performance. (FAA, 2005a, p. 2)  
The FAA started the policy and accountability for integrating and harmonizing HF 
considerations in the FAA in 1993.  This was done to improve aviation safety, efficiency, and 
productivity (FAA Order 9550.8, 1993).  The FAA also promotes the “Dirty Dozen” by stressing 
safety first to minimize the 12 common causes of mistakes in the aviation workplace.  The 12 
elements were a concept developed by Gordon Dupont in 1993 while he was working for 
transport Canada.  They include but are not limited to lack of communication, fatigue, stress, 
distractions, and lack of resources (Civil Aviation Authority, 2002).   
Human Factors for Air Traffic Control Specialist: A User’s Manual for Your Brain was 
sponsored in part by the Air Traffic Control Association (ATCA) and developed by the FAA US 
Department of Transportation in 1999.  It was developed by Dr. Cardosi and a team.  Dr. Cardosi 
and the team presented the findings of HF research useful to air traffic controllers in a concise 
and easy-to-read format.  The topics included were: “controller-pilot voice communication, 
memory, fatigue and the effects of stress on information processing” (FAA, 1999, p. ii.).  The 
user’s manual was provided to support controllers in reducing the likelihood of mistakes in 




recalling specific information and recognizing symptoms of stress that could affect operational 
performance, and how to lower fatigue (p. ii). 
Cardosi and Lennertz (2017), in their study on HF complications for Air traffic Control 
(ATC) and drone use, stressed the importance of continued research to alleviate risks connected 
with the HF issues identified.  They analyzed accidents and incidents to identify causes of 
mistakes in UAV operations and to help develop risk mitigation strategies.  They also suggested 
that in addition to mining the ASRS, that there is the possibility to include data from the 
Mandatory Occurrence Report (MOR) and the Air Traffic Safety Action Program (ATSAP) for 
additional risk mitigation (Cardosi and Lennertz 2017; FAA, 2012).  The ATSAP program may 
need further review as it may now fall under the Air Traffic Organization Occurrence Reporting 
(FAA, 2020 b).  ASRS gives exceptional insight from the HF perspective.  More will be 
discussed in the review of literature on current HF issues. 
In addition to the HF issues that are at the forefront of drone incorporation, there are 
issues in cybersecurity, privacy, and public safety as drones take on more major roles in 
connecting cities through delivering of goods and services.  It is imperative that as literature is 
reviewed there is a search for threats from malicious entities that desire to conduct physical or 
cyberattacks to see if some solutions to the HFs associated with drone incorporation could also 
be applied to cyber threats.  An example would be drones’ dependency on global positioning 
satellites (GPS) and the possibility of GPS spoofing that may result in loss of control of a drone 
or distraction to ATC (Vattapparambam, Guvenc, Yurekli, Akkaya, & Uluagac, 2016).  
Vattapparambam et al. explained ways they observed drones being compromised.  One is 
through WIFI, and drones could be hijacked because there is no required encryption on the 




compromise using GPS equipment in spoofing attacks.  These could all complicate 
communications between drone operators and ATC (2016).  Though not the focus of this 
dissertation the research on cyber implications in the HF area of drone integration in the NAS 
was reviewed during the literature review. 
Background of the Study  
Until recently, and in most of the 2017, Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) reported that UAS 
HF data is available on the UAS that are operated by the military in a military operations area 
(MOA).  These MOAs areas are established outside of Class A airspace and communicate with 
ATC (Cardosi &Lennertz, 2017).  The other type of UAVs in use weigh less than 55 pounds, are 
limited to 400 feet and below, and require UAV operators to maintain a visual contact with their 
UAV (Holcombe, 2016).  The smaller UAVs are monitored and regulated by the FAA, and 
currently there are approximately 900,000 drones registered with about 380,000 being 
commercial and 500,000 being civilian.  Additionally, there are around 220,000 certified remote 
pilots through the FAA program (FAA, 2021a).  The numbers are increasing and have increased 
rapidly the last two years.  The FAA has kept public records of UAS sightings since 2014, and 
the reports of UAS sightings from law enforcement, citizens, and pilots have increased 
substantially in the past few years (“FAA UAS sighting by the numbers,” 2021).  These reports, 
from observers to the FAA, are where citizens may report drones operating around airplanes, 
helicopters, and airports which is both dangerous and illegal.  In the first report, from November 
of 2014 to August of 2015, there were about 750 sightings (“FAA UAS sighting by the 
numbers,” 2021).  In the most current 10-month period there were about 1400 sightings (FAA 
UAS events Jan-Mar 2020, Apr-Jun 2020, Jul-Sep 2020, and Oct-Dec 2020) or almost double in 




  The use of sUAS in the NAS brings operational challenges; however, the possibilities 
they bring to the air transportation industry growth are vast and should provide incentive to 
figure out ways to mitigate the risk.  These opportunities require further investigation in small 
UAS (sUAS) use.  The various functions and uses include aerial photography, recreational flying 
for individual use, commercial package deliveries including medical supplies, and search and 
rescue operations following natural disasters or criminalities (FAA, 2020). 
It is imperative to focus on the implications of the growth of UAV operations in the NAS 
for controllers, pilots, and UAV operators and the associated technologies, integration, 
procedures, and other issues to mitigate risk and ensure safe integration.  Both Cardosi and 
Lennertz (2017) and Kamienski and Semanek (2015) agree that risks need further assessment 
and mitigation, with changes in procedures and policies for the successful inevitable integration.  
It is also crucial when looking at the pilots' and UAV operators' input to remain focused in this 
study on the ATC perspective as the airspace is managed by the controller.  Previous studies 
have focused on both the UAVs’ operator and the machine but not from the ATC perspective, so 
there is a gap in the knowledge of ATC involvement.  ATC and air traffic management (ATM) 
are a complex socio-technical system, and better awareness of HF is critical for risk assessment 
and mitigation protocols that could identify easy-to-use HF tools for ATC and ATM UAV 
incorporation (Teperi, Leppanen, & Norros, 2014).  
Problem Statement  
Though HF associated with UAS operations come in an assortment of characteristics, 
they are inadequately represented in literature that focuses on the perspective of air traffic and 
pilot HF perspective. This may impact the safe integration during the growth of sUAS in the 




commercial use in the NAS, and they are expected to be sources of expansion in the aerospace 
industry (Stark, Coopmans, & Chen, 2012).  As the number of UAVs in controlled airspace 
increases, situations have appeared where UAVs have clashed with air traffic and caused concern 
for air traffic safety, efficiency, and workload in ATM (Vengal 2011).  Though HF associated 
with UAV operations come in an assortment of characteristics, they are inadequately represented 
in literature, focusing on the controller and air traffic management.  Those that have been 
identified need to be critiqued to ensure they are accurate.  Additionally, there is a need to do a 
risk assessment and the interconnections of the humans-in-the-loop (HITL) components 
identified.  HITL is part of the SHELL model that analyses the human interaction with the other 
components of the SHELL (Hawkins, 1987). This research will recommend next steps or 
protocal that could be researched or identified and tested to ensure air traffic controllers maintain 
safe operations in the NAS of UAVs with other air traffic. 
Purpose of the Dissertation Study  
UAVs is a recent phenomenon in ATM.  Truitt, Zingale, and Konkel (2016) 
demonstrated the significance of mitigating risk so that UAVs’ access to the national air space is 
completed safely and expeditiously.  This dissertation assessed some of the current and future 
challenges in incorporating UAVs in the NAS in a safe manner.  Examination of UAV accidents 
and incidents obtained from the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) and the FAA 
Quarterly Sightings reports, for risk assessment and human-machine interface, can provide 
protocol to test for safe incorporation of UAVs into the NAS.  The results will have a meaningful 




Significance of the Study  
Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) publicized the number of military UAV operations currently 
taking place within the military; there are identifiable HF issues that need risk analysis for 
mitigation purposes.  Stark et al. (2012) pointed out that the HFs between the controllers and the 
UAS have largely gone unresearched and that for safe integration both the individual aspects and 
the interconnection between the human and the UAS must be studied for risk mitigation.  These 
mitigation protocols would improve safety not only in airspace operated by military drones but 
also in all other drone operations in controlled and uncontrolled airspace.  This research can have 
substantial positive influences on UAVs' safe integration in the NAS and could build trust 
between users, regulators, and the public in general. 
UAV incorporation in the NAS is foreseeable, and regulations are changing at a quicker 
pace than in the past.  UAV are becoming an essential part of the infrastructure in the 
communities in which they are employed for many businesses or emergency operations.  Safe 
incorporation of solutions associated with UAVs must stay at the forefront of research.  This 
analysis and dissertation can position UAV incorporation in airspace safely and aid in the air 
transportation industry's growth.   
Nature of the Study  
To ensure safe and secure integration of drones in commercial airspace, specifically the 
HF aspect between the controller HITL and the UAS, a quantitative research study was 
conducted as it focuses on computing the assortment and examination of data (Harkiolakis, 
2020).  A quantitative study is most appropriate because it permits the researcher to present 
analysis based on implications resulting from data in numerical form, such as durations and 




and incidents.  A quantitative study is most appropriate because its intent is to examine 
interactions between variables by quantifying, comparing, and using numerical data (McCusker 
& Gunaydin, 2015).  HF risks to air traffic controllers as they apply to integration of sUAS in the 
NAS were studied.  Also studied were the effects as they apply to HFs in the different types of 
use of sUAS and the different scenarios in incidents as collected from reports.  Consideration 
was taken that there are gaps in the literature as the use of sUAS is relatively new and evolving 
at a rapid pace.  Because of the situation and having few studies to build on, the research design 
was explorative in nature.  However, HFs in aviation have been studied in detail over the last 50 
years.  The literature shows that it has often been studied more from a pilot perspective than from 
the air traffic controller.  In addition, the sUAS use is relatively new so there are gaps in the 
research that focuses on HF and other risks associated with incorporation of the sUAS in the 
NAS.  
This study explored air traffic controllers’ involvement in air traffic management of 
sUAS in NAS as it relates to HFs. HFs may have different meanings for air traffic control in the 
relationship of drone control and the mitigating risks associated with drone ATC as there are still 
technologies and processes that are not understood. This is due to the short history of use of 
drones in commercial roles and the associated research. 
  The quantitative method that investigates HFs between the controller and the UAS for 
integration in the NAS are evaluated further in Chapter 3.  Understanding these HFs should 




Hypotheses/Research Questions  
To achieve its purpose, this study’s central critical research question is: How can negative 
consequences of integration in commercial airspace between UAS and ATM systems be reduced, 
so that when incidents happen situational awareness (SA), and HF risks are negligeable?  
Supporting sub questions were also developed and are as follows:  
1. What protocols could be identified to ensure air traffic controllers develop metrics for 
cognitive workload, SA, and other HFs to ensure safe operations in the NAS of UAVs 
with other air traffic? 
2. What needs to be done to mitigate HF issues using risk management and safety 
management processes within the new operations of UAS in NAS? 
3. What are the factors that influence the safe implementation of UAS integration in the 
NAS?  
4. In what ways could the perception with the public be improved to increase support of 
integration of UAS in the NAS? 
5. What technology investments can be made for communication and airspace 
management for safe operations of UAS within the NAS?  
6. What action can be taken on the regulatory challenges for safe and efficient UAS 
operation in the NAS? 
Research Method 
  Data from the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) NASA 2019 report and the 
FAA UAS Quarterly sightings reports were collected and analyzed.  This research emphasized 
utilizing the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), grounded in Reason's 




SHELL model as adapted for the computer-automation of radar equipment by Miller in 2019.  
This before mentioned research will assist in the current risk analysis, mitigation, and 
identification of proposed protocols of the associated HFs identified to understand sUAS 
integration. 
Conceptual or Theoretical Framework  
A conceptual framework was developed to examine sUAS integration thoroughly and 
safely in the NAS.  The framework of the research uses data retrieved from ASRS NASA 2019 
report modeled after work done by Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) and data retrieved from FAA 
UAS quarterly sightings reports.  The analysis also focused on SHELL and Swiss cheese 
research models.  The first model of use was done with HFACS, from Reasons’s (2000) SCM 
(Stark et al., 2012).  The second one came from Miller, Holley, Mrusek, and Weiland’s (2019, 
2020) adaptation of Hawkins’s (1987) SHELL model modified to include live-ware-Liveware-
Liveware team and computer-automation HITL.  
The FAA (2019) in the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) divides the airspace into 
two categories: (a) regulatory, which includes Classes A, B, C, D, and E airspace; and (b) 
restricted and prohibited areas.  The other category is non-regulatory, including military 
operations, warning areas, alert areas, and controlled firing areas (FAA, 2019).  Additionally, the 
FAA, National Aeronautics and Space Association (NASA), and the Government Accounting 
Authority have depicted UAV integration issues.  Figures 1-4 depict the NAS classification, 





                                                   Figure 1.  Airspace Classification (FAA Safety n.d.) 
 
Figure 2.  Airspace classification (FAA, n.d.). 
 




Figure 3.  Air space guidance for small UAS operators (FAA n.d.). 
 
Figure 4.  UAS use (GAO 18-110, n.d.). 
 
Elements of the Framework.  There are numerous approaches to analyzing accidents and 
incidents in the NAS.  The HF indicated in UAV incidents have various characteristics and seem 
to have been inadequately demonstrated in the literature (Stark et al., 2012).  The data from the 
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) by controllers, pilots, and operators of UAVs can be 
used in conjunction with the data from HFACS.  HFACS was intended to aid accident reporting 
systems such as ASRS.  It is intended to provide a data-driven plan for labeling fundamental HFs 
to lead to developments in training and mediation programs.  It uses the Swiss cheese approach 
to classify faults, which, in turn, allows investigators to classify four different levels of factor 
breakdowns that led to the final incident (Stark et al., 2012).  
Figure 5 depicts the SCM.  Though the HFACS is sufficient for classifying many of the 
HFs, it neglects the HFs when interacting with the newer automation in the use of UAVs.  The 
software, hardware, environment, liveware, liveware (SHELL) model, developed by Hawkins 




Document 9859 Safety Management Manual, is a concrete mechanism used to evaluate the 
interface of multiple system sections (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2017).  For 
example, a software item could be an automated Automatic Terminal Information Service 
(ATIS) or an approach plate.  Hardware is the ATM equipment or the UAV.  An environment 
element would be workspace conditions, and liveware to liveware would be the actors and their 
interactions between the controllers, UAV operators, and pilots of crewed aircraft (ICAO, 2017; 
Singh, 2012).  A significant focus of the SHELL model is the human at the forefront and 
understanding that the human is the least predictable and most vulnerable to internal and external 
influences.  Hawkins (1987) was researched and further developed in both “Assessing cognitive 
processing and Human Factors challenges in NextGen air traffic control tower team operations” 
and A Change in the Dark Room: The Effects of Human Factors and Cognitive Loading Issues 
for NextGen TRACON Air Traffic Controllers (Miller et al., 2019, 2020). These concepts, as 
displayed in Figures 7 and 8, could be adapted for this research. 
Figure 9 shows the flow of the conceptual framework.  It is a four-step procedure.  Going 
clockwise, the first step is data mining from the ASRS database, and the FAA UAS sightings 
reports relevant to UAV accidents and incidents.  Step two utilizes the HFACS and the SCM for 
risk assessment, and from there, step three employs principles of the SHELL to ensure all 
components were gathered and validated.  These steps should lead to step four, which identifies 





Figure 5.  The Swiss cheese model (SCM) of human causation.  Adapted from Reason (1987). 
 
 









Figure 8.  Tower controller human factors SHELL analysis based on the model by Hawkins 






Figure 9.  Conceptual framework for critique of identified air traffic control human factors that 
could be preventing safe integration of unmanned aerial vehicles into the National Airspace 
System. 
 
Definitions of terms Acronyms and Abbreviations  
AIM - Airman Information Manual 
ARTCC - Air Route Traffic Control Center  
ATC - Air Traffic Control 
ATM - Air Traffic Management  
ATSAP - Air Traffic Safety Action Plan 
ASRS - Aviation Safety Reporting System 
BLVOS - Beyond visual line of sight 
DAA - Detect and Avoid 
EASA - European Aviation Safety Agency  




FAR - Federal Aviation Regulation 
HFACS - Human Factor Analysis and Classification 
HF - Human factors 
IFR - Instrument Flight Rules 
IATA - International Air Transportation Association 
ICAO - International Civil Aviation Organization  
MOA - Military Operations Area 
MOR - Mandatory Occurrence Report 
NAS - National Airspace System 
NMAC - Near Mid-Air Collision 
SA - Situational Awareness 
SCM - Swiss Cheese Model  
SMS - Safety Management System 
SHELL - Software, hardware, environment, liveware, liveware 
sUAS - Small Unmanned Aircraft System 
TCAS - Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System 
UAS - Unmanned Aircraft System 
UAV - Unmanned aerial vehicle 
UAST - Unmanned Aircraft Safety Team 
UTM - Unmanned traffic management 
VLOS - Visual line of sight 






Wargo (2015) discussed the importance of knowing what an assumption is when applied 
to research and used the Dictionary of Statistics and Methodology Vogt’s definition of 
assumption as “(a) A statement that is presumed to be true, often only temporarily or for a 
specific purpose, such as building a theory; (b) The conditions under which statistical techniques 
yield valid results” (p. 3).  
The first assumption of this research was that the ASRS report filers were honest in their 
reports and that they did the reporting with the intent to ensure safe integration of drones in 
commercial airspace.  The second assumption was that using the ASRS data, and the FAA UAS 
quarterly sightings reports would assist in answering the critical research question: “How can 
negative consequences of integration in commercial airspace between UAS and ATM systems be 
reduced, so that when incidents happen SA and HF risks are negligeable?”  The third assumption 
is that the data obtained would be adequate to answer the sub questions that would ensure 
reduction in human errors and give a better understanding of HFs in the integration of drones in 
commercial airspace.  
Scope 
The scope was mainly on the interaction between the HITL (the air traffic controller) and 
the machine (sUAS) and the associated HFs for safe integration of sUAS in commercial airspace 
in the U.S.  It must take into consideration the other aspects of the SHELL and SCM to ensure 
this safe integration.  The literature review includes research documents that incorporate, history, 
regulations, types of commercial use of drones, HFs, and security. The scope will analyze for 
identification of items that are linked to cybersecurity as it applies to air traffic controllers HF 




individual, machine, and interconnection for identification of HF risks with sUAS integration.  
The intent of the research was to have better awareness of HF tools for ATC and ATM UAV 
incorporation.  This analysis identified protocols to be tested to ensure ATC develops metrics for 
cognitive workload, SA, complacency, and other HFs. 
Limitations  
Wargo (2015) also focused on the importance of knowing research limitations and 
referred to Roberts (as cited in Wargo, 2015), who stated, “Limitations are usually areas over 
which you have no control. Some typical limitations are sample size, methodology constraints, 
length of the study, and response rate” (p. 15).  The first limitation for this research was that both 
the ASRS and FAA sightings are not required to be submitted by law so they may be 
inconclusive.  The second limitation was that the submitted reports may not have knowledge that 
can be analyzed from a cybersecurity or HF perspective.  The third limitation was that most 
reports were submitted from incidents that were close to airports, so they might not represent the 
entire picture of drone flights.  The fourth limitation was that at the time of this research laws 
were changing, thus the picture is only a snapshot in time, and continuous analysis and 
assessment are needed. 
Delimitations  
Theofanidis and Fountouki (2018) stated that delimitations require motivating the 
conventions of the researcher and are set by the researcher.  The idea is that when the researcher 
sets boundaries, the researcher is also able to achieve the objectives of the research.  
Delimitations are primarily focused on the research framework, questions, background, and 
items of that research.  In other words, delimitations are neither negative nor positive but rather 




was proven reports from the U.S. government that were used in the past to gather information for 
safe and secure integration of drones in commercial airspace were used as they are reliable and 
valid.  The second delimitation used standard methods to assess and analyze HFs such as the 
SHELL and Swiss cheese models to evaluate HFs in drone use.  The identified protocols should 
be researched further and tested to ensure air traffic controllers develop a method for ideal 
cognitive workload as it relates to HITL, thus ensuring safe operations in the NAS of drones with 
other air traffic.    
Chapter Summary  
Chapter 1 presented an overview of the complications of integration of sUAS in 
commercial airspace.  It included a high-level overview, the background and significance of the 
problem, research questions, conceptual framework, and the related constructs in the scope of the 
study.  Chapter 2 contains the literature review.  Chapter 3 describes the quantitative research 
approach that was used to collect information and includes data analysis and validity.  Chapter 4 






CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The purpose of this chapter is to review the pertinent literature which delineates the 
crucial concepts applicable to the implications to air traffic controllers when incorporating UAS 
in the NAS.  The review will deliver these fundamental concepts from existing research and will 
present an overview of principles and current literature in different areas of drone use in the 
NAS.  It is important to understand the HFs, potential for human error, cyber threats, and other 
risks associated with the growth of drone operations in the NAS for controllers, pilots, and drone 
operators.  It is also important to review literature on the uses of drones and the associated 
technologies, policies, and procedures to mitigate risk and ensure safe integration.  It is also 
important to note that this literature review will focus on the air traffic controller when possible.  
Currently, there seems to be a lack of research available to assist the air traffic controller from 
the HF perspective in the requirements to integrate drones for commercial use in the NAS.  
There is literature available for larger drone use at higher altitudes, and it is hoped that this 
literature can lend insight into further incorporation.  Once the current situation of drone usage or 
desired usage is discussed, a review of UAV reported sightings from the FAA ASRS UAV 
database report (National Aeronautics and Space administration [NASA], 2019) will be 
discussed, and the importance of further analysis of these reports will be defined. 
  The literature review conducted also focused on using keywords that pertain to drones, 
HFs, air traffic control, and airspace.  Review of regulations, policies, journal articles, 
organizations, history, and current findings in areas of drone operations were conducted.  
Literature in these areas will be discussed on risk in operations including overflight of 




situations in the U.S. in civil applications include healthcare, environmental management, 
agriculture, and commercial delivery. Public perception will also be discussed.   
Policies, procedures, and regulations that focus on the modernization of U.S. airspace that 
is called “The Next Generation Air Transportation System or NextGen” include the integration 
on NextGen in the ATM system.  Additionally, technology challenges will be reviewed 
including information on the UAS being able to take off, fly the programmed route, and land at 
the destination as planned.  Discussion will include detect and avoid (DAA) concepts, VLOS and 
BVLOS, and emergencies.  HFs, SMS for UAS, pilot and controller challenges will also be 
reviewed. 
Status of UAS Integration into Commercial Airspace 
 In 2016, the FAA with the Department of transportation (DoT) in the report, The Future 
of the NAS, stressed the importance of periodic updates as they checked the integration of 
NextGen concepts to ensure they were remaining on track for milestones.  They also stressed that 
it was important to remain adaptable for change and be able to accommodate new entrants such 
as unmanned aircraft to ensure there was a transparent, sustainable, agile, and resilient NAS 
(FAA, 2016).  The demand for admittance to the NAS by UAS has grown at an accelerating rate, 
and the FAA must work towards alleviating the challenges to find affordable and safe ways to 
integrate new entrants.  The FAA is working with stakeholders including NASA to find a safe 
and efficient way for integration that has a small impact on other users.  In addition, this 
expansion of users involved defining the automation support, as well as the surveillance, 
communication, and navigation capabilities that go together with the performance of UAS.  A 
focus must be placed on providing clear separation of responsibilities (FAA, 2016).  Though this 




integration would be needed in controlled and uncontrolled airspace.  One area that has unique 
requirements is the DAA capability for maintaining separation from other aircraft.  This area is 
in the forefront as the number of registered UAS operators continues to increase at a rapid pace.  
Future operations show a large range of maneuvers that will have to be dealt with using 
appropriate ATC procedures and policies.  Figure 10 gives a few examples of operations that will 
need to be accommodated.  Interestingly, Figure 10 displays only a few items and in just 2020 
with COVID, the delivery of medical supplies and e-commerce items have shown how much 
more UAS’s safe integration is needed. 
 
Figure 10.  Future NAS UAS operations (FAA, The Future of the NAS, 2016). 
 In 2015, the Air Line Pilot Association (ALPA) identified some of the challenges for safe 
integration of UAS into the civil airspace.  Though the use of drones goes back over 50 years, 
until recently these machines were very expensive and were limited to government and research 
organizations.  Technology has improved at such a rapid rate in the last decade that the improved 
performance and lower cost have led to rapid increase in use by both the military and civilian 




regulations; however, these regulations are still lagging and need further updating (Air Line Pilot 
Association, 2015).  One of the largest remaining concerns is the ability to use the drones in a 
way that does not negatively impact the superb aviation safety record in place.  A challenge to 
the incorporation is the multiple aircraft designs, diverse applications, and the pilots’ varied 
levels of training.  Though the technology must be evaluated, it needs to be done expeditiously 
and in an encompassing way for a smooth incorporation for use.  The technologies need to be 
reliable and mitigate for the absence of a professionally trained pilot aboard the aircraft.  Many 
of these aircrafts weigh less than the average weight of a pilot (ALPA, 2015). 
 Communications between the operator and ATC must be accomplished with some type of 
link that is safe to transfer data between the aircraft, operator, and air traffic controller.  A plan 
needs to be in place for the safe control of the aircraft so that if these communications are lost 
that does not put anyone or anything in jeopardy. 
 IATA stressed the importance of stakeholder involvement for successful integration in 
the report “We Are All One in the Sky”, by outlining five key principles for a successful 
regulatory framework for UAS operations.  They believe that the safe, secure, and sustainable 
integration of UAS is one of the significant issues in the aviation industry.  With the abundance 
of drone operations and opportunities it is imperative that safety and security are not 
compromised and that current operations have the correct regulations in place for the growth in 
the use of UAS in the NAS.  The EASA initiative has listed five key principles for successful 
integration, and this must ensure all stakeholders are involved.  The regulatory framework must 
look at: 
1. Enabling common airspace SA through information exchange. 




3. Maximizing airspace capacity and value through integration, not segregation. 
4. Maintaining and improving today’s high safety level. 
5. Creating a flexible framework to accommodate an evolving industry.  
Cline, Lercel, Karabiyik, and Dietz (2020) brought to the forefront that there are also 
security risks associated with UAS use due to their simplicity, above average performance, and 
increasing popularity.  They stated that as of 2019 there were over 500 UAS products offered by 
over 250 companies and that without standardization, manufacturing and marketing these 
products may not match operation or performance and may cause further complications in use 
(Cline, Lercel, Karabiyik, & Dietz et al., 2020).  Because these may pose legal implications, it is 
imperative that the C-UAS implementation and policy procedures work closely with public and 
private agencies to ensure that legal definitions are included for UAS to operate safely. 
Concept of Operations for Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Traffic Management 
 The FAA NextGen office developed the Concept of Operations for urban air mobility 
(UAM) in the context of ATM and UAS, which included collaboration with NASA, industry, 
and community stakeholders in 2018.  Successful UTM is crucial to integration and mitigation of 
HF errors.  It is also crucial due to the expected growth in both controlled and uncontrolled 
airspace.  The FAA 2020 Concept of Operations shows a rapid growth in sUAS operations 
starting in 2018 for all types of tasks.  This brings a larger workload to air traffic controllers and 
could cause more HF errors.  Figure 11 depicts the projected growth and is a good visual to use 
to better understand the complexity of drone operations in both controlled and uncontrolled 
airspace.  The FAA estimated the combined recreation and commercial number of drones could 





Figure 11.  Projected UAS growth. 
Due to the rapid growth of operations and because there will be movement between 
controlled and uncontrolled airspace, there needs to be a way to enable safe management of the 
movement with and without ATM. SA between operators and air traffic controllers is imperative 
as is UTM.  The FAA defined UTM as “as the manner in which the FAA will support operations 
for UAS operating in low altitude airspace” (FAA, 2020e, p. xi).  This is done by providing 
services via the FAA regulatory rules and regulations that are either not made or in the infancy of 
development.  Some of these regulations will be discussed in the literature review as they may be 
applicable to HR errors associated with air controllers.  Integration of sUAS is a complex 
cooperative management endeavor in an already complex system of systems as applicable to 
overall ATM.  UTM is optimistic that the collaboration between UAS operators and stakeholders 
will facilitate the support of and demand for a variety of operations with increasing complexity 
(FAA, 2000e).  FAA version 2.0’s focus is not only on the UTM operations at 400 feet above 
(AGL) ground level and below, which usually do not require ATC interaction, but also includes 




E) airspace situations (FAA, 2000e).  Figure 12 shows UTM operations in perspective of 
airspace classes.  This is due to the anticipated growth and opportunities for use of sUAS and has 
a direct impact on air controllers and the possibility of HF errors.  
 
Figure 12.  UTM operations in context of airspace classes (FAA, 2020e). 
The FAA’s current version 2.0 was published and will be discussed for further insight on 
the industry (FAA, 2020e).  It is relevant to this research as it includes case elaboration, 
rulemaking advancements, and the advancement of technology.  All these advancements have 
HF connections to the air traffic controller.  It is also a good document for review and analysis as 
after the data gathered from reports and articles are analyzed, the concept documents may lend 
credibility to the recommendations in HF applications. This may also lead to further research for 
air traffic controllers as they mature in the work with UAS in the NAS as it implements UTM 
with NASA.  
Additionally, version 2 stressed the urgent need to support the security of UAS in the 
NAS as that is a key focus area for Remote ID application (FAA, 2020e).  Remote ID is 




incorporation of UAS in the NAS.  I believe it is applicable to both safety and security and may 
assist in mitigating HF errors.  The FAA is also expanding concepts to incorporate operational 
scenarios with more complexity.  This is important as there has been great pressure from 
stakeholders to find ways to operate drones beyond BVLOS in denser airspace (FAA, 2000e).  
These complex operations will be in both controlled and uncontrolled airspace and have HF error 
implications for the air controller, especially increased workload, and they are areas where SA 
may be lost (Yaacoub, Hassan, Salman, & Chehab, 2020).   
As the number of drones used increases due to demand and multi-purpose functions, the 
malicious usage of drones by criminals and hackers may increase, and the need for detective, 
protective, and preventive measures may be required. Thus, there need to be ways to analyze 
vulnerabilities and mitigate them (FAA, 2020e & Yaacoub et al., 2020). 
Federal Aviation Administration Evolution of Regulations for UAS in Commercial 
Airspace 
 
 The road to legislation and incorporation has been long and complicated.  The first 
federal policy governing UAS was published in September 2005, entitled Federal Aviation 
Administration memorandum AFS-4000 UAS policy 05-01.  This policy was interim and basic 
for clarification by the FAA.  It was the first attempt at policymaking for operations of UAS in 
the NAS.  It included airworthiness certification and other safety and security provisions (FAA, 
2005b).  It was followed up with a more detailed policy under 14 Code of Federal regulations 
(CFR) Part 91.  This added clarification on the difference between hobby and sport recreational 
use of UAS in the NAS (FAA, 2007).  
It took an additional five years for more legislation to be passed, and in 2012 the FAA 
Modernization and Reform Act was signed into law.  This public law called for the integration of 




unmanned systems, safety studies, and specific rules for model aircraft with recommended 
completion dates.  Requirements and roadmaps were supposed to be developed to allow safe 
integration of UAS into the NAS by September of 2015 (FAA Modernization and Reform Act, 
2012).  Many of these dates have not been met as of spring of 2021.  However, in 2020, the FAA 
has released its third edition of Integration of Civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the 
National Airspace System (NAS) Roadmap.  The FAA acknowledged that the safe incorporation 
is complicated but that they have also made significant strides in developing standards, policies, 
and operational procedures.  Of significant note are the following accomplishments showing that 
there has been forward movement to bring UAS operations to the NAS. 
1. Establishing full FAA authority over all UAS operating in the NAS through 2019 
2. FAA Reauthorization Act, in which 50 UAS-related provisions were outlined  
3. Expanding automation for how drone users get near real-time permission to fly in 
controlled airspace through the Low Altitude Authorization and Notification 
Capability (LAANC)  
The FAA in a short period of time granted more than 65,000 waivers and exemptions to allow 
more drone fliers to complete advanced operations (FAA, 2020c). 
In 2016, the FAA, under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 107 titled Operation and 
Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, formalized the work in a framework that 
outlines the requirements for the operation of UAS in the NAS.  It is for sUAS that weigh under 
55 pounds and remain in the VLOS of the visual observer to fly for non-hobby and non-
recreational operations (Operation and Certification of Small Aircraft Systems, 2016).  Part 107 




command certification and responsibilities, aircraft requirements, and model aircraft.  Some of 
the most concerning ones that may cause complications for incorporation include: 
1. UAS VLOS only with the controller or visual observer 
2. VLOS must not use anything other than corrective lenses 
3. UAS may not operate over any person not directly participating in the operation 
4. Daylight only operations or civil twilight if equipped with appropriate anti-collision 
lights 
5. First person view camera does not satisfy see-and-avoid 
6. No person may operate more than one UAS at a time 
7. Aircraft FAA airworthiness certificate is not required (Operation and Certification of 
Small Aircraft Systems, 2016, p. 5).  For further information, Part 107 may be read in 
its entirety. 
The analysis of drone operations beyond the visual line of sight (BVLOS) has received recent 
examination, and a few items are in the process of being changed.  Currently, many countries, 
the U.S. included, have not allowed drones to fly BVLOS as they are concerned with the risk to 
property and the public.  Part 107.31 includes the guidelines that limit a pilot to operating in the 
VLOS.  One may apply for a waiver; however, most waivers have been denied.  Currently Part 
107.31 stated: §107.31   Visual line of sight aircraft operation 
(a) With vision that is unaided by any device other than corrective lenses, the remote pilot 
in command, the visual observer (if one is used), and the person manipulating the flight control 
of the sUAS aircraft system must be able to see the UAS throughout the entire flight to: 
(1) Know the unmanned aircraft's location. 




(3) Observe the airspace for other air traffic or hazards; and 
(4) Determine that the unmanned aircraft does not endanger the life or property of 
another. 
(b) Throughout the entire flight of the small, unmanned aircraft, the ability described in 
paragraph (a) of this section must be exercised by either: 
(1) The remote pilot in command and the person manipulating the flight controls of 
the small, unmanned aircraft system; or 
(2) A visual observer.  (“Visual Line of Sight Aircraft Operations,” 2016 p. 2). 
The FAA continues to be active in the safe incorporation of the UAS.  Recently published 
information and final rules requiring remote identification of drones and some flights over 
people, moving vehicles, and night flying in certain conditions went into effect April 21, 2021 
(FAA, 2021).  This is significant because to fly at night or over people operators no longer 
requires a waiver.  Regulations and policy implementation are moving forward to integrate UAS 
in the NAS; however, they need to be ready for additional risk management with these added 
permissions for drone operators.  This area has been under intense review, and the five-year 
outlook is promising with regulation changes for Remote ID, night operations, and operations 
over people.  Of significance to note is that in 2019 there were over 1200 applications sent in for 
a waiver in the Part 107.31 the majority were denied (Choudhary, 2019; FAA, n.d.c). 
One other area of research and possible changes are requirements in DAA.  This is 
important as it will enable support in BLVOS operations, and this will ensure ecommerce 
movement of routine package delivery that will be discussed more in the civilian use of drones’ 
section.  A consideration that must also be reviewed is the security, privacy, and noise issues 




 Government Accountability and Management of Safety Risks for sUAS 
 There was also a specific interest in past research or pilot studies of UAS incidents 
similar to Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) research using data from NASA on UAS incidents.  The 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) also had done research around the same time as the 
pilot study from Cardosi and Lennertz.  The GAO investigation was done because there have 
been many questions raised by Congress and other organizations about the extent of the safe 
incorporation of drones in the NAS.  Thus, there was also a review of GAO-18-110 report for 
indicators in HF risks, specifically for ATC.  Doing this review would help in understanding the 
status of FAA data collection on drone incidents and interaction in the NAS.  The GAO noted 
that the FAA had been collecting data of safety events involving sUAS since about 2002.  
However, it was noted by GAO that the validity and completeness of the data might be 
questionable (Government Accountability Office, 2018).  The intent was to use reports generated 
by controllers and pilots that were analyzed by NASA and the FAA, knowing ahead of time how 
accurate the reports were assisted in analysis and recommendations.  An example the FAA gave 
to the auditors was that even though the FAA sUAS sightings reports had grown to over 100 a 
month, there was no way for the FAA to verify that there were UAS involved in most of the 
sightings.  This is because most of the sightings are relayed to ATC from manned aircraft, and it 
may be difficult to properly identify the drone due to its size and the fact that small drones do not 
display on radar (GAO, 2018). 
 The GAO found that the FAA did have some safety risk management policies that they 
used, but they were not specific to HF and were not always able to analyze and assess the safety 
risks.  The situation was exasperated because they did not have enough data, and they often 




committee analyzed the information, and this current research started analysis at the point of data 
that the GAO analysis stopped to see if there were any changes.  The GAO items were 
noteworthy and had some use in the current research.  The GAO also had the ability to get 
information from the Department of Defense, Department of Energy, the U.S. Forest service, and 
the U.S. Park police.  This is important because agencies have recorded sUAS flying over 
property, and people and have affected procedures of these organizations.  These other federal 
reports may be more valid because the person reporting the sightings were on the ground and 
could tell the UAS from a manned aircraft.  In addition, the agency in some cases was able to 
contact the operator of the sUAS.  Officials noted that the FAA reporting was not able to 100% 
determine the sightings were valid (GAO, 2018).  This is significant as it is imperative that the 
sightings and incidents are validated.  It is difficult to learn from or mitigate HF situations 
between the sUAS and the air traffic controller in the NAS if they are not able to be validated.  




Table 1  Selected UAS Sightings from Government Agencies 2013-2017 
Selected UAS Sightings from Government Agencies 2013-2017 
(GAO 18-110, 2018) 
Note.  a.  In more than half of the recorded incidents, the wildfire fighting operations were either managed by the 
Forest Service or co-managed by it and one or more other state or federal agencies. A service official told us that in 
the other incidents, the Forest Service may have provided resources in support of the operations. 
b. The incidents included only sightings of UAS in areas of primary jurisdiction of the Park Police located within the 
National Capital Region, the Park Police New York Field Office, and the Park Police San Francisco Field Office.   
  
Additionally, the GAO report summarized the plan for regulations discussed above, and 
this is depicted in Table 2.  This is a significant snapshot that will aid not only in analysis and 
findings but in making recommendations as each new regulation has the potential to create a 




Table 2 FAA Incremental Approach for developing a regulatory Framework for sUAS 
FAA Incremental Approach for developing a regulatory Framework for sUAS  
 
Note. (GAO 18-110, 2018), 
Civil Applications of Unmanned Aerial vehicles  
 Until recently, most of the uses for UAS were seen in combat or spying on people by 
authority.  With these types of operations often came a negative perception.  Negative 
perceptions put a burden on HFs too, as the negativity may lend to more stress in the controller 
and lack of clear communication between the controller and the drone operator.  The last couple 
of years have brought forward some other applications for UAS use.  However, this perception 
still needs to be changed.  UAS potential in civil applications has grown tremendously in the last 
decade.  The above literature review went over regulations and some of the current changes that 
were implemented in Spring 2021.  With these changes the public’s perception is even more 
important.  Measuring Public Utilization Perception Potential of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, a 
report from the FAA states that the initial implementation is rife with argument and a major 
concern is privacy invasion impacts on security, influence on international diplomacy, and drone 
flights’ risks to property and people.  At the same time operators have recognized the potential in 
technological, economic, and social-political benefits and are working to change the perception.  
One main reason that public perception needs to be updated is that perception often influences 




validation of a research instrument called Public Utilization Perception Potential.  Their literature 
review showed that there are mixed public perceptions for both support and opposition in 
applications of use for UAS.  Keller et al. (2018) stressed the importance of identifying the 
factors that influence public perception as the relationships between these factors will assist all 
UAS stakeholders in successful incorporation of UAS in the NAS.  Investment in informational 
resources, training, and support for sponsorship groups by government, commerce, and 
university will enhance public knowledge and will also assist in safety programs and risk 
mitigation.  The next sections will discuss areas that UAS are being employed and some of the 
problems associated with the use due to policy and perception. 
Medical 
 Drones have started playing a role in assisting healthcare providers.  With increased 
demand for healthcare services there is potential for UAS to provide this service.  Movement of 
supplies and equipment in all types of environments could be augmented in a timely manner that 
saves lives using drones.  Thiels and Aho (2016) summarized potential applications for drones in 
medicine.  They showed that as early as 2015 drone flights carried prescriptions, blood samples, 
and defibrillators and that there are other applications in the healthcare area that need to be 
explored to save lives.  One of the benefits is that many of the medical laboratory samples that 
need to be transferred for analysis are lightweight, which is a perfect fit for the sUAS (Thiels & 
Aho, 2016).  The demand for quick analysis will continue to grow, and sUAS may well be a 
perfect way to get highly perishable samples tested.  Drones could also be used to deliver 
medication in a timely and safe manner.  This may be beneficial to all where controlled 
substances are required.  Prescriptions could be done for as short as daily or weekly delivery 




efficient communication between emergency personnel, pharmacists, and doctors.  In addition, 
drones could be equipped with cameras for assistance in telemedicine and disaster response, 
along with first responder supplies and organ transportation. 
 Due to COVID-19, countries were able to get permission to conduct trials to use drones 
to carry samples and test kits up to 40 miles in Scotland.  It was documented those remote 
geographical locations were able to receive supplies in 15 minutes versus the normal 36 hours by 
road (Morrison & Chadwick, 2020). This, in of itself, could be the difference between life and 
death for some patients.  This also shows that drone equipment and capability are available to 
move goods.  With better optimization of delivery of medical supplies by drones, home health 
care could be improved.  Euchi (2020) reviewed over a dozen applications of drones assisting in 
the health care industry.  Of special note is that the uses of drones may mitigate negative 
environmental, social, and technical aspects of drones (Euchi, 2020).  
Commercial Delivery 
 With COVID-19 and the large lockdown on economies, another aspect of drone use that 
needs further understanding is commercial delivery of goods.  The FAA issued new rules in 2020 
overseeing commercial drone use for delivery of goods.  This went into effect in February 2021 
and has provisions for delivery of food, medical supplies, and other small items.  In addition, 
these rules that took effect in early 2021 have addressed some of the safety and security 
concerns.  The use will require remote ID and allow some drones to fly at night and over people 
while delivering goods.  Additionally, Amazon was one of the first companies granted approval 
by the FAA to deliver packages by drones.  As part of the procedure, operators must use the Part 
135 certification process as outlined by the FAA (“Package Delivery by Drone,” 2020).  The 




program.  This program was started in 2017 to build collaboration between the government and 
private sectors to examine and assess the integration of UAS in the NAS, and it will assist the 
DoT and the FAA in writing new rules that support the integration (“UAS Integration Pilot 
Program,” 2020).  
The application of use, along with the regulations that apply to those applications, was 
touched upon lightly to show how complicated the integration into the NAS is for safe and 
efficient use of the airspace.  The next section will discuss some of the HFs to be considered for 
integration of the UAS in the NAS.  This will be done mainly from the air traffic controller 
perspective.  Literature is still sparse on the HFs associated as most of the drone use until 
recently was at high altitudes and outside of controlled airspace.  Now that many rules are 
changing so that drones may be flown in controlled airspace, BLVOS, over populations and at 
night it is imperative that there be better understanding of the possible HFs and ways to mitigate 
incidents and mishaps.  
There is little research available from the air traffic controller perspective on HF 
considerations for UAS incorporation into the NAS.   Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) did an 
analysis of 220 drone-related reports submitted by controllers, pilots, and drone operators from 
the ASRS database.  The controllers’ primary concern was the difficulty of communications with 
UAV pilots and the UAV pilots not understanding ATC clearance.  It should be noted that of the 
participants, only 17% represented air traffic controllers.  The UAV pilots had concerns about 
not receiving clear direction on operational restrictions and the possible irregularity of these 
situation and the complications that irregular operations could cause in SA.  The pilots of 
manned aircraft also expressed the need to be protected from drone operations, and they had 




Lennertz, 2017).  All these concerns can cause undue stress, lack of communication, and a large 
amount of distraction, which, if not understood or corrected, could lead to incidents and 
accidents.  It is imperative that all stakeholders and especially air controllers understand the 
implications of HFs so that drones may be safely incorporated into the NAS.  Cardosi and 
Lennertz (2017) review of the ARSR reports detail operational issues such as more training for 
air controllers and drone pilots.  Additionally, they pointed out that the missions reviewed were 
under different rules as they applied mainly to military operations.  However, some of those 
situations and lessons need to be reviewed now that there are so many more small drones 
registered and being used with more use on the horizon and with rule changes going into effect 
in 2021.  It is imperative that communication between air traffic control (ATC) and drones 
become more standard and predictable so that confusion is not increased as workload increases.  
Much of the workload increase will be in the proximity of airports, and it is imperative that 
studies are done that focus on controllers’ experience identifying tools and mitigation strategies 
to train both the controller and drone operator for fewer incidents (Cardosi, & Lennertz, 2017).  
Cardosi and Lennertz recommended that continued monitoring of the ASRS be done for 
understanding.  The NASA ASRS 2019 report was also reviewed and compared to findings from 
the Cardosi and Lennertz report later in the literature discussion. 
Whenever a change in systems or operations comes to the air transportation industry 
there are HF issues that come into play because change brings new procedures.  Of note in the 
Cardosi and Lennertz work is that even though drones have had HF situations since the 
beginning, little was done to mitigate those situations.  Cardosi and Lennertz stated that Neville 
and Williams believe this was because the first use of drones was geared towards the military, 




addition, Cardosi and Lennertz also quoted research from Col. Dougherty who said, “Human 
factors was not integrated into the original design of the Predator” (p. 200).  This may have been 
acceptable at the time; however. with the large amount of civilian drone registrations and the 
forecasted increase in applicability, the time has come for understanding HF implications for safe 
use in the NAS.  The time for seamless and uncomplicated as possible integration is now.  
Understanding current concerns requires identifying gaps in research that will enable safe and 
well-organized drone operations in the NAS. 
Some of Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) research focused on operational assessments with 
feedback from air traffic controllers.  They reviewed work done by Abrahamsen and Fulmer 
(2013) that took views from over 100 ATC from four air route traffic control centers (ARTCC).  
They included ATC in different positions and used open-ended questions.  In this process 
Cardosi and Lennertz were able to find common operational themes.  Additionally, Thompson, 
Won, Sollenberger, and Pastakia (2016) pursued responses from approximately 80 controllers 
with drone experience that dealt with the effects of incident operations such as lost link, lost 
communication, loss of the proficiency to DAA aircraft, and engine failure on ATC workload 
and performance.  The findings in both research results were similar and set some basic 
interpretation to be discussed (Cardosi & Lenertz, 2017).  The research identified the need for 
additional expanded training as the main concern.  It is important to note that at the time of 
Cardosi and Lennertz research, there was no standard national curriculum for drones.  This 
current work should discover whether this has been remedied and whether it is improving the HF 
implications to integration.  Reviews were conducted to find some of the suggested initial and 
recurrent training that is needed to incorporate sUAS. The reviewed research recommended that 




(Abrahamsen & Fulmer, 2013; Thompson et al., 2016).  In addition, other research noted that 
training should also include scenario-based contingency operations (Pastakia et al., 2015).  Of 
note, is the significance in using the information to assess civilian integration of sUAS.  Better 
briefing information on drone flights that include drone mission, flight plans, contact information 
and lost link procedures and overall communication procedures information needs to be 
implemented.  Additionally, communication between drone pilots and ATC for safe and efficient 
operations with a special emphasis of standardization needs to be discussed and analysed.  
Outside of the scope of this project, research needs to be completed that assesses the 
available automation support with an emphasis on the benefits and complications with the 
upcoming requirement of Remote ID of UAS. This would assist in addressing safety, national 
security, and law enforcement concerns.  In this vein, the FAA has mandated a Remote ID 
process and procedure to begin in 2021; however, there will not be data available for a while to 
see if this assists in safe integration.  
Another area of research that needs consideration in HF is data for a better understanding 
of issues that focus on HITL situations.  It is hoped that the ASRS NASA 2019 report will 
illustrate there is a need to incorporate procedures for improvement in this area.  These studies 
and reports focus on pilot and controller performance through workload, communication, 
timeliness of response, and other factors.  Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) reviewed studies that 
were carried out by the FAA’s William Hughes Technical Center.  Their data can be used to 
examine information in the NASA 2019 report and the FAA sightings report to see whether there 
are correlations.  
A study by Buondonno, Gilson, Pastakia, and Sepulvado (2012) examined controller 




incrementally increasing a series of experimental scenarios.  The idea behind the study was to 
identify concerns pertaining to the integration of UAS into the NAS.  Their report documented 
the results of the Multi-UAS Operational Assessment: Class D Airspace, HITL simulation study 
and was one of a series of research endeavors designed for promotion of UAS into the NAS.  
The specialized purpose of the simulation was to identify and document events and their effects 
on the NAS associated with mixing multiple simultaneous UAS operations with manned aircraft 
operations within Class D airspace (Buondonno et al., 2012).  The simulated airspace was in 
California, and the UAS used were military as this was over a decade ago, and they did not have 
enough data or types of civilian drones to have standard operation capabilities.  The HITL 
simulation purposely investigated the impact of multiple concurrent UAS and manned aircraft, in 
both insignificant and off-nominal environments, to air traffic control communications, capacity, 
situation awareness, proficiency, and safety of the operations.  Interesting to note is that the study 
showed “that the proposed operations were not feasible as simulated, and that several key 
interoperability requirements must be identified and implemented before simultaneous Class D 
operations with manned and multiple unmanned aircraft can be considered” (Buondonno et al., 
2012, p. 2).  It is possible that now is the time to conduct studies that are more realistic to the 
times with some of the standard drones in use for civilian operations.  These studies or analyses 
may give better comprehensive safety evaluations as there have been pockets of operations 
approved throughout the NAS. 
Another way to observe HF implications or reactions is to investigate contingency plans 
or operations.  Pastakia, Won, Sollenberger, Aubuchon, Entis et al. (2015) examined contingency 
operations with controller performance by working with 24 TRACON controllers in both arrival 




and lost engine failure.  Dealing with these situations and not having a standard contingency plan 
may have a negative impact on the controller performance. This could also indicate that an 
increased workload without an updated contingency plans or updated standardized training 
program will also increase the mental demand and frustration for the controller. This could lead 
to flight delays, which then may lead to a need for more communication between ATC and the 
drone pilots. This type of scenario often leads to HF errors and possibly mishaps (Pastakia et al., 
2015).  It is hoped that the FAA sighting and the ASRS from 2019 may shed some light on the 
current situation and offer ideas for better solutions to controller workload pressures. 
Additionally, word searches in reports analyzed will look for items that could be used to develop 
contingency plans and/or scenarios for training. 
One of the principal issues in integration has been the “see and avoid” FAA requirement, 
which also requires being able to “see and avoid” without any assistance other than acceptable   
corrective lenses.  The see and avoid criteria has implications in the BLVOS and VLOS.  New 
technology that is being employed in sUAS operations in the DAA procedures uses equipment 
on drones for safe BVLOS in controlled airspace.  Truitt, Zingale, and Konkel (2016) were 
understandably concerned with the “see and avoid” requirement and the impact it would have on 
ATC performance for both workload and efficiency.  They reviewed controllers in situations 
during a missed approach and multiple low approaches and found that aircraft flew longer 
distances and spent more time is a sector when a UAV was present.  They also stated that 
controllers believed that UAV operations had a negative impact on their workload (Truitt, 
Zingale, & Konkel, 2016).  This is comparable to Pastakia et al.’s (2015) work.  They reinforced 
some of the negative issues on controller workload and emphasized that more research needs to 




possible to follow some of the procedures that the country of Poland is using with its focus on 
VLOS and BVLOS operations by employing new technology (Konert & Kasprzyk, 2019).  
Need for Current Analysis of Accidents and Incidents to Include FAA Sightings Reports 
Analysis of accidents and incidents by Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) show that continued 
analysis of ASRS reports is a productive means of finding HF issues in UAV operations.  Their 
research was conducted around 2015, and they also reviewed research from Williams (2004), 
Tvaryanas, Thomson, and Constable (2006), and Wild, Murray, and Baxter (2016).  At the time 
of their study those operations were limited due to numbers on the civilian side and because 
military operations are often classified.  Data were available from the military which observed a 
higher accident rate in UAVs with a focus on the HF in general.  
Williams (2004) did a review and analysis of data collected from the military in a two-
step process.  The first step classified the data by categories, which included HFs, and the second 
step looked at specific issues related to HFs, such as skill-based issues versus procedural errors 
along with display design and alerts or alarms.  The percentage of HFs varied from 20% to 68% 
(Williams, 2004).  Critical findings showed that there were many kinds of accidents and different 
HFs and that most accidents could have been anticipated and possibly prevented.  It was noted in 
Williams’s research that there are different HF issues depending on the accidents, and it may be 
beneficial to look for similarities in accident types along with HF match up.  
Tvaryanas, Thompson, and Constable (2006) also reviewed the military between 1994 
and 2003.  They used the Department of Defense’s HFACS.  Of the 221 mishaps reviewed, 60% 
involved operations-related HFs.  An example that Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) pointed out is 
mechanical failures that are associated with HFs, such as an engine failure often accompanied by 




Cardosi and Lennertz (2012) also reviewed Wild et al. (2016), who analyzed civilian data 
from various aviation organizations.  Wild et al. data were collected from a 10-year period and 
covered over 150 events.  There were a few differences in the analysis compared to data 
collected previously.  Wild et al. found that drone operations were more likely to experience, 
“(1) loss of control in-flight, (2) events during takeoff and in cruise, and (3) equipment 
problems” (p. 1).  This shows that as more technology, operations and procedures are 
implemented, human errors could increase. This also displays the significance of HFs, and that it 
is imperative to do additional research and analysis that covers the last few years in sUAS 
operations. This research needs to be done with stakeholder involvement and should include the 
technologies, operators, and controllers for cross-over responsibilities. This will allow for the 
best changes to procedures and regulations. 
Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) stressed the importance of continued research, the research 
staying responsive to operational needs, and the changes in operational needs.  A productive way 
this may be done is to analyze ASRS and mine the encounters of UAV pilots, commercial pilots, 
and controllers who regularly interact with drones on a continuous cycle.  This mining could 
look for parameters or metrics found in the Swiss cheese and SHELL models.  Their analysis of 
ASRS reports could be adapted for the analysis on the NASA 2019 ASRS database report set and 
the quarterly FAA UAS sightings to analyze for HFs in UAS incorporation in commercial 
airspace.  Their approach and adaptation to a current approach will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 3. 
Cyber Threat from Drones 
 There are security implications along with the rapid growth in drone usage.  ALPA’s 




there are challenges for current and future drone operation in complex airspace.  Safety and 
security are two different pieces to the operation; however, they need to complement each other 
for safe and efficient operation.  Communication capabilities with drones are a bit different in 
that they have two parts.  They exhibit the long-established style of ATC communication, but 
this completely dependent on trustworthy, precise, two-way communication and not the 
traditional controls and displays in a cockpit.  This is called “command and control,” or C 2, and 
is an integral part of incorporation and the second integral part of “detect and avoid” in the 
airspace (ALPA 2015).  
“Command and control” is completed with the pilot not present in the aircraft; instead, 
this is done with a link in the wireless digital extension of the pilot. When this cannot be 
completed, it is called “lost link”; the failure needs to be understood and evaluated as it is 
susceptible for security threats.  Mitigations must be established to prevent this from happening 
as the “lost link” scenario is one that can lead to HF errors by both the Pilot and the controller 
(ALPA, 2015; Best, Schmid, Tierney, Awan, Beyene, et al., 2020; Bora & Romny, 2020).  While 
many drones have preprogrammed commands for the aircraft in such an event, one must 
remember that the pilot is no longer in control of the aircraft.  This is concerning when the 
aircraft is possibly near airspace occupied by other conventionally piloted aircraft and becomes 
both a security and a safety concern.  Though many operators, regulators, and controllers are 
aware of this situation there is no clear set of procedures to report this situation to a government 
agency (ALPA, 2015).  When this broken link happens, it takes time, and this is where a breach 
in security could take place.  Incidents need to be reported for this type of situation, and 




DAA is the second type of security and safety issue that technology needs to expand for 
drones to operate safety. This could be looked at mainly as a safety issues but if the drone has 
been hacked it becomes a security issue too.  Since drones are very small, slow, and hard to see 
by the human eye until they are very close mitigation methods need to be developed 
electronically in conjunction with NextGen efforts in Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B) with GPS.  Additionally, incidents need to be reviewed to see whether it is 
possible to incorporate the new airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS) which is like 
TCAS, only specific to drones (ALPA, 2015).  Both ADS-B and ACAS could be the critical 
improvements needed for the safety and security of drone integration in the NAS.  
Analyzing current FAA sightings and ASRS reports could be done in a collaborative 
manner and possibly using ALPA’s recommendations to mitigate challenges to UAS 
incorporation.  ALPA supports four essential elements to safely integrate UAS into the NAS, 
which are education, registration, technology, and penalties and enforcements (ALPA, 2015).  
Current analysis of incidents needs to be done to ensure these essential elements are in place and 
safe integration will be maximized. 
  To further understand the possible cyber threats from drones, Best et al. (2020) work   
also focused on current and future vulnerabilities.  Their work highlighted some conceptual 
approaches that assist in categorization of UAS cyber threats.  It may be out of scope for this 
research; however, it would assist in the analysis of ASRS reports and FAA sightings reports if 
there were indicators that incidents were caused by vulnerabilities and security issues.  Best et al. 
also reviewed the use of UAS as both targets and trajectories of cyberattacks.  They applied their 
research to some real-world threat scenarios and looked at it from the perspective of the 




technology was over $12 billion and growing in 2021.  Their research points to drones possibly 
restructuring the cyber security world in two areas.  First, drones could be a cybersecurity target. 
Second, drones in the hands of adversaries could present more attacks as “cyber weapons.”  
Their research looked at ways to categorize drone related cyber threats, which could assist 
policymakers in writing legislation and could also assist in education and training for both 
controllers and operators.  Their research also highlighted industry developments and potential 
implications of those developments (Best et al., 2020).  Having this literature as a reference may 
help find similarities in cyberattacks and other incidents in reporting.  
Ly &Ly (2020) did a comprehensive literature review to identify which types of attacks 
are the most common and what effects they cause in airspace.  They found that spoofing and 
denial of service attacks were the most common and concluded that there need to be 
enhancements to drones and procedures to prevent the attacks (Ly & Ly, 2020).  They also stated 
that further studies are required for more details on how attacks are carried out and how to avoid 
them. 
Though Best et al. (2020), and Ly and Ly (2020) did not mention HFs there may well be 
an HF element to cyber security.  Reviewing and analyzing FAA sightings reports and ASRS 
may reveal HITL situations that involve cognitive load, SA, and other HF elements that need 
some safety risk management (SRM) for UAS operations.  Cyber breaches and attacks have 
elements that can impair ATC cognitive workload. This should encourage further research in HF 
and cyber breaches in ATC and UAS operations.  reports  
Conclusion 
Throughout the literature review areas outside of the scope of this research were found 




airspace and those areas were noted.  Authors reviewed believe the growth of drone use will 
continue to be a key part in connecting people and delivering goods to people.  Authors such as 
Vattapparambam et al. (2016) believe that there is a gap in research that needs to be eliminated 
because this growth brings together several procedural and social matters and challenges in the 
areas of cybersecurity, privacy, and public safety.  The research in this paper identifies the gaps 
and finds ways that drones may be used for the improvement of society without the fear of 
malicious attacks or threats. 
Additionally, the literature review identified research gaps in the HFs area of drone 
integration in commercial airspace.  Specifically, it was noted that there is a gap in the 
knowledge in HITL with the relationship between the air traffic controller and the drone. This 
means that more research needs to be conducted to understand the right level of workload for the 
air controller that will optimize the drone and ATC interaction (Stark et al., 2012).  There are 
overall goals of HFs understanding in the FAA to support an attainment of high levels of human-
system operation across the industry. The FAA also has the goal to do continuous research to 
ensure the “systems of systems” operations such as ATM, considers the multifaceted interactions 
among people, technology, procedures, and organizations.  The FAA also stated that this 
research needs to have an approach that brings promotion, education, and partnership among HF 
organizations within the FAA together to collaborate with industry, academia, and global 
partners (FAA, n.d.b). 
Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) also discussed gaps in research. Their research revealed that 
most data available have focused on military drone use and that for safe incorporation of drones 
in commercial airspace continuous research needs to be done due to the ever-increasing use of 




available on a regular basis from ASRS could fill the gaps in understanding HFs, thus being able 
to mitigate risks associated with the HF issues currently known (Cardosi & Lennertz, 2017).  
This could also identify areas of risk as they occur and grow the body of knowledge on human 
errors in ATC and drone integration quickly, further mitigating risks. 
Summary  
In summary, Chapter 2 was a discussion of some of the pertinent literature that is 
available about ATC and drone incorporation into a “system of systems” that operates the 
commercial airspace.  As the system is so complex, the literature review examined crucial 
concepts as they applied to ATC and civilian drone integration from an HF perspective.  It relied 
on data from a military perspective and identified that there is a gap from the commercial 
perspective in the research and mitigations that comes from the change brought in with sUAS in 
the NAS. Neville and Williams may have been the first to identify this lack of knowledge and 
research because the initial use of drones by the military. Both Neville and Williams and Cardosi 
and Lennertz research showed that this may have been because HF were not studied in as much 
detailed in civilian application as they wanted the drones use in military scenarios to be quickly 
implemented. This has often been the case when a piece of equipment is being developed for the 
military to use in a hostile situation (Cardosi & Lennertz, 2017). 
The gap in literature and research may have also been increased because the rapid growth 
in civilian application especially in controlled airspace may not have been adequately estimated. 
Kamienski and Semanek, point out that UAS operators are at an increasing rate are requesting 
access to controlled airspace (2015). The fast that their research again focused on large military 
drones shows the lack of anticipation of sUAS involvement in the NAS. Additionally, the FAA 




the line of visual sight and over people. The number of applications for these types of operations 
have increased with few given waivers. There is the strong possibility that not being able to 
operate drones in an area that brings in more human error opportunity leaves research more at the 
speculative level and may have not been attractive to the researchers. As these types of 
operations are made permissible there is the probability of human error increase due to HF 
elements. This in of itself should encourage more research and diminish the gap of understanding 
the HF implications of sUAS us in the NAS. 
  It also showed that with the rapid growth in sUAS use, reviewing and analysis of the 
latest ASRS report and FAA UAS sightings will give a current snapshot and possibly identify 
risk mitigation and solutions for safe incorporation of sUAS.  The literature stressed the 
importance of growth in knowledge of HF, potential for human error, cyber threats and other 
risks associated with the growth of the drone industry.  The chapter also brought in some of the 
history, policies, regulations, and current uses of drones. The chapter also had a focus on drone 
integration challenges in the NAS in the last decade.  
The review also looked at how risk is currently identified and analyzed to see the 
possibilities to use some of those methodologies in a combined manner for further data gathering 
and analysis.  Chapter 2 did not cover every single HF or type of use of drones; however, it 
discussed enough so that one can understand that there is need for research to mitigate the risk of 
drones in commercial airspace from the controller machine interaction and HF.  I explain the 
method that will be used for data gathering and analysis in Chapter 3 to safely incorporate drones 






CHAPTER 3: METHOD 
This chapter includes the quantitative research design, methodology, the procedures used 
to gather the data, data analysis strategy, reliability, and validity of the research. In this chapter 
the problem and purpose are restated along with the research questions.  It is important to note 
that all levels of government seek to provide safe integration of sUAS in the NAS.  However, 
there are specific problems that must be examined to mitigate the risks, specifically in the safety 
and security areas of HF and cybersecurity.   
The purpose of this quantitative study was to determine, through statistical analysis of 
reports involving UAS sightings and incidents, HF, safety, and security risks that need to be 
mitigated for safe and secure incorporation of sUAS in the NAS.  The data to be analyzed were 
gathered from the NASA 2019 ASRS report, and the three most current FAA UAS sighting 
reports. The first available FAA UAS sightings report was reviewed for general knowledge but is 
not analyzed. and the three most current reports.  This analysis will use some of the variables that 
Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) used for comparison and possible risk mitigation.  
Problem Statement 
Though HFs associated with UAS operations come in an assortment of characteristics, 
they are inadequately represented in literature. The inadequacies do not have a strong focus on 
the integration of drones from the air controller or the operator of the drone from a HF 
perspective (Cardosi & Lennertz, 2017).  The next few years will include an increase in civilian 
and commercial use of drones in the NAS and is expected to expand in the aerospace industry 
(Stark et al., 2012).  As the number of UAVs in controlled airspace increases, situations have 
appeared where UAVs have clashed with air traffic and caused concern for air traffic safety, 




come in an assortment of characteristics, they are inadequately represented in literature, focusing 
on the controller and air traffic management.  Those who have been identified need to be 
critiqued to ensure they are accurate.  Additionally, they need a risk assessment and the 
interconnections of the humans-in-the- loop identified.  This analysis will identify protocols to be 
tested to ensure air traffic controllers manage safe operations in the NAS of UAVs with other air 
traffic. 
Purpose of the Dissertation Study 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)’s is a recent phenomenon in ATM.  Truitt, Zingale, 
and Konkel (2016) demonstrated the significance of mitigating risk so that UAVs’ access to the 
NAS is completed safely and expeditiously.  This dissertation assessed some of the current and 
future challenges of incorporating UAVs in the NAS in a safe manner.  Examination of UAV 
accidents and incidents obtained from the ASRS, and the FAA quarterly sightings reports for risk 
assessment and human-machine interface can provide protocols to test for safe incorporation of 
UAVs into the NAS.  The results will have a meaningful influence on the growth of UAVs’ 
positive contribution to the aerospace industry. 
Research Questions 
This study’s central research question was: How can negative consequences of 
integration in commercial airspace between UAS and ATM systems be reduced, so that when 
incidents happen SA and HF risks are negligeable?  
Supporting sub questions were developed:  
1. What protocols could be identified to ensure air traffic controllers develop metrics for 
cognitive workload, SA and other HFs to ensure safe operations in the NAS of UAVs 




2. What needs to be done to mitigate HF issues using risk management and safety 
management processes within the new operations of UAS in NAS? 
3. What are the factors that influence the safe implementation of UAS integration in the 
NAS?  
4. In what ways could the perception with the public be improved to increase support of 
integration of UAS in the NAS? 
5. What technology investments can be made for communication and airspace 
management for safe operations of UAS within the NAS?  
6. What action can be taken on the regulatory challenges for safe and efficient UAS 
operation in the NAS? 
Research Design 
Government organizations both in the U.S. and globally seek to provide safe use of the 
NAS for all stakeholders.  However, with the rapid rise in desire and use of sUAS it is imperative 
that ATC and HF be researched to mitigate the risks associated with the incorporation.  This 
study employed the quantitative phenomenological research method to explore ways to mitigate 
the risks from an air traffic controller perspective and HF perspective on how to incorporate 
drones in commercial airspace.  The research encompasses statistical analysis of the possible 
threats and their mitigation for expanded use in the NAS.  
To produce dependable assessments, quantitative research requires large numbers of 
contributors, and the analysis is done through statistical tools to ensure better representation of 
findings (Harkiolakis, 2020).  Collecting data for quantitative studies is based on tools and 
processes.  This research involved using the ASRS reports and the FAA UAS sightings reports.  




experience as pilots, air traffic controllers, and mechanics.  Each report must be reviewed by at 
least two analysts to discover aviation hazards and to classify reports along with other duties 
before the reports are incorporated into the ASRS’s database (NASA, n.d.a).  The FAA UAS 
sightings reports come from pilots, citizens, and law enforcement.  The FAA uses the reports to 
send messages to all stakeholders and to educate users on proper procedures.  The FAA fines 
people for unauthorized flights and encourages the public in general to report unauthorized drone 
use (FAA 2021 d).  These two types of reports are analyzed and compared to give past and 
current situations and to offer risk mitigation. 
Research Method and Design Appropriateness  
With the methodology of quantitative research chosen and the research questions along 
with the conceptual framework developed the next step was to devise a plan.  Using the 
secondary research data gathered from the ASRS reports and FAA UAS sightings to collect the 
data made it easier for analysis.  The idea of using these reports was that the reports focus on a 
repeating occurrence so that the sample group experiences, or phenomenology could be studied 
and analyzed.  The ASRS reports from both NASA and the one analyzed by Cardosi and 
Lennertz (2017) are analyzed by an aviation safety specialist, while the FAA UAS sightings are 
submitted by anyone.  Both styles of reporting (ASRS and NASA) are about a repeating 
occurrence or a theme, which is drones in places that may cause incidents.  This research design 
had an underlying philosophy that guided in the quantitative methodology.  Elements from the 
Swiss cheese and SHELL models while analyzing the test of the incidents reports in the ASRS 
and FAA UAS sightings were used.  Data was mined from the reports and incorporated into 




Population, Sampling, and Data Collection Procedures and Rationale 
Population Sampling 
In this study the target population consisted of UAV reports from the ASRS database 
during two periods of time and FAA UAS sightings reports from four different periods of time.  
This sampling segment of the population was guided by the purpose, research questions, and 
perspective of the design in the research.  Harkiolakis (2020) noted that for accuracy and to 
eliminate bias, the sample must be a miniature reflection of the population.  Non-probabilistic 
sampling in the form of purposive sampling was chosen.  This sampling is based mainly on 
demographics because it is very efficient.  The qualified participants material is in the databases 
and reports from the ASRS and the FAA UAS sightings reports. The research sampling is based 
on the supposition that like-minded persons exposed to a certain circumstance form association 
or closely tied social groups (Harkiolakis, 2020).  These stakeholders, especially the controllers, 
regulators, operators, and safety minded individuals, will report incidents for safety 
consideration.  
Data Collection and Instrumentation 
The first ASRS report reviewed HF issues recognized in operational assessments, 
experimental research, incidents, and accidents.  These 200 reports came from air traffic 
controllers, UAV pilots, and pilots of manned aircraft and were analyzed by subject matter 
experts picked by the FAA. (Cardosi & Lennertz, 2017). These 200 reports that were analyzed 
are considered the baseline report and focused mainly on military situations.  Some of the same 
variables from the reports Cardosi and Lennertz used to analyze their HF scenarios were used in 
this analysis from the ASRS report batch of 50 incidents provided by NASA. This is called a 




report, includes 50 records, and is dated February 2019.  The current batch report was analyzed 
as a follow-up or continuation of similar work done by the Cardosi and Lennertz 2017 research.  
All ASRS reports generated and analyzed by NASA are not mandatory so they may reflect 
reporting biases (NASA 2019). However, the report narrative is qualitative information that was 
used to build quantitative information for analysis and to represent purposive sampling.  The 
samples size from ASRS is 200 older reports (Cardosi & Lennertz, 2017) and the 50 most 
current reports (NASA 2019).  The ASRS database online is considered the world’s largest 
storehouse of information the is voluntary and confidentially submitted (NASA, 2019). The 
reports are submitted by members that are in the aviation industry. One benefit of these reports is 
that the narrative section is a good source for information on human factors as they apply to the 
incidents. These reports may be reviewed after names have been removed to assist with policy 
change, research, training, and education (NASA, 2019). The ASRS has 30 Database report Sets 
on areas that are of interest in the aviation community. UAV is included as one of the standard 
30 reports.  The report batch or set has 50 records that are a sampling of reports or a ratio 
involving UAV events. The reports are reviewed for relevance on the topic. The list of topics is 
updated as the aviation community interest changes. The objective is to provide reliable data of 
the 50 recent relevant records The reports are numbered, have a cover letter with explanations 
and caveats regarding the use of the ASRS Data report sets (NASA, 2019).  This gives more 
reliability and validity to the material being relevant to the subject research. This also allows for 
the research to be duplicated to observe changes in the subject matter, which, will allow 
consistency in research models for analysis and the development of protocols to mitigate human 
errors with sUAS in controlled and uncontrolled NAS. The February 2019 UAV report is 




other materials available for additional information on how to use the data for research, 
education and training. 
The FAA UAS sightings reports started with approximately 69 reports in 90 days from 
November 1, 2014, through January 31, 2015, to approximately 350 reports in the last quarter of 
2020 (FAA 2021).  There are four FAA UAS sightings reports.  The first one is from November 
2014 to August 2015 and consists of about 600 sightings. Only the first 90 days of data for a 
period to set the baseline were analyzed.  The three most recent reports from the FAA are April 
through June 2020, July through September 2020, and October through December 2020. 
These six reports were mined for information to analyze and were modeled after the 
ASRS data from Cardosi and Lennertz (2017).  The instrumentation used is based on variables 
that Cardosi and Lennertz used in their analysis which are listed below. The new variables may 
change as the data are analyzed.  However, this gives a base for all data reviewed. The data was 
also gleaned to find specific HF verbiage. 
1. Frequency of reported altitude of event 
2. Frequency of reports by type of operation 
3. Frequency of reports by airspace 
4. Frequency or reports by phase of flight 
5. Frequency of potential conflicts by type of operation, as reported by aircraft pilots 
6. Proximity by altitude of potential conflicts (Cardosi & Lennertz, 2017). 
Procedures 
The procedure followed a four-step procedure.  The proposed study utilized secondary 
data, reported by numerous sources based on validated reporting procedures developed by the 




report is Appendix A. The standard ASRS forms is Appendix B and the ASRS 2019 report is 
Appendix C.  
The four-step procedure was explained in Chapter 1 and is expounded on more below in 
a five-step process that still aligns with the procedures outlined in Chapter 1.  Three of the steps 
below became the data gathering and analysis process as outlined in Chapter 3.  The fourth step 
listed below will be discussed in Chapter 4 with the results.  The fifth step listed below will be 
discussed in Chapter 5 with the findings and recommendations. 
1. Data mined from the ASRS database, and the FAA UAS sightings reports relevant to 
UAV accidents and incidents.  
2. Utilization of the SCM for risk identification and assessment.  In this area I also 
looked for risk indicators of a cyber event variable. 
3. Employment of the principles of the SHELL model to look for HF variables.  During 
this analysis, I ensured data were reliable and validated with extensive review of the 
credentials and requirements set forth in the forms for the ASRS reports and the 
procedures that the FAA put forth to make a report to the FAA on a UAS sighting. 
4. Discussion of the research findings and a summary of the data. 
5. Presentation of findings and recommendations for protocols for further research for 
possible implementation. 
The data analyzed from the ASRS Data batch report was categorized in the following 
areas to develop analysis using the Swiss Cheese and SHELL parameters. The keywords used 
below are standard variables in analysis of ASRS and FAA data when reviewing HF and 




pertain to HF.  The ASRS was not analyzed for cybersecurity breaches as it is a non-punitive 
report.  
1. Altitude 
2. Person reporting 
3. Time of day 
4. Mention of HFs 
5. Conflict reported by reporter 
6. Flight synopsis that included some details of the situation reported  
To analyze the FAA UAS sightings reports, the two most recent FAA UAS sightings 
were used data mining looked for patterns.  It should be noted that the FAA UAS sightings report 
per the FAA website is more geared towards policing the incidents and distributing fines to 
people who breach security rules rather than finding safe ways to integrate drones. The list below 
is a sample of the items that were used as variables to analyze the data. This information leads to 
recommendations for safe sUAS integration into the NAS. 
1. The US States that had the most sightings and where in those states were the sightings 
located 
2. Person/occupation giving the report to the FAA at the FSDO 
3. Law enforcement involvement 
4. Whether, in reviewing the summary, an HF indicator could be identified using HF 
jargon found on ASRS reports 




Reliability and Validity 
Reliability and validity are two criteria for good research as they are related to 
measurement instruments in aviation.  According to Mohajan (2017), validity is what and how 
well an instrument measures something, and reliability is what one believes the data gathered 
and the instrument used are trustworthy. It is a theoretical way to do analysis as it allows for 
reporting to be used in a more practical manner. For example, technology is an important item to 
use in ensuring continued safe operation in the NAS complexity. If there is a way to make 
reporting more effective as more technology is developed it may be employed to assist in more 
relevant data being obtained automatically through the new technology in reporting or gathering 
data. The automated technology could assist in the data being uploaded to the reports in a more 
accurate and timely manner. This information could be analysed quicker without taking away 
from SA in the environment. The number of incidents is increasing so it is important to have data 
that stays reliable and valid. Then this same information could be plugged into HFACS, SCM 
and the SHELL concept to be analyzed in the PDCA manner that could mitigate human errors. 
Having fewer human errors ensures there are fewer HF errors with the controller as the HITL. 
This could also lead to better training scenarios and fewer incidents. Technology in reliability 
and validity continues to improve and would assist in the four-step process for mitigation and 
encourage continuous improvement. The technology allows for more current applicable results 
that are better understood, thus being both more reliable and valid. Mohajan stressed that 
according to Singh (2012), with good validity and reliability there is more transparency and with 
more transparency there should be less ability for the researcher to insert bias (Mohajan, 2017).  
As this research relied on secondary data from NASA and the FAA, a detailed assessment was 




assessing the reliability and validity of the data obtained it is difficult to describe the 
relationships, and it is hard to determine whether true information has been obtained (Mohajan, 
2017).  It is also important to note that reliability and validity are important tools to prevent 
errors in research. Technology improvements will work with continuous reliable and valid data 
being readily available for analysis. 
As stated in Chapter 1, part of the conceptual framework included use of the SHELL 
model.  The SHELL was incorporated in the research for validation procedures.  The SHELL 
model aims to collect safety information during an investigation. Sharing safety information is 
part of this research to ensure sUAS are incorporated into the NAS under the conceptual 
framework.  Part of the SHELL concept developed by Hawkins required the collection of 
information from SHELL (Hawkins, 1987). This collection of information describes the 
interaction between the software, hardware, environment, liveware and liveware elements and 
delivers consistent data that provides safety indicators (Pouliquen, Ferrante, Jouniaux, Nicolas, 
and BEA, 2005).  The SHELL model depicts a system as the relationships of humans (a 
Liveware and in this research the central liveware of point is the air traffic controller) with four 
components: software, hardware, environment, and liveware.  Each element of the model 
includes items and their interactions (Hawkins, 1987).  Pouliquen et al. discussed how the BEA 
corporation developed a methodology validation protocol using the SHELL method, and this 
process is taken in consideration in this research mining and analysis of data from NASA and the 






Harkiolakis (2020) proposed that the practical aspects of data need to be taken into 
consideration so others can both follow and duplicate the research with similar results.  This is 
very beneficial in continuous study that desires continuous improvement.  Processing and 
analyzing the data go together, and the strategy needs to be clear to answer and test the research 
questions.  Creswell and Creswell (2018) asserted that it is important that data analysis consist of 
variables that are understandable to form theories, findings, and recommendations.  Data analysis 
must also be assessed for truthfulness to support decision making (Creswell & Creswell, 2018).  
The data analysis began by studying the variables from Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) as 
previously stated.  From there the second ASRS report was analyzed to find similar variables and 
trends.  The 2017 report covered 13 years and showed the number of reports growing from zero 
to almost 90 in the 13 years.  The most recent ASRS report included only 50 reports from 2019 
so that variables may be validated or discounted for the ASRS 2019 report.  Additionally, data 
from FAA UAS sightings reports were analyzed to see whether similar variables could be 
duplicated or whether additional information could be gleaned to give more relevance to the 
study of HF indicators for ATC involvement with drones.  The number of sightings went from 
69 to as high as 485 in a three-month period (FAA 2021).  The analysis of the data was used to 
answer the primary and secondary research questions. 
Summary  
This chapter started with restating the problem and purpose of the research along with the 
primary and secondary research questions.  The research design section stressed the importance 
of gathering or sorting data to populate the Swiss cheese or SHELL models for assessment.  The 




sampling procedures, reliability and validity, and ethics consideration.  Additionally, details on 
the processes, steps, and procedures used to be able to present the results, findings, and 






CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
This quantitative research approach pursued research that could answer questions that 
would ensure UAS could be safely integrated in the NAS.  Its critical aim was to answer, how 
can negative consequences of integration in commercial airspace between UAS and ATM 
systems be reduced, so that when incidents happen SA, and HF risks are negligeable?  
Supporting subquestions were also developed as listed:  
1. What protocols could be identified to ensure air traffic controllers develop metrics for 
cognitive workload, SA and other HFs to ensure safe operations in the NAS of UAVs 
with other air traffic? 
2. What needs to be done to mitigate HF issues using risk management and safety 
management processes within the new operations of UAS in NAS? 
3. What are the factors that influence the safe implementation of UAS integration in the 
NAS?  
4. In what ways could the perception with the public be improved to increase support of 
integration of UAS in the NAS? 
5. What technology investments can be made for communication and airspace 
management for safe operations of UAS within the NAS?  
6. What action can be taken on the regulatory challenges for safe and efficient UAS 
operation in the NAS? 
The research also targeted whether it is possible to find cybersecurity connections in data 
available from NASA and the FAA.  Current civilian use of sUAS that had the possibility of 
large growth and use of the NAS were reviewed for applicability.  There are so many market 




reviewed in detail in the literature review; however, data that could identify the civilian 
applications to include search and rescue, firefighting, disaster relief, highway, rail and other 
transportation modes, inspections, agriculture, recreation, and medical and package delivery 
were studied.  This enabled vigilance in finding reliable key pieces of data in the reports.  The 
primary finding was that sightings and incidents are increasing. However, almost all reports have 
gaps in the information that would allow for the bigger picture to be presented and for risks to 
HF to be mitigated.  The results as they will be presented demonstrate that there are HFs present 
applicable to air traffic controllers, and that they cause stressors to the air traffic controllers such 
as, loss of SA, and work overload. 
Another observation from reading the detailed summaries in reporting and follow-up 
reporting data it that it takes time for air traffic controllers to receive and transfer that data. This 
takes them away from their primary job of air traffic control and management.  Additionally, 
variables in the data show that many stakeholders participate in reporting sUAS in areas in which 
they may not be authorized; however, there is little information to support follow-up data 
collection or analysis that mitigate the risks to air traffic controllers and all stakeholders in 
general.  Much more analysis needs to be done to identify safety protocols that could be 
developed and tested as a means of mitigating the risks to UAS incorporation in the NAS.  This 
chapter presents the findings, the emerging topics generated from the data analysis that 
developed from the findings, and recommendations for safe UAS integration in the NAS from 
the perspectives of air traffic controllers, which will make it safer for all stakeholders. 
Pilot Study 
The pilot study used to set up the current study was done by Cardosi and Lennertz 




research and analysis.  Their research was a good base for variables to look for in analysis of the 
current data. However, the focus of this research was to expand on the ATC perspective started 
by Cardosi and Lennertz to see what new trends may be emerging with the growth in civilian 
sUAS use, mainly in the aeras of safety and security.  The pilot study that focused on military 
drones showed there appeared to be many HF issues that could also be related to sUAS.  Cardosi 
and Lennertz report is lengthy, however, it is publicly available and is listed as a reference in this 
research. Of note, the pilot study and current research analysis come from reports that were 
voluntary in nature and may be only the tip of the iceberg of the current situation; however, 
current data show a large increase in reporting.  The pilot analysis showed that between 2003 to 
2016 there was a significant increase in reporting.  The pilot report also looked at the altitude of 
events, reporter and aircraft type, time of day, conflicts, frequency of reports by airspace, and 
frequency of potential conflicts by type of operation, as reported by aircraft pilots.  The pilot 
report also analyzed the HF issues faced with incorporation of drones at that time and included 
recommendations from pilots and controllers, along with recommendations and next steps.  
The recommendation for analysis of accidents and incidents becoming an ongoing 
activity is what inspired this current research.  Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) found there is 
valuable information in the ASRS that may be analyzed for risk mitigation in UAS incorporation 
in the NAS.  Cardosi and Lennertz also proposed that the data described, gathered and analyzed 
should be done on a continuous basis as data evolves. The continuous gathering may show 
changes and provide information that updates contributing factors (Cardosi & Lennertz, 2017).  
This current research aimed to do that by analyzing not only the current 2019 NASA ASRS but 
also the ASRS forms to see what data are gathered to complete the analysis.  Additionally, this 




the same time as the analysis was completed by Cardosi and Lennertz in 2017.  The forms are 
available in Appendix A, and the NASA 2019 report is available in Appendix B.  It was this pilot 
or groundwork that set the stage for the evaluation of the information and offer the following 
findings in this chapter.   
Results of Analysis of Reports 
Aviation Safety Reporting System 
The Aviation Safety Reporting System is housed in a component of the government that 
combines, business, and individuals both in and out of government agencies who continue to 
advance aviation safety.  The information collected is done on a voluntary basis and submitted 
on aviation safety incident report forms, and no criminal information should be submitted 
(NASA, 2020).  There are four different forms that can be used to get information to NASA for 
analysis, and three of the forms will be discussed in this research. The forms are called NASA 
ARC 277A, B, and C, for ATC, general and cabin crew reporting forms.  Once the report is 
received it is analyzed and distributed to stakeholders to ensure the quality of human 
performance in the NAS is maintained (NASA, 2009a, b, and c).  These forms are in Appendix 
A.  The results of the analysis will focus on incident elements that include altitude, reporter, time 
of the day, HFs, and conflict.  The report set is a sampling of reports that have UAV events, and 
the reports are screened to ensure they fit the topic.  As the reviewers process the data, they 
ensure all reports are de-identified permanently (NASA 2020).  
Of significant note is the immunity concept of paragraph 9 c. of the FAA Advisory 
Circular No 00-46 e that is adhered to.  The forms also remind the reporter that aircraft accidents 
and criminal activities are not to be reported on these forms.  There are other cautions that NASA 




that the report numbers exemplify the lower number of actual incidents (NASA, 2020).  It is 
important to keep in mind that the number of reports are just events that have been reports and 
that there are many events that are never reported.  The reports have strength in the narrative 
section. This section NASA calls the “why it happened” section. This type of information is 
qualitative and gives information that was used to find areas to improve safety. It also assisted in 
answering the critical research question.  
Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) recommended that the form be reviewed and updated if 
needed.  The current form available online is dated 2009 and still needs to have an update to 
include sUAS information.  The form expires in July 2022. 
 Both the Swiss cheese and SHELL concepts is used in the analysis of 50 incidents batch 
report data mining to see whether the information requested could assist on the forms in 
identifying HFs that impact safety in the use of drones in the NAS and whether 
recommendations for improvement could supplied.  
 Reporters, time of day, and altitude. The first three items of the 50 reports analyzed 
were the type of reporter, time of day, and the altitude because these three items set some of the 
background for further analysis in the conflict and HF indicator.  In the majority (20 or 40%) of 
incidents the reporter was a crew member from a commercial air carrier.  The other manned 
aircraft reporters were 17 of the 50 (34%), a total of 74% of the reporters coming from manned 
aircraft.  It is proposed that they were on the frontline and the ones most adversely affected by a 
sighting.  sUAS pilots giving reports was 20%.  The review of the narrative shows that sUAS 
pilots report because they can gain knowledge from the experience of reporting and they know 
that they cannot be identified in the final report.  It is not known whether there were any 




some mitigation in culpability, or whether they had done an ASRS report prior.  It is all part of 
the confidentially process of ASRS reporting. The ATC reporters were only 6% and usually 
reported loss of communication that a controller had with a drone.  It is assumed that ATC’s low 
number of ASRS reports is because they were not directly involved in the sighting unless they 
had lost communication with the drone pilot.  Figure 13 shows the data from reporters. 
 The time of day analysis broke out the time in six-hour blocks starting at midnight. 
Current data reflect that sUAS are supposed to fly in daylight only so it was not noteworthy that 
there were no sightings between midnight and 0600. This may change as regulations change. The 
majority of the sightings took place between 1201 and 1800 followed by 0601 and -1200. From 
1201to 1800, 48% of the incidents took place and from 0601 to 1200, 34% took place for a total 
percent of 84% in daylight hours (Figure 14). Seeing sUAS during daylight is easier for aircrew. 
The majority of the reporters were from manned aircraft so the larger takeaway for the 
examination is that the drones flew as required mainly during daylight hours; however, they were 
in close proximity to air carriers and may have been in airspace they were not authorized to be 
in. Ther summary portion also gives the indiation there is also the possiblity that the drone pilot 
may not have always had line of sight with the drone and may not have realized that they were in 
the proximity of another aircraft, or they may not have been aware of the ASRS reporting.  
 The third factor is the altitude at which the reporter saw the drone. The majority (17 or 
34%) were at 400 feet or below, which is the correct altitude where sUAS should be located. The 
second largest group were at 14 of 50 events, and 34% were between 10,000 and 30,000 feet, 
which are assumed to be miliatry drones (Figure 15). The data show that both sUAS and higher 
level (possibly military) drones were in the right airspace; however, they may not have been 




 To summarize the background data, 74% of the reports came from manned aircraft with 
40% of those being commecial aircrew. Addtionally, 84% of the incidents were during daylight, 
which is when military drones usually fly, and the vast majority of sUAS are airborne. The 
altitude of the incidents shows that most incidents were in the required 400 feet or below or in an 
altitude that is usually reserved for military aircraft. However, these drones may have been in a 
class of airspce they should not have been and that may cause a conflict with a manned aircraft, 
which, in the majority of the time, has paying passengers aboard. 
 





Figure 14. Person reporting. 
 
Figure 15. Altitude of UAS. 
 Conflict and human factors.  Evaluting the conflict situation and if it had a HF element 
was improtant to this study. The conflict focused on reports that specified NMAC, which is 
considered a safety concern and often has an HF involved. The NASA report also stated that 
NMACs may exist in the highly-concentrated class “A” area rather than “B” due to the fact that 




an incident when a NMAC occurs (NASA, 2020). This could be considered a bias or limitation 
as it related to the quantitative statistical analysis performed. Of the 50 reports, 40% reported that 
it was an NMAC situation and that 10% had to take evasive action. Even one evasive action 
could prove to be a major diaster and cause loss of life (Figure 16). Of note was that the NMAC 
often cited an HF situation. 
 The next area that was examined  HF implications. This was done by looking for 
keywords in the different sections of the report along with the narrative section that apply to 
HFs. In addition,  the SHELL technique was used when reading the narrative for identification of 
HFs.  The keywords looked for are listed below. FAA, in general, follows the Dupont 1993, 12 
common human errors which are: 
1. Lack of communication 
2. Distraction 
3. Lack of resources 
4. Stress 
5. Complacency 
6. Lack of Teamwork 
7. Pressure 
8. Lack of Awareness 
9. Lack of Knowledge 
10. Fatigue 
11. Lack of assertivness 




In addition, the DOT/FAA/AR/99-39  was reviewed and exemply Cardosi’s four HFs that apply 
to ATC which could be considered under more than one of the above factors. The four HFs are: 
1. Memory  
2. Controller-pilot communication 
3. Limitations to performance 
4. Fatigue (Cardosi, 1999) 
Overall, out of the 50 reports, 47 (94%) had an HF comment or phrase. Of the three ATC 
reports 100% stated HF involvement. The top HF named as the primary cause was SA with 19 
incidents (40%). Another 15 (32%) had SA and even broke it down into different parts of the 
SHELL model. A total of 72% were related to HF, and each had a component of SA. The other 
reports listed additonal HF implications. The reports were not clear on who had a lack of SA in 
verbiage; however, in most cases the summary used a word to indicate it was the drone pilot who 
probaly did not have good SA. Lack of good SA can lead to more SA in the other comments of 
the SHELL model to include the air traffic controller. 
The three ATC reports were detailed in the HF verbiage and should be noted; even 
though there were only three reports out of 50, they were all HF related. The first report that 
ATC did was a conflict in special use airspace between a piloted aircraft and two drones where 
ATC had to issue an alert because there was a communication breakdown, and ATC felt 
overworked. The second report from ATC involved an NMAC with a drone and a piloted aircraft 
that had to take evasive action to prevent a midair the controller deemed as a loss of SA. The 
third ATC related report was where a center controller had a loss of seperation between a sUAS 




awareness, training, and qualification and distraction, which all fit into analysis through the 
SHELL and SCM. 
It should be noted that when one piece of the SHELL has a situation that invovles SA, its 
interaction with other parts of the SHELL which may cause additional SA for all pieces of the 
model (FAA, 1999; FAA, n.d.-b; Miller et al., 2019).  It is also possible that it brings in other 
HFs for all memebers to include ATC. The HF brought in could cause performance to degrade 
and the cognitive workload to become overwhelming for the parties invovled. Addtionally, the 
increased workload could lead to fatigue, and this could cause more complications. One could 
use  the SCM and watch for  HFs that align. When more HFs items align it is more likely an 
incident could turn to an accident (Reason, 2000). Figure 17 shows the HFs invovled most often, 
and Figure 18 is a list of all the HFs identified in the 50 reports.   
 
 





Figure 17. Most often reported HF involved. 
 
 
Figure 18. All human factors cited. 
Through the analysis of the  ASRS reports, a very strong HF connection in the ASRS 
reports is shown. By combining the five varibles of reporter, time of day, altitude, conflict, and 
HFs, the centeral and supporting subquestions of the research could possibly be answered. 
Again, it should be stated that the main purpose of the ASRS reporting is safety and not 




report, which may be used for punative purposes as stated before and to see corrolation or 
immplication.   
FAA UAS Sightings Reports 
To analyze the FAA UAS sightings, report first the intent of the report on the FAA 
website needed to be understood. As noted in the literature review, the GAO report noted that the 
FAA could not verify whether the sightings were correct, and the public had to deal with an 
incomplete web reporting process (GAO, 2018).  Of special interest to me was the main purpose 
of the FAA UAS report was to stop unauthorized use of sUAS.  The FAA receives over 100 
reports a month and want to see more compliance enforced through law enforcement and state on 
the web page they will always contact the applicable law enforcement agency.   The FAA wants 
strong communication to all who operate drones where they are not legal that they may be 
subject to large fines and criminal charges that could result in prison time (FAA, 2021).  The 
FAA is working with the aviation industry to educate drone users; however, they need to stress 
that a lack of education is not an excuse for breaking the rules, and they are working closely with 
the law enforcement to investigate unauthorized flights.  The FAA with other authorities has 
imposed civil punishments and have many cases in progress.  The FAA also encourages citizens 
to report to local law enforcement sightings of improper use of drones (FAA, 2021).  One part of 
the website also recommends a person calls the FSDO to report an unauthorized drone sighting.  
It is not known whether the report is complete by using a form or whether the notifier talks and 
the FSDO does the form as this information is not available on the web page or any of the related 
documents. 
In the study there was a search for items that could answer the main research question 




FY2021Q1.  FY2020Q4 had 486 reports, and FY2021Q1 had 366 reports, showing that both are 
well over 100 reports a month.  The FAA UAS sightings report is different from the ASRS, and 
there is no information available on the FAA website on how they are using the data for analysis 
other than to punish people.  The data consist of four items which are day of sighting, city and 
state of sighting, and a summary. The first three categories give useful information to display on 
maps; however, the summary has many components that would need to be broken out in other 
spreadsheets for analysis.  The intent in reviewing the research was to evaluate the following 
items for safety and security concerns.  
1. Which U.S. states had the most sightings and where in those states the sightings were 
located 
2. Person/occupation giving the report to the FAA at the FSDO 
3. Law enforcement involvement  
4. Whether, in reviewing the summary, an HF indicator could be identified using HF 
jargon found on ASRS reports 
5. Whether, in reviewing the summary, a cyber threat was encountered 
Location of sightings by U.S. city and state.  Time was spent reviewing the elements of 
the FAA UAS sightings reports and it revealed that the first report in 2014 used a 10-month 
period.  Because of that it would be difficult to compare the 10-month periods to the current 
quarterly reports, so no correlation was done to the initial report.  However, there are two 
important points from the first report: (a) the 10-month report showed about 750 sightings, which 
is about 75 a month; and (b) California was in the lead with 171 reported sightings. These two 
points are important as they show a place further research should be done possibly with a state-




numbers are significantly higher in certain states than locations. Having higher numbers may 
indicate a place that a mishap would happen before other places. The research and analysis of 
higher number sites gives a larger sample of data to investigate and prevent further infractions 
that often lead to mishaps. 
Similar to the Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) pilot study for the ASRS information, this 
study also used the information from GAO report the GAO for this study was GAO 18-110 as a 
pilot report.  Also, as noted in the literature review, the FAA now requires all commercial, 
public, and non-recreational UAS operators and pilots to register UAS.  Figure 19 depicts the 






Figure 19. The FAA registrations of recreational and commercial sUAS as of October 31, 2017.  
(Retrieved from GAO 18-110 report, Small unmanned aircraft systems, 2018). 
 
 As the use, integration, rules, and regulations are changing rapidly, this research 
examined data from the most current report and then work backwards.  The most current report 
was the data in FY2021Q1, which is from October 1, 2029, to December 31, 2020.  There were 
364 incidents listed in the report.  This aligns with the FAA statement on the webpage that says 




showed that 42 (84%) states reported unauthorized use of drones.  California had 74 reports 
(20%).  Figure 20 shows the complete numbers by state.   The top ten states accounted for 265 
sightings or a little over 71% of the sightings.  Figure 21 shows complete numbers by the top 10 
states.  The top three states were border states and bordered on the water.  They account for 158 
sightings or a little over 43%.  The top ten locations all have busy airports or are in densely 
populated area.  Seven of the 10 are border states, and six of the 10 border the water.    
  
Figure 20. FAA UAS U.S. sightings. 
 




California is the state with the most sightings, and of the 74 sightings 21 (28%) are in and 
around Los Angeles, which is a highly populated area with many airports.  After Los Angeles the 
numbers dropped drastically and were spread out over the entire state as depicted in Figures 22 
and 23. Both a figure listing of all sightings is displayed as well as the top ten for better visual 
effects.  
     
 Figure 22. UAS 2014 sightings by California cities. 
  




 The third largest state was Texas with 37 sightings, and the majority were in either 
Houston or the Dallas/Fort Worth area, which are both densely populated. Texas had about 60% 
less sightings than Califiornia, but it is 69% larger than California. This may bring in additional 
ideas for further research on the density of the states population. Figure 24 and Figure 25 show 
those results.  
   
Figure 24. Texas UAS sightings FYQ1 2021. 
 
Figure 25.  Size comparison of Texas compared to California. 
      The next report reviewed was the FY2020Q4, which had 484 sightings for a three-month 




remaining top ten from FY2021Q1 were in the top ten. Figures 26 and 27 show the numbers, and 
Figure 28 gives a chart with top ten state numbers for the 484 sightings. Again, it was observed 
that the top three were California, Florida, and Texas.  
 
Figure 26. FAA UAS U.S. sightings FY2020Q4. 
 







Figure 28. Top ten UAS U.S. sightings FY2020Q4. 
Texas had 36 sightings with Dallas/Fort Worth in the top place, while Florida is in fourth 
place with 33 sightings.  The most sightings for Florida were in Miami (Figures 29 and 30). The 
data show that the last two quarters were about the same for sightings of drones in the wrong 








Figure 29. UAS Texas Sightings FY2020Q4. 
 
Figure 30. UAS Florida sighting FY2020Q4. 
       In summary, the data for two consecutive quarters show that the sightings remain at over 
100 sightings a month.  In addition, the sightings are in densely populated areas, and the report 
showed that U.S. states are consistent from quarter to quarter.  It should also be noted that of the 
873,000 registered drones, fewer than 1/10 of one percent have been where they do not belong.  
This may be a small number, but it could be catastrophic if improper use of a drone causes loss 




     Person/occupation giving the report to the FAA.  For the two UAS sightings reports 
evaluated, 95% of the information came from an FAA air traffic controller.  The summary was 
not clear as to the sequence of events for reporting.  The information presented in the sightings 
report displayed that almost all the incidents were given to air traffic control from pilots.  Once 
ATC received the material, they had to document the information in some type of format to relay 
the data to the FSDO.  The initial reporting and gathering of data took away the primary focus of 
both the controller and the pilot of the manned aircraft reporting the situation throughout the 
process. This shows additional tasking for the air traffic controllers in a work environment that 
was already very busy.  This will be discussed further in Chapter 5 in the findings and 
recommendations section. 
       Law enforcement involvement.  Next the summary of the UAS sightings report was 
studied and the majority showed some type of law enforcement involvement.  The summary area 
of the report combined different items; however, having information on the number of sightings 
reports that were referred to some type of law enforcement agency and whether there was 
mention of a possible cyber threat could be significant.  This was partially because the FAA 
emphasizes penalties to the drone operator for being in the wrong place and the FAA also 
encourages people to report sightings of drones doing illegal activities.  Most of the reports state 
that law enforcement had been notified however, they do not expand of what was done in most 
reports.  The first report covering November 2014 to August 2015 had over 750 reports or about 
75 a month.  Of those, the summary showed that about 50% involved law enforcement.  Both the 
FY2021Q1 and FY2020Q4 showed that almost 85% had been referred to law enforcement 
agencies.  As this is a summary of the sightings it does not include information about law 




However, the GAO 2018 did provide some valuable information on the range of actions 
that can be used to tackle noncompliance and unsafe acts.  The FAA has limited funding to 
enforce these actions, but they are able to impose a fine of up to $20,000, which may be one way 
to obtain more resources for enforcement and education.  Table 3 depicts actions taken between 
2007 and 2018. 
Table 3 Number of Actions Taken by the FAA to Address Noncompliant or Unsafe Use of sUAS 
Number of Actions Taken by the FAA to Address Noncompliant or Unsafe Use of sUAS 
 
Note. (GAO, 2018, 18-110) 
      Human factors indicators.  Of the approximately 1600 incidents reviewed for the initial 
10-month period and the last two quarters, about 95% (1500) did not involve PDCA any evasive 
actions.  That does not mean there were not HF indicators; it just means none were brought up or 
stated in the report.  In Chapter 5 there is discussion about which HFs have been involved that 




controller in ensuring safe and expeditious control of manned aircraft with unmanned aircraft in 
the vicinity. 
      Cyber security indicators.  The 1600 reports were scanned from a high level to observes 
and look for indicators that a cyber incident took place along with an unauthorized location of 
the sUAS.  Though over 90% of the reports were forwarded to law enforcement of some type, 
not a single summary indicated it was a cyber incident.  This, coupled with the analysis from the 
ASRS reports that stated lost communication between the controller was about 5%. Lost 
communication could come from equipment failure and could be caused by a malicious attack. A 
malicious attack on communication systems is a cyber threat, which will be examined in the 
Chapter 5. 
Summary 
In summary, this chapter focused on data analysis to find answers for the research 
questions.  It began with a review of the pilot study conducted by Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) 
that focused on HFs that should be considered for safe incorporation of drones in the NAS.  Of 
note is that controllers depicted incidents in that study that caused interference and could impact 
SA, communication, and workload, which are all HFs in ATC (Cardosi & Lennertz, 2017).  It 
was also noted that most of the self-reported incidents in the 2017 report were military drones. 
NASA’s ASRS reports were used from 2019 to see what had changed in two years.  
Additionally, the NASA report forms were used to ensure that nothing had changed in the items 
that were reported.  It was found that most of the current reports that involved sUAS were still 
mainly generated by manned aircraft crew.  The analysis also showed that lost communication, 
SA, and workload were impacted by the smaller drones too.  The final data analyzed were from 




between the two types of reporting and that is the ASRS is voluntary and non-punitive while the 
FAA is mainly for punitive purposes.  Through analysis of the incidents both voluntary and 
punitive in nature, the research in previous chapters show that the research questions are 
answered and that recommendations may be made for safe integration of sUAS in the NAS along 
with recommendations for further research.  The next chapter of the research will answer the 





CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Concerns about a safe integration of sUAS in the NAS have been going on for over a 
decade.  With the rapid increase in use and waiver requests, the FAA has started to make 
changes to procedures, and they are allowing more usage of drones in places and for purposes 
that were different just three months ago.  This requires more research and analysis to ensure the 
changes do not have a negative impact on HF relationships for ATC. 
 Due to the anticipated rapid increase of drone usage in the NAS it is imperative to have a 
way to mitigate HFs errors in drone use, especially for the air traffic controller as they are often 
the front line for manned and unmanned aircraft from point A to point B. Human behavior in the 
operation of sUAS has been challenging in the last decade.  The literature review and data 
analysis showed in earlier chapters that as more humans are flying drones with minimum 
education of aviation and airspace, the more human errors have taken place.  This was evident in 
the review of ASRS reports, which are voluntary and non-punitive, along with the FAA UAS 
sightings reports that are reported for punitive purposes.  The reports used for analysis did not 
reflect data that could be used to prevent cyber incidents, and this is an area for further research 
that will be discussed in the recommendations. 
The literature review also showed that there was a lack of research that emphasized the 
air traffic controller’s role and the HFs as they applied to the controller.  This may be because 
many of the drone flights were not under ATC control.  It may also be because there have not 
been many reported accidents that involved drones.  The review, research, and analysis also 
showed that as more drones are flying and the more it jeopardizes air traffic controllers’ SA, 
communications procedures, and workload cognitive abilities (Cardosi & Lennertz, 2017; FAA, 




about HFs in drone use, and it is possible that some of the challenges with these factors arise 
because aircraft and operators are not located in the same place and because the air traffic 
controller is often not involved until there is an incident (McCarley & Wickens, n.d.).  The 
specific HF problems researched pertain to the air traffic controller, but they appear evident in 
the crew of both manned and unmanned aircraft. 
This study’s central research question focused on how air traffic controllers could 
minimize the impact of HFs while incorporating drones in the NAS.  The primary research 
question was: How can negative consequences of integration in commercial airspace between 
UAS and ATM systems be reduced, so that when incidents happen SA, and HF risks are 
negligeable?  
The study’s objective was to investigate how air traffic controllers could positively 
influence HFs as they pertain to drones in the NAS, thus minimizing negative results and 
increasing safer use of airspace.  The subsequent subquestions assisted in investigating the topic: 
1. What protocols could be identified to ensure air traffic controllers develop metrics for 
cognitive workload, SA, and HFs to ensure safe operations in the NAS of UAVs with 
other air traffic? 
2. What needs to be done to mitigate HF issues using risk management and safety 
management processes within the new operations of UAS in NAS? 
3. What are the factors that influence the implementation of UAS integration safely in 
the NAS?  
4. In what ways could the public’s perception be improved for increased support of 




5. What technology investments can be taken for communication and airspace 
management for safe operations of UAS within the NAS?  
6. What actions can be taken on the regulatory challenges for safe and efficient UAS 
operation in the NAS? 
The quantitative research focused on finding ways to mitigate negative consequences of 
integration of the sUAS in the NAS. This was done to answer all questions asked in Chapter 1 
and to present findings and recommendations in Chapter 6.  Chapter 6 will also discuss the 
limitations while doing the research, recommendations for future research, and a chapter 
summary. 
Limitations 
It can be assumed that all research faces some type of challenge.  These challenges need 
to be identified so they do not severely weaken the quality of the research.  As stated in Chapter 
1, “Limitations are usually areas over which you have no control.  Some typical limitations are 
sample size, methodology constraints, length of study and response rate” (Wargo, 2015, p. 15).   
Also, stated in Chapter 1, were the concerns on the validity of the data as neither the 
ASRS nor the FAA UAS sightings reports were mandatory.  To compensate for the situation, the 
background, and requirements of the two types of reports were reviewed.  With the ASRS report 
the NASA website was reviewed in the area and blocks on the forms that should be completed to 
report an unsafe situation.  This information on the ASRS forms that generate the reports were 
very detailed with boxes to check and a place for the reporter to put a narrative (ASRS, 2009).  
Additionally, those who evaluate the reports and make the information available to the public are 
well versed in the reports, their purpose, and the industry (NASA 2021).  Though the data may 




further analyzed to come up with recommendations to answer the critical research question and 
subquestions.  On the other hand, the FAA sightings report did permit some limitations in certain 
areas.  The reports show an increasing trend of reporting drones in locations they are not 
authorized to be in, but it was found that the summary did not do an analysis of the situation 
which gave the opportunity to delve into the summary to find causes and effects that led to the 
recommendations.  This limitation is addressed further in the findings in this chapter. 
The second limitation was that the reports may not show HF or indicate a cyber security 
threat.  The information that identifies HF situations, is better in the ASRS than in the FAA UAS 
sightings report, and this too will be addressed in this chapter.  The third limitation is that most 
reports are about situations close to airports; however, it still gave the opportunity for findings, 
recommendations, and further research.  The fourth limitation was that the data gathered were for 
snapshots of time and that was taken into consideration in the investigation of the statistics. 
The investigation tried to get FAA involvement in the FAA sightings reports, but none of 
the phone calls were returned.  This was the fifth limitation to the work and that the full use of 
the FAA sightings report was not available but led to further recommendations that will continue 
to give answers to the research questions.  These questions, though asked as a glimpse in time, 
could be repeated for continued research. 
It should also be noted that the researcher also attempted to explore the HFs from the 
perspective of a past air traffic controller and aeronautical engineer with over 30 years’ 
experience with HFs and aeronautical science.   
Findings and Interpretations 
Findings and interpretations will be examined as they pertain to the four reports analyzed 




and three FAA UAS sightings reports.  The findings may also link back to the pilot study 
completed by Cardosi and Lennertz (2017).  In addition, the supporting subquestions were 
examined to ensure the recommendation section reflected their intent.  A finding may pertain to 
more than one research question.  The process will follow the order of the analysis in that the 
NASA ASRS report will be deliberated first and then the FAA UAS sightings report.  The 
findings from the NASA ASRS report may, on occasion, link back to the Cardosi and Lennertz 
analysis as that is the pilot study that set up for this current research.  When possible, there is a  
link between findings to established research.  The following critical research question guided 
the research examination. 
Central Critical Research Question 
How can negative consequences of integration in commercial airspace between UAS and 
ATM systems be reduced, so that when incidents happen so that SA and HF risks are 
negligeable? 
 This question explored how sUAS and manned aircraft could jointly operate in the NAS 
with minimum HF impact to air traffic controllers and possibly ways to lower the incidents of 
unsafe interaction between manned and unmanned aircraft.  The primary finding from analysis of 
all three reports indicate that there are ways through training, particularly of air traffic 
controllers, to reduce human errors in the control of unmanned aircraft in the NAS.  The findings 
reveal that the FAA regulatory authority has overall responsibility to all stakeholders for the safe 
and orderly integration of sUAS in the NAS.  The finding places an emphasis on training and 
technology among other items and will be further examined in the recommendation section of 
this research.  Regarding training for air traffic controllers however, general awareness and 




controllers.  This general awareness and specific training of all stakeholders will minimize 
negative consequences related to HFs.  The ASRS NASA 2019 report will be examined first.  
A finding in the analysis of the ASRS report shows that a way to mitigate negative 
consequences is to use both the SHELL and SCM to find HF indicators in the narrative 
summary.  The phrase words, such as NMAC, SA, and altitude, could be lined up via the SCM to 
show the increased possibility of an accident.  In addition, the SHELL model was used to see the 
interactions between the software, hardware, environment, liveware and liveware.  The literature 
review showed that identifying HF indicators is the first step in finding ways to mitigate negative 
consequences (Cardosi & Lennertz, 2017).  Using the SHELL and SCM showed that 94% of the 
ASRS reports had an HF indicator.  Being able to determine the line ups with the SCM and the 
interconnections with the SHELL analysis is valid and reliable which supplied information that 
led to the recommendations.  The loss of SA was cited in over 50% of the reports (NASA, 2019 
a).  
This finding indicates that the drone pilot awareness of different elements of the SHELL 
configuration took place whether the report was filed by manned aircrew, ATC, or the drone 
pilot.  It also shows that this increases the risk of an accident with further analysis using the SCM 
(Reason, 2000).  Most of these drones were not under ATC control, but because they lost their 
SA some had strayed into airspace that was controlled by ATC.  This becomes additional 
workload and fatigue for the air controller.  This could also lead to loss of SA for the controller if 
they are overworked with unexpected or illegal air traffic (Cardosi & Lennertz, 2017).  
 Another finding is that 100% of the air traffic controllers’ reports conveyed negative 
consequences that involved HFs.  In all three reports the controller was able to mitigate the 




between a manned aircraft and two drones in special use airspace and had to issue an alert.  The 
controller noted in one incident that there was a communication breakdown during a heavy 
workload period (NASA, 2020). The second report from a controller involved an NMAC 
between a manned aircraft and a drone.  The controller stated that SA was lost by the controller 
(NASA, 2020).  The final report from a controller discussed human-machine interface and a loss 
of SA that may have been due to a lack of training and distraction.  The controller reported that 
separation was lost between a small transport aircraft and a drone (NASA, 2020). 
All incidents reported could have had severe negative consequences had the controllers 
not reacted as they did.  The reports also show that the information in the 2017 report by Cardosi 
and Lennertz is still valid, and mitigation strategies to integrate drones safely in the NAS needs 
to continue.  These incidences also showed that negative consequences were mitigated when SA, 
workload, fatigue, and distraction were present.  In the recommendation section there will be 
proposals to ensure mitigation of negative consequences are applied and that sUAS safely 
integrates into the NAS. 
Another finding in the analysis of the NASA ASRS report is that it is well organized, and 
the form is detailed with check boxes and a place for a narrative statement. Even if it is vague on 
UAS information the foundation is strong.  These two ways of obtaining information are very 
beneficial to the subject matter experts who analyzes the individual incidents.  This report 
information is also put together in a NASA report in a group of 50 incidents at a time.  This was 
beneficial in answering the main research question and the subquestions.  This material could be 
grouped for analysis for not just the air traffic controller HF area but for all stakeholders, thus 
ensuring minimum negative consequences of incorporation of sUAS in the NAS.  This is also 




validity to the data analyzed.  The finding that most incidents took place during authorized time 
slots is a good baseline indicator for tracking time zones as the rules and regulations change.  It 
was also found that the forms were detailed in HF indicators (NASA, 2009a, 2009b, and 2009c).  
Again, this type of emphasis on the form allows for valid systematic analysis of data. 
Other finding came from the FAA UAS sightings reports.  Some of the information 
brought forward to assist in the analysis of the current FAA UAS sightings reports came from the 
analysis in the GAO (2018) report.  The GAO discussed that the FAA may lack reliable 
information about the degree of unsafe use of sUAS in the NAS.  As stated in this research 
literature review and in the GAO report, and confirmed with the analysis of 2020 reports, the 
large number of reports are possible sightings, and the current analysis also found the reports 
offer only limited information (FAA, 2020c, 2020d; GAO, 2018).  Anyone can file a sightings 
report, and all are encouraged to file reports so that unauthorized activity can be fully punished 
(FAA, 2021).  These findings show that negative consequences of integration of drones in the 
NAS is possible.  These findings also show that situation awareness and other HFs can be 
minimized.  The study also revealed that the critical research question is answered with 
implementation of items from the subquestions; in other words, the subquestions should be 
written as statements of recommendations followed with ways that they can be accomplished. 
It could be stated that there are possibilities of negative HF consequences of integrating 
unmanned aircraft into the NAS; however, they can be mitigated by the following, which will be 
considered in detail in the recommendations. 
1. Increased collaboration between NASA, FAA, and UAST with oversight is 
imperative.  Protocols such as official procedures are being developed to ensure air 




SA and minimizing impact to the workload.  Rules are changing that include the 
following, and they must be monitored for continuous improvement. 
a.  Remote identification procedures (Remote ID) 
b.  Procedures for night flying 
c. Procedures for operations over people 
d. Protocols that focus on drone operations  
2. Continued development in risk management and safety management processes for 
integration of sUAS in the NAS that minimize HF implications for air traffic 
controllers.  
a. The UAST strongly supports an SMS in UAS operations.  
b. I, along with Cardosi and Lennertz (2017), believe that procedures need to be 
developed for controllers in training scenarios for practice in situations such 
as lost communication. 
c. The use of SHELL, SCM, and HFACS taxonomies through reporting, such as 
NASA, ASRS, and the FAA UAS sightings reports, need to be done along 
with continued research to improve these procedures and to see whether there 
are new taxonomies for ensure better safety analysis. 
3. Enhance positive public perceptions.  To positively influence the implementation of 
drone integration in the NAS, the relationship with the public must be improved by 
using five key principles that are founded in regulatory framework and under the “We 
are all one in the sky” concept by EASA.  These principles include: 




b. Continue the clarification of the responsibilities and liabilities for all 
stakeholders. 
c. Expand airspace capacity and value through integration, not separation. 
d. Maintain and improve the highest held safety levels in aviation 
e. Ensure a flexible framework is available for expanding and changing the UAS 
industry (IATA, 2021) 
4. Continued exploration of new technology options for sUAS. 
a.  A TCAS system for sUAS.  Technology that exists for TCAS on larger 
drones needs to be mined for applicability on sUAS. 
b. Maintained monitoring for improvements in Remote ID technology 
5. Sustainable assessment on operations that focus on issues for safe and efficient use of 
the NAS. 
a. Operational assessments of controllers with UAS experience 
b. Operational assessments by type of UAS operation 
c. Operational assessment between ATC, manned, and unmanned aircraft. 
6. Recurring analysis of data for mitigation of HF implications in the NAS 
a. ASRS data reports  
b. FAA UAS sightings reports 
The data available to the public as it stands now does not indicate any cyber security 
breaches or threats however, that does not mean they are not happening. This is another area for 





 Taxonomy is important as it assists in aligning terms and categorizing relationships.  The 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary stated that taxonomy is the “study of the general principles of 
scientific classification” (“Taxonomy,” n.d.).  This research used three articles (Rantanen, 
Palmer, Wiegmann, & Musiorski, 2006; Stojic, Vittek, Plos, & Lalas, 2015; UNICEF, 2014) to 
assist in the taxonomy, in the analysis of the research, and with recommendations for future 
research. 
        According to UNICEF, their intent was to form an organization-wide identification of what 
establishes research as there are benefits in ensuring all researchers and projects are aligned with 
a common theme (UNICEF, 2014).  For instance, this understanding could include all members 
involved with ongoing research would have a better understanding of the situation, and it could 
also ensure the efforts within UNICEF have outstanding quality assurance (UNICEF, 2014).  
The systematic taxonomy process they used for the research did and evaluation of studies which 
ed to an evaluation of taxonomy used in both HFs and air traffic control for strategies data 
collection and quantitative analysis of material.  
  Rantanen et al. (2006) focused on the relevance of main factors in aviation accidents 
being HFs.  Rantanen et al. stressed the importance of the information that NASA provided in 
their aviation safety programs.  They also stressed that as new technologies (i.e., drones) were 
brought into the NAS, new error prospects could be introduced and that understanding the 
relationships was paramount for evaluation and intervention.  They also put forward a framework 
focused on a matrix with the human operator, the task, and the environment, with additional 
taxonomy based on HFACS (Rantanen et al., 2006).  HFACS was reviewed in the literature and 




on taxonomy as it applied to aviation was paramount is charting out the HF implications 
associated with drones in the NAS.  It assisted in the proper linking of technologies employed in 
the use of drones as they relate to air traffic control and the airspace.  It allowed for scatter 
diagrams that identified high risk areas and for mitigation to minimize the risks and to further 
research ideas.  The task of providing comprehensive mapping between technologies and HFs 
has been available in aviation with manned aircraft, but it is relatively new for unmanned 
aircraft.  Rantanen et al. (2006) discussed it from the manned aircraft perspective, but I could not 
find any indication that they had used it in unmanned situations.  I believed these researchers 
agree that the taxonomy in the use of drone ATC relationships needs to be robust and is essential 
to the success of further research that mitigates HF risk of incorporation of the drones in the 
NAS.   
 The third analysis employed in reviewing the data and giving the recommendations came 
from understanding the taxonomies as they applied to aviation safety management systems 
(SMS).  Stojic, Vittek, Plos and Lalas (2015) focused on taxonomies that were broadly related in 
the aviation industry though not specifically in drone usage.  They reviewed taxonomies and 
their application with identifying subjects that were applied in this research that included drones.  
Stojic et al. also stressed that HFs are crucial parts in aviation safety.  There are shared 
taxonomies by organizations such as ICAO and the FAA that place importance of taxonomy 
development as systems are put together (Stojic et al., 2015).  This was beneficial to this research 
as the unmanned systems are being placed with manned systems, air traffic controllers, and in 
the NAS as this is a system of systems in a high-risk industry.  A taxonomy in use that they gave 
credit to was using HFACS, ASRS reports, are based on SHELL and Reason (2000).  However, 




importance of an efficient SMS program.  Hence, their work was very beneficial in the analysis 
of the data from the FAA and NASA and in the recommendations for next steps and research.  
Of special interest to this research is how they reviewed ASRS anomaly code taxonomy and 
HFACS as they apply to HFs.  They found that some of the codes may have been a bit vague and 
could be updated.  They also found that HFACS, due to the structure, may not be the best use for 
initial reporting (Stojic et al., 2015).  This current research also noted that the forms could be 
updated; the clarification could be better at assisting in ways to mitigate adverse situations.  It is 
possible there are better taxonomy procedures and that the possibility for further research exists 
to find common universal taxonomies. Though there were some limitations in taxonomies used 
in analyzing aviation safety, aviation is considered the safest mode of transportation.  The below 
recommendations are based on the study’s findings, analysis, and conclusions. 
Recommendations  
This study’s findings are focused on the current situation of mitigating HF implications 
for the air traffic controller.  The research and data analysis show that HF issues must be 
addressed on a continuous basis for safe and secure integration of drones in the NAS.  All 
stakeholders are actively involved in mitigating negative HFs associated with air traffic 
controllers, but the research also shows that there are opportunities for more collaboration 
between the stakeholders.  The research also highlighted the complexity of a system of systems 
with the air traffic controller as the center focal point for safe operations of sUAS in the NAS.  
This complex system of systems needs multi-faceted solutions to reach its full potential.  The 
current literature review gave the background for analysis of the ASRS 2018 NASA report and 
the FAA UAS sightings reports.  The analysis focused not only on the literature and the reports 




areas for further research and development.  Metrics for cognitive workload and SA need to be 
an integral part as the integration moves forward.  This can be accomplished by continued 
research and development of processes that employ a strong SMS foundation. This will ensure 
safe implementation and integration.  The stakeholders must have continuous interaction with the 
public to ensure a positive perception of drone use is part of the solution moving forward.  As 
technology and regulations are rapidly changing, there needs to be continued operational 
assessments and analysis of mined data.  This will minimize human errors made by air traffic 
controllers and improve the understanding of all the opportunities that drones may bring to the 
economy.  
 There is a solid foundation for safe integration with a focus on HFs.  However, it is 
imperative to continue the development of the FAA’s Concept of Operations.  The Concept of 
Operations has foundational principals in both safety and security (FAA, 2020e) and both, 
through review of literature and data analysis employing SHELL and SCM and other 
taxonomies, show the relationship to human error.  Additionally, it is important for the 
stakeholders, as they continue to develop the roles and responsibilities and include scenarios and 
operational threads, to work closely with the recommendations from the GAO 2018 report with 
an emphasis on improved technology.  The analysis of the current data validates the GAO’s 
findings and recommendations.  
The next section will detail the recommendations and point out some of the practical and 
economic benefits along with safety and security that should ensure the continued minimization 
of ATC HF incidents as drone use grows in the NAS.  As stated before, there are numerous 
recommendations because with the complex challenges of new entrants in the NAS, multi-




recommendations needs to be placed on collaboration between stakeholders with regulators and 
users at the top of the list.  One of the most promising areas is that regulators globally are 
actively engaged in making the integration possible in a safe and secure manner.  COVID and its 
almost complete shutdown of commercial air traffic gave stakeholders time and opportunity to 
focus on all the possibilities for integration of sUAS operations. The results were that rules and 
regulations were changed during this time hence allowing for more operations in the industry 
(FAA, 2020a, 2020c, & 2020f). This also allowed a focus on research and development that led 
to some of the changes in the industry.  It is hoped that as air traffic for commercial operations 
starts to increase again that the research and development of sUAS traffic also continues.   
Regulation Changes for sUAS Operations 
      In the GAO report and the literature reviewed it was found that regulations and 
procedures changed in both the later part of 2020 and early 2021. The Remote ID, sUAS flight at 
night and sUAS flight over people are being updated with new and operational dates for 
compliance (GAO, 2018, FAA, 2020f & FAA, 2021b).   This will be briefly summarized with  
the recommendations that go with changing regulations.  Whenever regulations change, they 
must be monitored for impact to the industry.  The recommendation in this section will examine 
sUAS night flying and sUAS flights over people.  This gives the reader insight on the changes 
that may be needed to report procedures and the potential for further research.  The research 
shows that to integrate sUAS in the NAS these regulatory changes needed to take place.  The 
FAA Extension, Safety and Security Act of 2016 § 2202, FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 
2012 § 232, and the FAA, Integration of Civil Unmanned aircraft Systems (UAS) in the National 




      sUAS night flying and flights over people.  The literature review discussed operators 
filing waivers to fly their sUAS at night and over people. The regulations did not allow for flight 
over people however, they allowed an operator to file a waiver. These waivers were being filed 
so that operators could complete missions and for new opportunities in the industry. This was a 
time-consuming process, and many of the waivers were not granted.  The operations over people 
became effective April 21, 2021.  This falls under Part 107 and allows drone operations at night, 
over people, and over moving vehicles if the provisions in the rule are met.  This change is only 
for operations in uncontrolled airspace (FAA, 2020f).  The executive summary came out in 
December of 2020.  The final rule covers four categories of eligibility for operations over people, 
operations at night, and eligible aircraft.  This also mean that the testing for remote pilot 
knowledge will change (FAA, 2020f).  As this is a new FAA rule it has many HF error 
possibilities from both the operator and controller it needs to be monitored for obstacles. Doing 
continuous monitoring in a PDCA manner will ensure safer operations (Britton, 2018).  This 
research lists five current recommendations.  However, there may be more recommendations 
made as the maturity of the operations presents best practices and lessons learned. 
1. The FAA and other organizations need to encourage research and development in this 
area to include new technology for continued safe operations in the industry. 
2.  The FAA must ensure in the continued development of concepts of operations under 
safety and security and other areas as applicable that there be provisions for roles and 
responsibilities that reflect these changes. 
3. The FAA and NASA in reporting procedures find ways to incorporate these changes 




4. The FAA and NASA continue collaboration to educate the public on these changes to 
ensure positive public perception in safety and security. 
5. The FAA, as it changes the remote pilot testing, ensures that remote pilots also have 
the knowledge base reflected in online recurrent training and that this knowledge is 
free of charge. 
The literature review and investigation of the literature that pressures an involvement 
from stakeholders along with their detailed scientific investigation that included solutions led to 
the recent regulatory changes is imperative.  The changes to these regulations need to be 
incorporated in reporting procedures.  This will lead to further understanding and ideas for 
education and training for all stakeholders.  This will also lead to the next generation of 
regulation changes that may be essential for growth in sUAS industry.  However, if not properly 
monitored and revised they could increase human errors and negative consequences. 
Increased FAA oversight and collaboration with NASA and GAO.  Increased FAA 
oversight and collaboration between the FAA, NASA, and GAO are imperative.  Continuous 
collaboration assists in protocols being developed to ensure air traffic controllers are educated on 
HFs involved in sUAS in the NAS.  This will enhance SA and should minimize the impact to the 
workload with increased and diversified operations.  All these changes need to ensure that 
NASA and the FAA are working together in the endeavors and that they are encouraging GAO 
audits to identify areas of improvement. 
The GAO noted in their 2018 report the need for a traffic management system for drones 
that is similar to  the ATC system of manned aircraft is needed.  This collaboration was started in 
2013 by NASA and is considered a concept of UTM.  This concept would facilitate routine, 




allow for different operations and interactions.  This would possibly allow delivery of small 
packages, as proposed by Amazon and Google (GAO, 2018).  The literature review illustrated 
this concept, and the figure is presented again due to the significance of the research and 
development that will minimize HF errors and allow for rapid growth of the utilization of sUAS 
(Figure 31).   
 
Figure 31. NASA concept of UTM (GAO 18-110, 2018) 
 This concept has developed, and in March 2020 the Concept of Operation published 
version 2.0. It is recommended the continuation of the concepts for full integration of sUAS in 
the NAS goes forward as it evolves.  UTM is not considered a single full system for the 
continental United States but, according to NASA officials, will likely be composed of small 
local and regional systems.  Additionally, review of the analysis and statistics back up not only 
the GAO concept but also the speculative architecture from the FAA Version 2 concept as 
depicted in Figure 32 and Figure 33.  This architecture development will keep all stakeholders 
involved and ensure positive commitment leading to continuous solutions in the research topic 
area.  The evolution and maturity must continue so that HF errors are mitigated and cyber threats 




responsibilities of are divided.  This is what is needed in the next evolution of integration from 
the top down.  It is also recommended that as reports are developed for analysis of incidents, 
whether the reports come from NASA, ASRS, or the FAA, they take into consideration the UTM 
architecture as it will mitigate HF errors and increase SA for all stakeholders.  
 





Figure 33. Operational context of UTM services (FAA, 2020e). 
 
 Development and collaboration through reporting.  The current analysis of reports 
from both the FAA and NASA confirmed that there is still room for improvement in reporting.  
It is recommended that UAST, the FAA, and NASA collaborate on a standardized reporting 
system that is included in the FAA concept of Operations. This recommendation should also 
include more effective reporting using new technology.  This also backed up the pilot report 
from Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) that was used in the research.  The analysis also showed that 
current reporting is not as detailed or consistent as it needs to be to prevent human errors.  The 
GAO report proved reliable and valid in that current procedures do not give enough information 
because the reports cannot be verified in numerous areas.  The reporting is a good first 
generation, but it is time for analysis and improvement of the reporting protocol.  There are 
numerous ways for improvements in the reporting that also cross over into technology, 
regulation, policy, and procedures.  
    The UAST is a collaboration between industry and government for safe integration of 
drones in the NAS.  The UAST recommends a standard reporting format to analyze data in 
standard logical reports.  This data could then be used for legislation education and other 
outreach programs, thus ensuring the public receives correct information (UAST, 2020).  
Improving the format of the UAS sightings report used by pilots, aircrew, and controllers will 
enhance safety.  These reports, to reach their full potential to mitigate HF, controllers and 
operators need to do the following because they have shown that many of the sightings happen 
on final approach to airports.  The aircraft in the landing and takeoff phases are in a crucial time 




can increase the controller’s distraction. If there is a standard in place for pilots to report the 
information to the controller both the pilot and controller will understand the situation better. 
This could be enhanced through technology that automatically reports information on sUAS. 
This will decrease the cognitive workload and the distractions that can be caused by workload 
(UAST, 2020).  UAST members have been working on a list of reporting variables and 
formatting.  The analysis shows that the information collected and analysed between the different 
reports is very important to the future safety of the NAS. Collaboration needs to be done on a 
regular basis between the report writers. 
 Reports need to be verifiable and should consider: 
a. Better sUAS detection with RADAR 
i. Remote ID continued development 
b. Review of existing reporting tools such as the ASRS and laser sightings to ensure 
safety data are collected on UAS accidents 
c. Technology for pilots to assist with positive identification of: 
i. Distance from the observed position 
ii. Speeds of both manned and unmanned aircraft 
iii. Ways to minimize other factors competing with pilots’ and controllers’ 
attention 
iv. TCAS development for sUAS 
d. Better ways to determine the validity of the report  
i. Review and revision of data to ensure correct and sufficient information is 
available for analysis 




iii. Show security in addition to safety indicators  
iv. Further investigation (An example is that some reports state a UAS however, 
there was no way to do follow up work.  This may mean research needs to be 
done that develops a completely different form of reporting.) 
The FAA has worked well with NASA and other organizations to improve the data it 
collects on sUAS operations; however, it must continue to seek new data for collaboration in 
safety and security.  It should also continue developing the web-based and FAA-based reporting 
system the public uses to report UAS that may be a safety or security concern.  Finally, in 
reporting procedures, it is recommended that high stakeholders such as FAA, NASA, and UAST 
develop surveys to determine the UAS anticipated growth and activities to meet the demand. 
Risk Management through Safety Management Systems (SMS) 
Another recommendation from the UAST for safe UAS operations is that risk 
management can be accomplished using an SMS program (UAST, 2020).  This is because 
having a good safety management program has been proven to work in other parts of the aviation 
industry it is a proven product. The program is a well-designed method to make knowledgeable 
decisions, and it will assist with safe drone integration.  This is applicable at both the individual 
and organizational levels.  The concept is recognized globally, and the literature review briefly 
discussed ICAO’s safety management manual document 9859.  A SMS is an approach that 
manages safety through structures and accountabilities.  SMS consists of safety policies, risk 
management, safety assurance, and promotion (ICAO, 2017).  SMS has been used in the aviation 
industry and has proven that it can produce increased assurance in risk controls through its 
structure.  Risk management and safety management processes are being developed for 




established risk mitigation strategy that involves regulators, auditors, operators, and controllers 
that use a risk management strategy that most in the industry are familiar with and have used in 
the past for commercial air operations. This new SMS program will be tailored to drones.  There 
are many benefits to a structured SMS UAS program including accountability to manage safety 
before a failure or incident, increased assurance in risk controls with processes that include 
safety assurance, and a way to create and advocate for a comprehensive safety culture.  This has 
been done in commercial aviation through four safety elements: policy, risk management, 
assurance, and promotion (Figure 34).  
 
Figure 34. FAA SMS components (UAST, 2020). 
The framework UAST has proposed is valid and reliable as it bases it foundation on the 
well-established program as it is being already being incorporated in the aviation industry. that 
The framework for the UAST may be done on a voluntarily basis as successful SMS for 
commercial aircraft started under this concept, and it allowed for a more robust program.  The 
framework of the procedures should understand UAS operations under CFR 14 Parts 91, 107, 




practices in the use of commercial UAS.  An ideal situation would be that this framework could 
fill identified gaps in minimum operating regulations.  This would lead to training and risk 
management policies and procedures that could be done from the analysis of the level of the risk 
involved in the operation.  As the use of SMS developed in manned commercial flight became 
widely accepted and trusted, it is believed that public trust and acceptance would grow in the use 
of sUAS in the NAS. 
Expanded Training to include UAS Human Factor/Air Traffic Situations for Controllers 
Controllers need to have information and tools to minimize human errors, and drones 
continue to be integrated in both controlled and uncontrolled airspace.   Cardosi and Lennertz 
(2017), and this research show that training scenarios need to be developed for controllers in to 
practice in situations such as lost communication and loss of SA.  Operational issues have been 
identified from ASRS reports and other research conducted. This should be continued to be 
identify human error situations.  Experimental research through simulated scenarios will help 
identify solutions.  As knowledge and technology continue to expand in human-in-the-loop 
interactions, simulation could be done with experienced pilots and controllers to find best 
practices to mitigate human errors such as loss of SA and other work overload factors. 
Understanding how these situations impact experienced operators would also assist in training 
less experienced operators.  
Expanded Taxonomy research with SHELL, SCM and Other Methodologies 
The use of SHELL, SCM, HFACS, and SMS taxonomies analysis is important when 
analyzing HFs to minimize errors.  This should continue with the analysis of reports from 
NASA, ASRS, and the FAA UAS sightings.  Additionally, if there are new taxonomies to ensure 




security analysis needs to be expanded to minimize cyber threats as these also pose HF 
implications.  The current ASRS and FAA UAS sightings reports focus on safety, and there 
needs to be a way to analyze security threats of drones in the NAS similar to safety issues for 
consistency in effectiveness of reporting that could be analyzed.  The research shows that it is 
only a matter of time before a drone is used in some type of cyberattack and that the rapid 
growth in the use drones may mean there is a growth in security implications.  This research 
could not find the links in the data analysis from NASA and the FAA that combine safety and 
security.  More research is needed in that area to analyze taxonomies that could be employed in 
the security aspect.  One such taxonomy that could assist in the security aspect of integration of 
sUAS is the STRIDE threat model taxonomy developed by Adam Shostack to categorize 
common types of cyber threats in six areas (Beyene et al., 2020).  The taxonomy was originally 
for software development, but the six areas could also be used for analysis of cyber security 
threats related to UAS.  Figure 35 illustrates the STRIDE threat taxonomy.  Further research 
needs to be done to see whether data gathered through STRIDE could then be worked into SMS 
risk management or some type of ASRS or FAA database for an analysis that combines safety 
and security.  This could also work with the recommendation of creating possible attack 
scenarios for air traffic controllers for training. 
 




Public Positive Perception and We are all One Sky 
To positively influence the implementation of drone integration in the NAS, the FAA 
needs to improve the relationship with the public by using five key principles founded in the 
regulatory framework and under the “We are all one in the sky” motto of the EASA.  These 
principles include: 
1.  Enabling communal airspace SA through knowledge interchange. 
2.  Continue the clarification of the responsibilities and liabilities for all stakeholders. 
3.  Expand airspace capacity and value through integration, not separation. 
4.  Maintain and improve the highest held safety levels in aviation 
5.  Ensure a flexible framework is available for the expanding and changing UAS 
industry (IATA, 2021). 
     As the research showed, drones are changing many aspects of everyday life in the 
aviation industry.  The research also showed the importance of ensuring a secure, safe, and 
sustainable integration of the sUAS.  EASA’s support of these concepts of sUAS use within the 
manned aviation framework is an example that could be used globally.  
Emerging Technologies for sUAS 
Technology advancements are the primary reason there is the possibility of sUAS 
operations in the NAS.  Due to the onboard mechanisms that can be commanded remotely and 
the lightweight and small size of sUAS, they have the potential for the fastest growth of 
opportunities in the air transportation industry.  Advancements in technology often mean more 
HF stressors for the human-in the-loop (i.e., the air traffic controller in this research).  However, 
the research shows that the HF/ATC negative implications for sUAS incorporation in the NAS 




and other similar regulatory authorities such as EASA, ICAO and NAS.  NASA and others have 
collaborated since 2011 on technical opportunities and advancements.  Exploration of new 
technology options for sUAS using Remote ID have finally came together with regulations 
taking effect in spring 2021, and recommendations are provided for implementation of the 
regulation.  Also, no literature reviewed revealed an FAA or Department of Transportation 
endorsement of TCAS for sUAS, it will also be discussed as a recommendation from the 
perspective of DAA work that is being conducted by NASA. 
Remote identification of unmanned aircraft systems (Remote ID).  Having remote ID 
will help the FAA and other federal agencies in addition to law enforcement finding the control 
station for a sUAS or any other drones.  In addition, this is a foundation that combines both 
safety and security in the integration of drones with manned aircraft in both controlled and 
uncontrolled airspace.  The recent regulation of Remote ID use for sUAS was approved and went 
into effect on April 21, 2021 (FAA, 2021c).  This new regulation forces most drones operating 
the NAS to have Remote ID installed on the drone over a period.  This requirement will provide 
identification, location, altitude, and where the drone departed from to assist in public safety and 
operations of drones (FAA, 2021b).  Having the ability to locate and identify the UAS will 
greatly assist in providing additional SA to controllers and manned and unmanned aircraft 
operators.  This is a significant step in mitigating HF errors in the integration of drones in the 
NAS.  It is also a crucial step that is needed for the continued unmanned traffic management 
(UTM) procedures.  There are three ways a drone pilot will be able to meet these FAA 
requirements. 
1. Operate a standard remote ID drone 




3. Operate (without remote ID equipment (FAA, 2021c). 
Figure 36 illustrates these concepts.  The FAA has compliance dates for both the 
manufacture and the operators.  The effective date is March 16, 2021, and the manufacture will 
have 18 months to comply, while the operator will have 30 months to comply with the 
regulation.  In addition, all drone pilots who are required to register their drones must comply 
with the regulations. 
 
Figure 36. FAA concept of three ways drone pilots will meet remote ID rule (FAA, 2021 c). 
The FAA is being very proactive with this “digital licence plate” program for the UAS 
and NAS community.  The program is establised under a new Part 89 in the title of the Code of 
Federal regulations. It provided operating rules, design, and production rules for manufactures, 
as well as other provisions (FAA, 2021d).  To assist in the implementation of the new rule, the 
FAA also made a RemoteID Tool Kit.  This should address some of the  gaps found in being able 
to properly identify drones so that HF errors could be minimized and properly address safety and 




program is established there are many opportunities for research that could help in both ongoing 
operational assessment and data analysis. 
 Ongoing operational assessments.  As integration of drones is an ongoing process it is 
imperative that there are opportunities for continuous action on operational assessments that 
focus on issues for safe and efficient use of the NAS.  These include:  
1. Operational assessments of controllers with UAS experience 
2. Operational assessments by type of UAS operation 
3. Operational assessment between ATC and manned and unmanned aircraft 
Data analysis improvement.  While the new procedures are going into effect research 
could be done that would expand the capabilities of use of the reports available through the FAA 
and NASA, along with the possibility of developing new reports as this would assist with the 
following: 
1. Continued analysis of data for mitigation of HF implications in the NAS 
2. ASRS data reports updated to have areas that are specific to UAS 
3. FAA UAS sightings reports 
4. Development of a security type of report 
Detect and avoid (DAA) and Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS). 
To safely fly BVLOS, DAA has been emerging as a field of study for a means of risk mitigation 
in collisions.  Additionally, TCAS has also been researched for unmanned aircraft as it has 
worked well in assisting manned aircraft avoid collision (Fern, Kenny, Shively, & Johnson, 
2012; NASA, 2015; Zeitlin & McLaughlin, 2006).  This research is being done to ensure sUAS 
are granted full admittance to public airspace. In addition, collision avoidance procedures also 




moving much faster than ideas with TCAS.  It is recommended that NASA continue the work 
they started in 2011 to support the development and validation of DAA technology that is needed 
to integrate UAS in the NAS (NASA, 2019).  NASA came to the forefront after research was 
completed on the possibilities of developing TCAS in 2006 and 2010.  This may have happened 
because there was concern that TCAS was being considered as a primary source of collision 
avoidance, and it was not designed for that; rather it was designed as a back up to a primary 
means of avoidance (Fern et al., 2012).  Though all TCAS systems provide some level of 
collision threat alert, it has been discouraged by the FAA for use on the sUAS as noted by Fern 
et al.  Their research agreed with FAA research that asserted the use of TCAS for sUAS should 
not be used to maintain self-separation or to provide better SA because the data could give 
inaccurate and incomplete information on the TCAS display.  Fern et al. research showed that 
fluctuating concentration of traffic had anticipated effects on air traffic controllers’ workload to 
include loss of separation and SA.  This gives further verification of the significant role ATC 
plays in maintaining separation in controlled airspace (Fern et al., 2012).  Their simulation 
experiment had encouraging results that controllers’ workloads were maintainable with the 
introduction of UAS into the controllers’ sector; however, if the rapid growth of UAS operations 
continue, ATC workload limits need further research to develop a tool that could assist in 
collision avoidance.   
Zeitlin and McLaughlin (2006) stressed the importance of modeling in developing a type 
of UAS sense-and-avoid standards.  They also concurred with Fern et al. (2012) and the FAA 
that using the TCAS II, the world standard for manned aircraft, may be problematic due to safety 
calculations.  An interesting point they brought forward is the fact that because the UAS is 




Mclaughlin, 2006).  They still recommend that a collision avoidance system needs to be 
developed.   
Tabassum, Sabatini, and Gardi (2019) took the research a step further by discussing 
safety assessment of DAA systems to identify the risk of collision of UAS with other flight 
vehicles.  They stressed the important fault tree analysis (FTA) being used to measure system 
unavailability for each component.  This and area that NASA should review as they have looked 
at the interdependencies on the systems in the UAS. The acceptance of a unified framework in 
UAS DAA is needed (Tabassum et al., 2019).   
Cyber Security 
In the literature review there is significant data available to show the possibility of a 
cyber security breach using a drone to do malicious work however it may have been more 
speculative.  There is also current research on HFs in cybersecurity in the use of drones.  
However, the data analyzed did not have details that pertain to cyber security HFs in the 
integration of drones in the NAS.  Based on this study it is recommended that HF specialists 
familiar with air traffic control, UAS, and cybersecurity professionals need to be part of the team 
that incorporates cyber security into tools that could be used to assess incidents and mitigate 
cyberattacks in the NAS.  There is research available that recommends the FAA fully implement 
better security practices for better oversight in avionic cybersecurity risks (GAO, 2020).  
Additionally, the FAA has an annual cybersecurity awareness symposium under the ATO that 
pursues the advancement of cybersecurity awareness, collaboration, and partnership with all 
stakeholders (FAA, 2020g).  This partnership could implement more effective security training 
and awareness that would implement continuous training that changes as the threats change 




would be a way to get all involved more in the HFs that lead to errors related to cybersecurity 
issues in the use of drones in the NAS. 
Recommendations for Future Research  
As air traffic control is a part of a system of systems and often requires multi-faceted 
solutions for advancement in safe and secure air traffic management, there are many 
opportunities for additional areas of research.  Continued HF research is needed in all areas of 
recommendation for continued validation and mitigation of human errors.  One reason is because 
technology and growth of UAS types and operations will continue at a rapid rate.  The first 
recommendation is to conduct research that utilizes SMS principles and audits to continue safe 
and secure operations.  The research should look at both quantitative and qualitative research that 
can employ the Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) approach as it will render continuous improvement 
and resolve problems (Britton, 2018).  This loop of planning, doing, checking, and acting will 
assist principles for continuous safe and secure operations of drones in the NAS.  It will also 
minimize air traffic control human errors.  The second recommendation is to conduct qualitative 
research that focuses on the HFs already identified that could also fall under cybersecurity to see 
if air traffic controllers are aware of possible cyber incidents that impact HFs as they relate to the 
controller.  The third recommendation comes from the identified gap in the FAA UAS sightings 
reports and that is to conduct research to develop reports like the ASRS that could assist in 
identifying cyber threats. This is possibly one of the strongest areas that could employ some type 
of technology to be more effective. 
As collision avoidance is stressful to the controller and operators, is a primary cause of 
loss of SA, and is a huge stressor for workload, another recommendation for future research is to 




beyond visual sight.  Collision avoidance may also benefit from more research as in Remote ID 
for drones.  There should be a way to monitor and develop case studies in the three required 
ways to use Remote ID technology. 
Original Contribution to Knowledge 
 This quantitative study contributes to the original body of knowledge in HFs by 
investigating the human error possibilities in drone integration from the air traffic controller 
perspective.  Air traffic controllers are crucial to the safe integration of sUAS in the NAS, but 
their role had been overlooked as the majority of sUAS were operated in uncontrolled airspace 
and had little interaction with air traffic control.  The majority of the research that had been done 
on HFs and drones focused on the machine and/or the pilot of the drone.  This study attempted to 
rectify the scarcity of research from the controller’s perspective as the center human-in-the-loop 
and the sUAS to reduce human errors while integrating sUAS in the NAS. 
   The study developed and employed a conceptual framework that used data from diverse 
reports and combined different models in HF analysis from the SHELL, HFACS, and SCM.  
This type of combination had recently been explored in ATC from the tower and radar, but this 
study added in the sUAS integration.  The conceptual framework contributes to the scholarly 
models, work, and philosophies already in place to mitigate HF errors in air traffic management.  
This study’s conceptual framework may be reused as new technology and procedures are put into 
place and regulated for the use of sUAS incorporation in the NAS.  This will continue to reduce 
or mitigate HF errors from not only the ATC perspective, but all stakeholders involved in the 
safe and secure incorporation of drones in the NAS. 
 Another contribution in this study is that it brought together diverse work from the 




some of the latest ideas in technology such as Remote ID.  Encapsulating and using the high-
level stakeholders with some of the newest technology through analysis of the SHELL and other 
research models have led to ways to train stakeholders, inform the public, and employ mitigation 
procedures.  This process also contributes to a continuous improvement or mitigation of HF 
errors by employing the plan-do-check-act integration with each generation of opportunities to 
use UAS in the NAS.  This is critical to the future of sUAS in the NAS and the aviation industry.   
Summary 
The purpose of this quantitative research was to explore the status of HFs as they apply to 
air traffic controllers as they continue to incorporate drones in the NAS.  By identifying 
vulnerabilities and mitigating HF incidents and errors, it is possible for drones to assist in 
economic growth in many industries.  The research indicated that the stakeholders are aware of 
HFs in aviation associated with drones in the NAS, but the focus was more on the pilots of the 
manned aircraft.  The research showed there is an understanding of HF in aviation and that the 
knowledge available can be easily transferred to controllers to mitigate HF errors.  This 
knowledge will also mitigate HF errors for pilots of both the manned and unmanned aircraft.  
The specific HFs that present a problem appear to focus on workload and SA.  This study’s 
critical research question was, how can negative consequences of integration in commercial 
airspace between UAS and ATM systems be reduced, so that when incidents happen SA and HF 
risks are negligeable?  The critical subquestions were: What protocols could be identified to 
ensure air traffic controllers develop metrics for cognitive workload, SA, and other HF to ensure 
safe operations in the NAS of UAVs with other air traffic?  What needs to be done to mitigate 
HF issues using risk management and safety management processes within the new operations of 




in the NAS?  In what ways could public perception be improved for increased support of 
integration of UAS in the NAS?  What technology investments can made for communication and 
airspace management for safe operations of UAS within the NAS?  What action can be taken on 
the regulatory challenges for safe and efficient UAS operation in the NAS? 
A literature review was performed on the research on the topics associated with the 
research questions.  Research was also conducted via keyword searches from the critical research 
question and the subquestions. Scholarly articles, dissertations, textbooks, and conference 
journals were reviewed.  The abstracts of the articles were reviewed for clarity and proper 
application of the research area.  The bibliographies and references were reviewed for other 
keywords to search to enhance the objectives of the research.  Additionally, regulations, laws, 
and regulatory organizations for policies and procedures as they pertained to the research topic 
were reviewed.  Additionally, some of the some of the industry’s virtual roundtables and 
conferences were attended to stay abreast of the fast-paced changes in UAS operations and HFs.  
Assembling this material allowed the accomplishment of the study’s objectives with emphasis on 
mitigation on HFs for air traffic controllers as they incorporate drones in the NAS.  This makes 
for safe and secure integration of drones in the NAS.  As the integration of drones continues to 
be dynamic in the air transportation industry for the unforeseeable future, it is imperative that all 
stakeholders advocate for continuous research in HFs associated with air traffic controllers and 
the incorporation of drones in the NAS from both a safety and security perspective.  This will 
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APPENDIX A: ASRS NASA REPORT FORMS 
A 
DO NOT REPORT AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES ON THIS FORM. 
ACCIDENTS AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE ASRS PROGRAM AND SHOULD NOT BE SUBMITTED TO NASA. 
ALL IDENTITIES CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT WILL BE REMOVED TO ASSURE COMPLETE REPORTER ANONYMITY. 
(SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR ASRS DATE/TIME STAMP) 
IDENTIFICATION STRIP: Please fill in all blanks to ensure return of ID strip to you. 
NO RECORD WILL BE KEPT OF YOUR IDENTITY. This section will be returned to you. 
 
TELEPHONE NUMBERS where we may reach you for further details of this occurrence: 
 
HOME Area No.  Hours    
WORK Area No.  Hours    
TYPE OF EVENT/SITUATION 
NAME       
ADDRESS/PO BOX       
DATE OF OCCURRENCE    
 
(MM/DD/YYYY) 






PLEASE FILL IN APPROPRIATE SPACES AND CHECK ALL ITEMS WHICH APPLY TO THIS EVENT OR SITUATION. 
REPORTER 
In what type of facility do you work?  Tower  TRACON  Center FSS Facility ID    
Describe your ATC qualifications.   Fully Certified  Developmental Time certified on position/sector: yrs mos 
What is your ATC experience in years? radar  non-radar military  supervisor    
What was your control position or 
activity during the occurrence? 




 enroute  flight service  trainee  supervisor/CIC 
 flight data/  ground  local  traffic management 
clrnc delivery  handoff/assist  oceanic  other    
Was instruction a factor?   no  yes    Reset  I was instructing  I was receiving training 
Do you have pilot experience?   no  yes hours Reset  instrument rated 
AIRSPACE  CONDITIONS / WEATHER ELEMENTS LIGHT / VISIBILITY 
 Class A  Class E 
 
 Class B  Class G 
 
 Class C  Special Use 
 








 fog  snow 
 hail  thunderstorm 
 haze/smoke  turbulence 
 icing  windshear 
 rain  other:    
 dawn  night 
 daylight  dusk 
Ceiling  feet 
Visibility  miles 
RVR feet 
AIRCRAFT 1 AIRCRAFT 2 
Your Aircraft Type (Make/Model) 
(e.g. B737, Not "N #", Flt #", etc.):    
Operating 
FAR Part:    
Other 
Aircraft:     
Operating 
FAR Part:     
Operator  air carrier 







 other:    
 air carrier  fractional  military 
 air taxi  FBO  personal 
 corporate  government  other:    





 other:    
 passenger  cargo/freight  ferry 
 personal  training  other:    




 none  VFR  SVFR  none 
 IFR  DVFR 
Flight Phase  taxi 
 parked 
 takeoff 




 initial approach 
 final approach 
 missed / GAR 
 landing 
 other:    
 taxi  climb  final approach 
 parked  cruise  missed / GAR 
 takeoff  descent  landing 
 initial climb  initial approach  other:    
Route 
in Use 
 airway (ID):  STAR (ID):  visual approach 
 direct  oceanic  none 
 SID (ID):  vectors  other:    
 airway (ID):  STAR (ID):  visual approach 
 direct  oceanic  none 
 SID (ID):  vectors  other:    
If more than two aircraft were involved, please describe the additional aircraft in the "Describe Event/Situation" section. 
LOCATION CONFLICTS 
Altitude: (single value)  MSL  AGL Estimated miss distance in feet:    horiz vert    
Distance: and/or Radial (bearing): from: Was evasive action taken?  Yes  No 
 Airport    
 
 ATC Fac     Was TCAS a factor?  TA O RA  No  






NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM 
NASA has established an Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) Section 91.25 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 91.25) prohibits 
to identify issues in the aviation system which need to be addressed. reports filed with NASA from being used for FAA enforcement purposes. This 
The program of which this system is a part is described in detail in FAA report will not be made available to the FAA for civil penalty or certificate 
Advisory Circular 00-46E. Your assistance in informing us about such actions for violations of the Federal Air Regulations. Your identity strip, 
issues is essential to the success of the program. Please fill out this form stamped by NASA, is proof that you have submitted a report to the Aviation 
as completely as possible, enclose in an sealed envelope, affix proper Safety Reporting System. We can only return the strip to you, however, 
postage, and and send it directly to us. if you have provided a mailing address. Equally important, we can often 
obtain additional useful information if our safety analysts can talk with 
The information you provide on the identity strip will be used only if NASA     you directly by telephone. For this reason, we have requested telephone 
determines that it is necessary to contact you for further information. THIS numbers where we may reach you. 
IDENTITY STRIP WILL BE RETURNED DIRECTLY TO YOU. The return 
of the identity strip assures your anonymity. Thank you for your contribution to aviation safety. 
 
NOTE: AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS SHOULD NOT BE REPORTED ON THIS FORM. SUCH EVENTS SHOULD BE FILED WITH THE NATIONAL 
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD AS REQUIRED BY NTSB Regulation 830.5 (49CFR830.5). 
 
Paperwork Reduction Act Statement - This information collection meets the requirements of 44 U.S.C. § 3507, as amended by section 2 of the Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 1995. You do not need to answer these questions unless we display a valid Office of Management and Budget control number. The OMB 
control number for this information collection is 2700-0172 and it expires on 7/31/2022. We estimate that it will take about 30 minutes to read the instructions, 
gather the facts, and answer the questions. You may send comments on our time estimate above to: P.O. Box 189 Moffett Field, CA 94035-0189. Send only 
comments relating to our time estimate to this address. 
If you want to mail this form, please fold pages, enclose in a sealed, stamped envelope, and mail to: 
NASA AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM 
POST OFFICE BOX 189 
MOFFETT FIELD, CA 94035-0189 
 
DESCRIBE EVENT/SITUATION 
Keeping in mind the topics shown below, discuss those which you feel are relevant and anything else you think is important. Include what you believe really caused the 
problem, and what can be done to prevent a recurrence, or correct the situation. (USE ADDITIONAL PAPER IF NEEDED) 
CHAIN OF EVENTS Page 2 of 3 HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS 
- How the problem arose 
- Contributing factors 
- How it was discovered 
- Corrective actions 
 - Perceptions, judgments, decisions - Actions or inactions 






DESCRIBE EVENT/SITUATION (continued) 
CHAIN OF EVENTS Page 3 of 3 HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS 
- How the problem arose - How it was discovered 
- Contributing factors - Corrective actions 
- Perceptions, judgments, decisions - Actions or inactions 







DO NOT REPORT AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES ON THIS FORM. 
ACCIDENTS AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE ASRS PROGRAM AND SHOULD NOT BE SUBMITTED TO NASA. 
ALL IDENTITIES CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT WILL BE REMOVED TO ASSURE COMPLETE REPORTER ANONYMITY. 
 
IDENTIFICATION STRIP: Please fill in all blanks to ensure return of ID strip to you. 
NO RECORD WILL BE KEPT OF YOUR IDENTITY. This section will be returned to you. 
 
TELEPHONE NUMBERS where we may reach you for further details of this occurrence: 
 
(SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR ASRS DATE/TIME STAMP) 
 
HOME Area    
WORK Area    
No.  
No.    
Hours  




TYPE OF EVENT/SITUATION 
NAME       
ADDRESS/PO BOX       
DATE OF OCCURRENCE    
(MM/DD/YYYY) 




PLEASE FILL IN APPROPRIATE SPACES AND CHECK ALL ITEMS WHICH APPLY TO THIS EVENT OR SITUATION. 
REPORTER FLYING TIME (in hours) CERTIFICATES & RATINGS ATC EXPERIENCE 
 Captain 
 First Officer 
 Single Pilot 
 Instructor 
 
Total Time    hrs 
 Student 
 Sport/Rec 






 pilot flying 
 pilot not flying 
 relief pilot 
 check airman 
 Trainee 
 Dispatcher: yrs 
 Other:    
Last 90 Days hrs 
 





 Flight Engineer 




AIRSPACE CONDITIONS / WEATHER ELEMENTS LIGHT / VISIBILITY ATC / ADVISORY SVC. 
 Class A  Class E  VMC  fog  snow  dawn  night  Ramp  Center 
 
 Class B  Class G 
 
 IMC  hail  thunderstorm 
daylight dusk Ground FSS 
 
 Class C  Special Use 
 





 haze/smoke  turbulence 
 icing  windshear 



















Name:     
AIRCRAFT 2 
Operating 




 air carrier 









 other:    
 
 air carrier 








































 final approach 
 
 passenger  cargo/freight  ferry 
 personal  training  other:    
 
 VFR  SVFR  none 
 IFR  DVFR 
 







missed / GAR 
landing 







missed / GAR 
landing 
other:    















































NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM 
NASA has established an Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) Section 91.25 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 91.25) prohibits 
to identify issues in the aviation system which need to be addressed. reports filed with NASA from being used for FAA enforcement purposes. This 
The program of which this system is a part is described in detail in FAA report will not be made available to the FAA for civil penalty or certificate 
Advisory Circular 00-46E. Your assistance in informing us about such actions for violations of the Federal Air Regulations. Your identity strip, 
issues is essential to the success of the program. Please fill out this form stamped by NASA, is proof that you have submitted a report to the Aviation 
as completely as possible, enclose in an sealed envelope, affix proper Safety Reporting System. We can only return the strip to you, however, 
postage, and and send it directly to us. if you have provided a mailing address. Equally important, we can often 
obtain additional useful information if our safety analysts can talk with 
The information you provide on the identity strip will be used only if NASA     you directly by telephone. For this reason, we have requested telephone 
determines that it is necessary to contact you for further information. THIS numbers where we may reach you. 
IDENTITY STRIP WILL BE RETURNED DIRECTLY TO YOU. The return 
of the identity strip assures your anonymity. Thank you for your contribution to aviation safety. 
 
NOTE: AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS SHOULD NOT BE REPORTED ON THIS FORM. SUCH EVENTS SHOULD BE FILED WITH THE NATIONAL 
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD AS REQUIRED BY NTSB Regulation 830.5 (49CFR830.5). 
 
Paperwork Reduction Act Statement - This information collection meets the requirements of 44 U.S.C. § 3507, as amended by section 2 of the Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 1995. You do not need to answer these questions unless we display a valid Office of Management and Budget control number. The OMB 
control number for this information collection is 2700-0172 and it expires on 7/31/2022. We estimate that it will take about 30 minutes to read the instructions, 
gather the facts, and answer the questions. You may send comments on our time estimate above to: P.O. Box 189 Moffett Field, CA 94035-0189. Send only 
comments relating to our time estimate to this address. 
If you want to mail this form, please fold pages, enclose in a sealed, stamped envelope, and mail to: 
NASA AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM 
POST OFFICE BOX 189 
MOFFETT FIELD, CA 94035-0189 
 
DESCRIBE EVENT/SITUATION 
Keeping in mind the topics shown below, discuss those which you feel are relevant and anything else you think is important. Include what you believe really caused the 
problem, and what can be done to prevent a recurrence, or correct the situation. (USE ADDITIONAL PAPER IF NEEDED) 
CHAIN OF EVENTS Page 2 of 3 HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS 
- How the problem arose 
- Contributing factors 
- How it was discovered 
- Corrective actions 
 - Perceptions, judgments, decisions - Actions or inactions 





DESCRIBE EVENT/SITUATION (continued) 
CHAIN OF EVENTS Page 3 of 3 HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS 
- How the problem arose - How it was discovered 
- Contributing factors - Corrective actions 
- Perceptions, judgments, decisions - Actions or inactions 






DO NOT REPORT AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES ON THIS FORM. 
ACCIDENTS AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE ASRS PROGRAM AND SHOULD NOT BE SUBMITTED TO NASA. 
ALL IDENTITIES CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT WILL BE REMOVED TO ASSURE COMPLETE REPORTER ANONYMITY. 
(SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR ASRS DATE/TIME STAMP) 
IDENTIFICATION STRIP: Please fill in all blanks to ensure return of ID strip to you. 
NO RECORD WILL BE KEPT OF YOUR IDENTITY. This section will be returned to you. 
 
TELEPHONE NUMBERS where we may reach you for further details of this occurrence: 
 
HOME Area No.  Hours    
WORK Area No.  Hours    
TYPE OF EVENT/SITUATION 
NAME       
ADDRESS/PO BOX       
DATE OF OCCURRENCE    
 
(MM/DD/YYYY) 







PLEASE FILL IN APPROPRIATE SPACES AND CHECK ALL ITEMS WHICH APPLY TO THIS EVENT OR SITUATION. 
REPORTER  EXPERIENCE 
 Flight Attendant (FA) 
 FA in charge 
 Off-Duty FA 
 Other   
Total years as Flight Attendant    
Total years as FA with your current airline                                                                         
Number of aircraft types currently qualified to work on                                                              
Percent of duty time in past year on aircraft type involved       
FLIGHT INFORMATION 
Type of Aircraft (Make/Model)    
number of seats  number of pax on board    number in cabin crew              
number of exits:   floor level    window   tailcone     
Flight Segment flight origin destination departure time (HH:MM) 
time since takeoff hrs/mins nearest city/state (if known)    
Cabin Activity 
(check all that 
apply) 
 boarding  beverage service  cart service 
 deplaning  meal service  tray service  other    
 safety related duties, specify    
OPERATOR FLIGHT PHASE WEATHER LIGHTING 
 air carrier 
 air taxi 
 corporate 
 fractional 









 gate arrival 
 other    
 
 clear  cloudy 
 rain  fog 
 turbulence  snow 




 high  daylight 




Reporter's location in aircraft at time of event                                                                                                                                       
Reporter's activity at time of event     
Was a passenger directly involved 
in the event?  Yes  No Reset 
Was fire/smoke involved in the event?  Yes  No Reset 
Did this event result in an injury? 
to passenger? 
to crew? 
 Yes    No 
 Yes    No 
 Yes  No Reset 
Was there an evacuation during or 
as a result of this event?  Yes  No Reset 






NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM 
NASA has established an Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) Section 91.25 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 91.25) prohibits 
to identify issues in the aviation system which need to be addressed. reports filed with NASA from being used for FAA enforcement purposes. This 
The program of which this system is a part is described in detail in FAA report will not be made available to the FAA for civil penalty or certificate 
Advisory Circular 00-46E. Your assistance in informing us about such actions for violations of the Federal Air Regulations. Your identity strip, 
issues is essential to the success of the program. Please fill out this form stamped by NASA, is proof that you have submitted a report to the Aviation 
as completely as possible, enclose in an sealed envelope, affix proper Safety Reporting System. We can only return the strip to you, however, 
postage, and and send it directly to us. if you have provided a mailing address. Equally important, we can often 
obtain additional useful information if our safety analysts can talk with 
The information you provide on the identity strip will be used only if NASA     you directly by telephone. For this reason, we have requested telephone 
determines that it is necessary to contact you for further information. THIS numbers where we may reach you. 
IDENTITY STRIP WILL BE RETURNED DIRECTLY TO YOU. The return 
of the identity strip assures your anonymity. Thank you for your contribution to aviation safety. 
 
NOTE: AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS SHOULD NOT BE REPORTED ON THIS FORM. SUCH EVENTS SHOULD BE FILED WITH THE NATIONAL 
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD AS REQUIRED BY NTSB Regulation 830.5 (49CFR830.5). 
 
Paperwork Reduction Act Statement - This information collection meets the requirements of 44 U.S.C. § 3507, as amended by section 2 of the Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 1995. You do not need to answer these questions unless we display a valid Office of Management and Budget control number. The OMB 
control number for this information collection is 2700-0172 and it expires on 7/31/2022. We estimate that it will take about 30 minutes to read the instructions, 
gather the facts, and answer the questions. You may send comments on our time estimate above to: P.O. Box 189 Moffett Field, CA 94035-0189. Send only 
comments relating to our time estimate to this address. 
If you want to mail this form, please fold pages, enclose in a sealed, stamped envelope, and mail to: 
NASA AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM 
POST OFFICE BOX 189 
MOFFETT FIELD, CA 94035-0189 
 
DESCRIBE EVENT/SITUATION 
Keeping in mind the topics shown below, discuss those which you feel are relevant and anything else you think is important. Include what you believe really caused the 
problem, and what can be done to prevent a recurrence, or correct the situation. (USE ADDITIONAL PAPER IF NEEDED) 
CHAIN OF EVENTS Page 2 of 3 HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS 
- How the problem arose 
- Contributing factors 
- How it was discovered 
- Corrective actions 
 - Perceptions, judgments, decisions - Actions or inactions 






DESCRIBE EVENT/SITUATION (continued) 
CHAIN OF EVENTS Page 3 of 3 HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS 
- How the problem arose - How it was discovered 
- Contributing factors - Corrective actions 
- Perceptions, judgments, decisions - Actions or inactions 
- Factors affecting the quality of human performance 
  





APPENDIX B:  ASRS NASA REPORT FEBRUARY 2019 
ASRS Database Report Set 
 




Report Set Description .......................................... A sampling of reports involving Unmanned 
Aerial 
Vehicle (UAV) events. 
Update Number ..................................................... 13 
Date of Update ...................................................... February 27, 2019 
Number of Records in Report Set ......................... 50 
Number of New Records in Report Set ................ 49 
Type of Records in Report Set .............................. For each update, new records received at 
ASRS will displace a like number of the oldest records in the Report Set, with the objective of 
providing the fifty most recent relevant ASRS Database records. Records within this Report Set 








Ames Research Center 








MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of Aviation Safety Reporting System 
Data SUBJECT: Data Derived from ASRS Reports 
The attached material is furnished pursuant to a request for data from the NASA Aviation 
Safety Reporting System (ASRS). Recipients of this material are reminded when evaluating 
these data of the following points. 
 
ASRS reports are submitted voluntarily. The existence in the ASRS database of reports 
concerning a specific topic cannot, therefore, be used to infer the prevalence of that 
problem within the National Airspace System. 
 
Information contained in reports submitted to ASRS may be amplified by further contact with 
the individual who submitted them, but the information provided by the reporter is not 
investigated further. Such information represents the perspective of the specific individual 
who is describing their experience and perception of a safety related event. 
 
After preliminary processing, all ASRS reports are de-identified and the identity of the 
individual who submitted the report is permanently eliminated. All ASRS report processing 
systems are designed to protect identifying information submitted by reporters; including 
names, company affiliations, and specific times of incident occurrence. After a report has been 
de-identified, any verification of information submitted to ASRS would be limited. 
 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its ASRS current contractor, Booz 
Allen Hamilton, specifically disclaim any responsibility for any interpretation which may 
be made by others of any material or data furnished by NASA in response to queries of the 
ASRS database and related materials. 
Becky L. Hooey, Director 




CAVEAT REGARDING USE OF ASRS DATA 
 
Certain caveats apply to the use of ASRS data. All ASRS reports are voluntarily submitted, 
and thus cannot be considered a measured random sample of the full population of like events. 
For example, we receive several thousand altitude deviation reports each year. This number 
may comprise over half of all the altitude deviations that occur, or it may be just a small 
fraction of total occurrences. 
 
Moreover, not all pilots, controllers, mechanics, flight attendants, dispatchers or other 
participants in the aviation system are equally aware of the ASRS or may be equally willing to 
report. Thus, the data can reflect reporting biases. These biases, which are not fully known or 
measurable, may influence ASRS information. A safety problem such as near midair 
collisions (NMACs) may appear to be more highly concentrated in area “A” than area “B” 
simply because the airmen who operate in area “A” are more aware of the ASRS program and 
more inclined to report should an NMAC occur. Any type of subjective, voluntary reporting 
will have these limitations related to quantitative statistical analysis. 
 
One thing that can be known from ASRS data is that the number of reports received 
concerning specific event types represents the lower measure of the true number of such 
events that are occurring. For example, if ASRS receives 881 reports of track deviations in 
2010 (this number is purely hypothetical), then it can be known with some certainty that at 
least 881 such events have occurred in 2010. With these statistical limitations in mind, we 
believe that the real power of ASRS data is the qualitative information contained in report 
narratives. The pilots, controllers, and others who report tell us about aviation safety 
incidents and situations in detail – explaining what happened, and more importantly, why it 
happened. Using report narratives effectively requires an extra measure of study, but the 





























ACN: 1600739 (2 of 50) 
ACN: 1600215 (3 of 50) 
ACN: 1600211 (4 of 50) 
ACN: 1599969 (5 of 50) 
ACN: 1599671 (6 of 50) 
ACN: 1598849 (7 of 50) 





















An EMS Helicopter pilot reported many hospital heliports are not in the FAA Airport 




Remote pilot reported the UAV was flown to an altitude that was likely in excess of the 
400 FT AGL limitation specified within FAR Part 107. Pilot states telemetry data on display 








First Officer reported sighting a drone while on initial approach to SAN, which caused a 
distraction and possible track deviation. 




ACN: 1593299 (10 of 50) 
ACN: 1592641 (11 of 50) 
ACN: 1592543 (12 of 50) 
ACN: 1591597 (13 of 50) 
ACN: 1591241 (14 of 50) 
ACN: 1591153 (15 of 50) 
ACN: 1591117 (16 of 50) 












Approach Controller reported airborne conflict between UAV and commercial aircraft being 












Departure Controller reported an airborne conflict between a manned aircraft and a flight 








UAV operator reported that the UAV suffered a complete loss of power during flight 
despite indications of sufficient battery time remaining. 
 





Air carrier flight crew reported a conflict with a Drone on approach to DEN. 
 
ACN: 1589922 (18 of 50)  
Synopsis 
UAS operator reported a conflict with a taxiing aircraft just prior to launch from an airport 
taxiway. The operation was published informing all users of the airport of the planned UAS 
operation. 
 
ACN: 1589625 (19 of 50)  
Synopsis 
UAV pilot reported being unaware the flight conducted was in controlled airspace. 
 
ACN: 1588688 (20 of 50)  
Synopsis 
UAV operator reported possible operation in Class C airspace. 
 
ACN: 1588430 (21 of 50)  
Synopsis 
UAV operator reported being advised by local FSDO that an investigation of recent 
operations of his UAV in the vicinity of an airport was being initiated. 
 
ACN: 1588041 (22 of 50)  
Synopsis 
Air Carrier Captain reported a NMAC with a Drone on a four mile final to JFK. 
 
ACN: 1587432 (23 of 50)  
Synopsis 
PA-38 pilot reported an encounter with a drone at 150 feet off the aircraft wing tip. 
 
ACN: 1586244 (24 of 50)  
Synopsis 
UAV pilot reported he was contacted by the FAA for a possible violation of FAR 107.39. 
Operating around a 0 AGL area. 
 





Cessna 182 pilot reported airborne conflict with UAV. 
 
ACN: 1583855 (26 of 50)  
Synopsis 
Cessna 172 pilot reported a NMAC with a drone at a distance of 0 feet vertical and 400 
feet lateral. 
 
ACN: 1583538 (27 of 50)  
Synopsis 
Air Carrier Captain reported an airborne conflict with UAV during approach. 
 
ACN: 1582733 (28 of 50)  
Synopsis 
757 Captain reported the flight crew observed a UAV at their same altitude. 
 
ACN: 1580222 (29 of 50)  
Synopsis 
Helicopter pilot reported a NMAC with drone. 
 
ACN: 1578620 (30 of 50)  
Synopsis 
Indianapolis Center Controller reported an NMAC between a Piper and a drone, and also 
failure on Controller's report to broadcast for 15 minutes afterward. 
 
ACN: 1578002 (31 of 50)  
Synopsis 
A General Aviation pilot reported an NMAC with a drone at approximately 500 feet altitude. 
 
ACN: 1577960 (32 of 50)  
Synopsis 
UAV pilot reported temporarily losing line-of-sight with drone. 
 
ACN: 1577881 (33 of 50)  
Synopsis 





ACN: 1574558 (34 of 50)  
Synopsis 
A R44 Pilot reported an encounter with a UAV just before liftoff. 
 
ACN: 1573395 (35 of 50)  
Synopsis 
Air carrier Captain reported a small white drone pass under his aircraft flying in the 
opposite direction. 
 
ACN: 1573186 (36 of 50)  
Synopsis 
Flight instructor reported sighting a drone while on an instructional flight at 4500 feet. 
 
ACN: 1571254 (37 of 50)  
Synopsis 
Citation Captain reported a NMAC with a drone while on approach to Runway 24L at LAX. 
 
ACN: 1570720 (38 of 50)  
Synopsis 
B737 Captain reported sighting a drone 400 feet below and just to the right of final 
approach fix to Runway 12R at STL. 
 
ACN: 1568419 (39 of 50)  
Synopsis 
B-777 flight crew reported passing over a drone by 1000 feet while at 4000 feet on the 
HYPER 7 ARRIVIAL into IAD. 
 
ACN: 1568336 (40 of 50)  
Synopsis 
B737 Captain reported sighting a drone while flying a visual approach to runway 27 at SAN 
and then again hovering over a parked airplane upon landing. 
 
ACN: 1566714 (41 of 50)  
Synopsis 
Air Carrier Captain reported sighting a quadcopter drone at approximately 4000 feet while 




ACN: 1562358 (42 of 50)  
Synopsis 
ZOA Center Controllers reported a loss of separation between a UAV and a Small 
Transport. 
 
ACN: 1562024 (43 of 50)  
Synopsis 
B737 First Officer reported an NMAC with a drone during approach to BOS. 
 
ACN: 1561883 (44 of 50)  
Synopsis 
C172 pilot reported a NMAC with a drone while descending into SBP. 
 
ACN: 1561479 (45 of 50)  
Synopsis 
A330 Captain reported they lost communication with ATC and did not realize it until they 
observed unidentifiable traffic near their aircraft. 
 
ACN: 1561264 (46 of 50)  
Synopsis 
An airport worker at CXP reported a midair collision between a helicopter and a drone. 
 
ACN: 1561150 (47 of 50)  
Synopsis 
ERJ-190 flight crew reported a NMAC with a Drone during the descent phase of flight. 
 
ACN: 1559150 (48 of 50)  
Synopsis 
CRJ-200 First Officer reported a UAV in close proximity to the aircraft. 
 
ACN: 1558327 (49 of 50)  
Synopsis 
C-172 pilot reported a NMAC with a drone while on final approach to Ann Arbor Municipal 
Airport. 
 





Helicopter pilot reported a NMAC with a quadcopter drone at approximately 650 feet MSL 





























ACN: 1605225 (1 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201812 
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200 
Place 
Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZJX.ARTCC 
State Reference : FL 
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4500 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : VMC 
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 
10 Light : Daylight 
Aircraft : 1 
Reference : X 
Aircraft Operator : Personal 
Make Model Name : Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 
172 Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91 
Flight Plan : None 
Mission : Personal 
Flight Phase : Cruise 
Airspace.Class E : 
ZJX 
Aircraft : 2 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 0 
Operating Under FAR 
Part.Other Flight Phase : Cruise 
Airspace.Class E : ZJX 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Reporter Organization : Personal 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying 
Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Private 
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 153 
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 19 
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 12 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1605225 





Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC 
Detector.Person : Flight Crew 
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 150 
Miss Distance.Vertical : 25 
When Detected : In-flight 
Result.General : None Reported / Taken 
Assessments 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure 
Primary Problem : Ambiguous 
Narrative: 1 
We encountered a drone at our cruise altitude of 4500 feet. It was clearly identifiable 
as an unmanned aerial vehicle with a white/red top and black bottom. No evasive 
action taken because the time between seeing the drone and the drone passing about 
150 feet from our left wing was too short (estimate between 0.5 and 1 second). 
Synopsis 




ACN: 1600739 (2 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201812 
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800 
Place 
Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport 
State Reference : US 
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2500 
Aircraft : 1 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ 
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier 
Make Model Name : B737-800 
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2 
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 
121 Flight Plan : IFR 
Mission : Passenger 
Nav In Use : FMS Or 
FMC Flight Phase : 
Climb Airspace.Class B : 
ZZZ 
Aircraft : 2 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Airspace.Class B : ZZZ 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying 
Function.Flight Crew : Captain 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP) 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1600739 
Human Factors : Situational Awareness 
Events 
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne 
Conflict Detector.Person : Flight 
Crew When Detected : In-flight 
Result.General : None Reported / Taken 
Assessments 









Flight encountered a drone passing 2500 ft (MSL). The drone was at our 9-
O'clock position. ATC notified. 
Synopsis 




ACN: 1600215 (3 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201812 
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200 
Place 
Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport 
State Reference : US 
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 200 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : 
VMC Light : Daylight 
Aircraft 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.CTAF : 
ZZZ Aircraft Operator : 
Personal 
Make Model Name : Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 
172 Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1 
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91 
Flight Plan : VFR 
Mission : Training 
Flight Phase : Final Approach 
Route In Use : Visual Approach 
Airspace.Class G : ZZZ 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Reporter Organization : Personal 
Function.Flight Crew : Instructor 
Qualification.Flight Crew : 
Commercial 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Flight Instructor 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 
1600215 Human Factors : Situational Awareness 
Events 
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict 
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / 
Policy Detector.Person : Flight Crew 
Miss Distance.Vertical : 
800 When Detected : In-
flight 





Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors 
Primary Problem : Environment - Non Weather Related 
Narrative: 1 
My student and I were on short final for Runway 10 at ZZZ when we each observed an 
unmanned aircraft operating directly above the airport at what appeared to be pattern 
altitude or possibly lower. It was difficult to gauge the size of the drone from our 
perspective but I would say at least 6 feet from wingtip to wingtip. We landed normally-- 
we had been planning to fly the closed traffic pattern for a few circuits at ZZZ but 
quickly decided after seeing the drone to depart the area for the day, which we did 
without seeing the drone again. We had been monitoring the CTAF since 15 miles out 
and had communicated our position and intentions for a straight-in approach several 
times, starting at 8 miles away. No one else had made radio transmissions at ZZZ the 
whole time. After landing back at [home airport] and concluding the flight, we spoke on 
the phone to someone at an FBO listed at ZZZ. He said "the drone people had been 
asking (him) earlier that morning if (he) could hear them on the frequency," and he said 
he hadn't been able to hear them. Obviously we could not either. He suggested we file 
[this] report. 
Synopsis 





ACN: 1600211 (4 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201812 
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200 
Place 
Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport 
State Reference : US 
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 400 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : VMC 
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 
10 Light : Daylight 
Ceiling.Single Value : 3200 
Aircraft 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.CTAF : 
ZZZ Aircraft Operator : 
Personal 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Flight Plan : None 
Mission : Test Flight 
Flight Phase : Cruise 
Route In Use : None 
Airspace.Class G : 
ZZZ 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person : Gate / Ramp / 
Line Reporter Organization : Personal 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1600211 
Human Factors : Situational Awareness 
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown 
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight 
Crew Communication Breakdown.Party2 : 
Flight Crew 
Events 
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict 
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / 
Policy Detector.Person : Flight Crew 
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 500 
Miss Distance.Vertical : 400 
When Detected : In-flight 









Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company 
Policy Contributing Factors / Situations : Human 
Factors Primary Problem : Human Factors 
Narrative: 1 
An unmanned aircraft was operating in the vicinity of ZZZ under a FAA 333 exemption 
authority. The aircraft was positioned about 1000 feet north of the runway flying parallel 
to the runway at 400 feet. At this time, a manned aircraft made a radio call that they 
were on "short final for runway ..." No prior radio call was made by the manned aircraft 
as they approached the area. The first radio call was made while the manned aircraft 
was approximately one mile from the approach end of runway. The UAS operator 
immediately commanded the aircraft to return to the south of the airfield where the 
ground control station was located in order to avoid the landing traffic. A radio call was 
also made by the UAS operator identifying the position of the unmanned aircraft but no 
reply was heard from the manned aircraft. As the manned aircraft crossed the threshold 
of the runway, the UAS was south of the runway by approximately 500 feet and 
maintaining 400 feet. The manned aircraft did not take any evasive maneuvers to avoid 
the unmanned aircraft and proceeded to do a touch and go. Several radio calls were 
made by the UAS operator but no replies were heard. While the unmanned aircraft was 
established in an orbit south of the runway, the manned aircraft made left traffic and 
climbed above pattern altitude and departed the area to the west. The manned aircraft 
made a final radio call indicating they had seen the UAS but did not acknowledge any 
radio calls by the UAS operator. 
Synopsis 




ACN: 1599969 (5 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201812 
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400 
Aircraft 
Reference : X 
Make Model Name : 
Helicopter Flight Phase : 
Cruise 
Flight Phase : Takeoff 
Flight Phase : 
Descent Flight Phase 
: Landing Flight 
Phase : Climb 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Reporter Organization : 
Personal 
Function.Flight Crew : Other / Unknown 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Commercial 
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 5210 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1599969 
Analyst Callback : Completed 
Events 
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / 
Policy Detector.Person : Other Person 
When Detected : Routine Inspection 
Assessments 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company 
Policy Primary Problem : Company Policy 
Narrative: 1 
In conducting research in regard to the accuracy of the FAA's Airport Master Record 
(5010) database system significant discrepancies have been discovered. While auditing 
four different states for hospital heliports; Ohio, Indiana, Wisconsin and Tennessee, 
numerous hospital heliports were found to be unaccounted for. Ohio-44, Indiana-36, 
Wisconsin-42 and Tennessee-38. Given these numbers it is estimated upwards of 2,000 
hospital heliports may be unaccounted for in the U.S. The criticality of this is based on 
the fact that the FAA has provided UAS and Drone operators with the B4UFLY application 
to alert them when they are in proximity of any airports. Since the B4UFLY application, 




FAA Airport Master Record Database, any facility not identified in that system will not 
appear in the B4UFLY, hence the UAS or Drone pilot would never know these facilities 
existed and would not know to avoid the area or to alert the hospitals of their operation 
as required by Part-107. The primary reasons identified for this lack of information are 




heliports are qualified as "private" facilities, even though commercial operations are 
performed at these locations, and the FAA has never been given any legal jurisdiction or 
authority over private facilities and cannot enforce compliance. With the continually 
increasing number of UAS and Drone operations being conducted in the U.S., the risk 
exposure for a potential incident continues to climb every day. 
Synopsis 
An EMS Helicopter pilot reported many hospital heliports are not in the FAA Airport 




ACN: 1599671 (6 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201812 
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200 
Place 
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 490 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : VMC 
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 
10 Light : Daylight 
Ceiling.Single Value : 2000 
Aircraft 
Reference : X 
Aircraft Operator : Government 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1 
Flight Plan : None 
Mission : Photo Shoot 
Flight Phase : Climb 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person : Hangar / Base 
Reporter Organization : Government 
Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Private 
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 1100 
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 10 
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 75 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1599671 
Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface 
Events 
Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types 
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / 
Policy Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR 
Detector.Person : Flight Crew 
When Detected : In-flight 
Result.Flight Crew : Exited Penetrated Airspace 
Assessments 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human 





While collecting photo/video data, the UAS was flown to an altitude that was likely in 
excess of the 400 FT AGL limitation specified within FAR Part 107. Remote Pilot in 
Command (RPIC) holds both Part 61 (manned) certificate and Part 107 (remote) 
certificate. A Visual Observer (VO), also a Part 61 & Part 107 pilot, was also scanning for 
traffic and other potential hazards in and around the planned operating environment. The 
crew had an aviation-band transceiver available to monitor the local airport's CTAF 
frequency, a small untowered/uncontrolled GA airport located approximately 1 nm away. 
No manned aircraft were heard (over the radio or via engine noise) or visually observed 
during the entirety of the day's flights and the UAS was not within the airport's 
approach/departure paths. The RPIC had eyes on the UAS while maneuvering to ensure 
UAS did not fly close to obstacles (primarily trees & power lines when closer to ground) 
or over areas that may have contained nonparticipants (yards, roads). The planned route 
was chosen to be free from most factors, with the few road crossings performed safely 
when there was no vehicular traffic in the vicinity (RPIC and Visual Observer both 
verbally verify prior to crossing). After all obstacles were well cleared and the UAS was 
maneuvered into position and had begun data collection, the RPIC checked the display 
and noticed the flight display software's telemetry data had been reset to display metric 
and was indicating approximately 150 meters. Knowing the metric equivalent of 400 FT is 
approximately 122m, the RPIC initiated an immediate descent. Contributing Factors: 
RPIC's focus on ensuring the UAS was not flown near obstacles or over people, coupled 
with the delayed awareness of the software displaying telemetry information in metric 
units. Corrective Actions (real-time): Upon noticing an indicated altitude in excess of 400 
FT AGL, the RPIC immediately descended the UAS below 400 FT (122m) AGL indicated. 
Corrective Actions (future procedures): In the future, pre-flight checklist will include 
verification that software units are displayed in feet (not metric) and the software-based 
altitude limit is enabled and properly set (when able). RPIC will also refer to flight display 
more frequently as the aircraft is climbing (assuming safe to do so) and call out altitudes 
passing through during major ascents/descents. Additionally, when the flight profile 
allows, RPIC will de-couple climbs/descents from horizontal maneuvering, particularly if 
the UAS is approaching the altitude limit or may be operating in the vicinity of other 
considerations (obstacles, roads, nonparticipants, etc.) which may take attention away 
from altitude awareness. 
Synopsis 
Remote pilot reported the UAV was flown to an altitude that was likely in excess of the 
400 FT AGL limitation specified within FAR Part 107. Pilot states telemetry data on display 




ACN: 1598849 (7 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201811 
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800 
Place 
Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport 
State Reference : US 
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 200 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : VMC 
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 
10 Ceiling.Single Value : 10000 
Aircraft : 1 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.Military Facility : 
ZZZ Aircraft Operator : Military 
Make Model Name : Jet/Long Ranger/206 
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91 
Flight Plan : VFR 
Mission : 
Training Flight 
Phase : Taxi 
Airspace.Special Use : MILITARY AIRSPACE 
Aircraft : 2 
Reference : Y 
ATC / Advisory.Military Facility : ZZZ 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91 
Flight Phase : Cruise 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Reporter Organization : Military 
Function.Flight Crew : Instructor 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not 
Flying Qualification.Flight Crew : 
Instrument 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot 
(ATP) Qualification.Flight Crew : Flight Instructor 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine 
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 3000 
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 120 




ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1598849 





Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC 
Detector.Person : Flight Crew 
When Detected : Taxi 
Result.General : None Reported / Taken 
Assessments 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors 
Primary Problem : Human Factors 
Narrative: 1 
While hover taxiing at a [military] training field a quadcopter drone (app. 2ft by 2ft) flew 
overhead of my helicopter at roughly 200 ft AGL. The training field is 1 square mile. My 
aircraft was in the southeast corner of the field. The drone flew over my aircraft then to 
the northwest until it eventually exited the training environment. There were 9 other 
helicopters at the field during this time. The drone flew overhead at least 3 other aircraft 
that were doing hover training during its transit across the field. [Military] operating 
altitude at this outlying field is 650 ft AGL and below. I made a call over our common 
training frequency to alert the other aircraft and also had the field duty officer file a 
report with local law enforcement. 
Synopsis 




ACN: 1595651 (8 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201811 
Place 
Locale Reference.ATC Facility : SCT.TRACON 
State Reference : CA 
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 7000 
Aircraft : 1 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : 
SCT Aircraft Operator : Air 
Carrier 
Make Model Name : B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model 
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2 
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121 
Mission : Passenger 
Flight Phase : Initial 
Approach Route In 
Use.STAR : LUCKI 4 
Airspace.Class B : SCT 
Aircraft : 2 
Reference : Y 
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : SCT 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91 
Airspace.Class B : SCT 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier 
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not 
Flying 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP) 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1595651 
Human Factors : Distraction 
Events 
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types 
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance 
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Other / 
Unknown Detector.Person : Flight Crew 
When Detected : In-flight 








Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure 
Primary Problem : Ambiguous 
Narrative: 1 
While on LUCKI 4 Arrival to SAN, we were distracted by an odd aircraft close to our 
track. It looked like a large drone. We were distracted discussing this aircraft and 
possibly missed something. Soon after ATC made an odd query as to our position as if 
we were tracking incorrectly, asked if we had the field in sight. I replied that we did and 
ATC cleared us for a visual approach. After landing they gave a phone number to call for 
possible deviation. SoCal implied we were off course/asked if field in sight/cleared us for 
a visual approach. I am unsure what was wrong. Need better communication with ATC. 
Synopsis 
First Officer reported sighting a drone while on initial approach to SAN, which caused a 




ACN: 1595573 (9 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201811 
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800 
Place 
Locale Reference.Airport : LAX.Airport 
State Reference : CA 
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2500 
Environment 
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 
2 Light : Daylight 
Aircraft : 1 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : 
ZZZ Aircraft Operator : Air 
Carrier 
Make Model Name : B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model 
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2 
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 
121 Flight Plan : IFR 
Mission : Passenger 
Flight Phase : Final 
Approach Route In 
Use.Other Airspace.Class B 
: ZZZ 
Aircraft : 2 
Reference : Y 
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Airspace.Class B : ZZZ 
Person : 1 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not 
Flying Function.Flight Crew : First 
Officer 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP) 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1595573 




Reference : 2 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 





Reporter Organization : Air Carrier 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying 
Function.Flight Crew : Captain 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP) 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1595575 
Events 
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC 
Detector.Person : Flight Crew 
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 300 
When Detected : In-flight 
Result.General : None Reported / Taken 
Assessments 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure 
Primary Problem : Ambiguous 
Narrative: 1 
A large drone (approximately 2 feet high) passed the right wing during approach to LAX at 
glideslope intercept. Distance estimated to be about 100 meters. Reported to ATC. 
Narrative: 2 
A large drone passed the right wing during approach at glideslope intercept. Reported 
to ATC. The drone was a barrel shape, cylinder-looking type, black cylinder 2 to 3 ft 
height. Red light and some rotors at the top. It appeared to be as close as 100 meters 
from the wing of the aircraft. Seemed stationary and did not appear to react to the 
aircraft approaching. It appeared to be hovering. 
Synopsis 




ACN: 1593299 (10 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201811 
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800 
Place 
Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.TRACON 
State Reference : US 
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 8000 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : VMC 
Aircraft : 1 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : 
ZZZ Aircraft Operator : Air 
Carrier 
Make Model Name : EMB ERJ 170/175 
ER/LR Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2 
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 
121 Flight Plan : IFR 
Mission : Passenger 
Flight Phase : Climb 
Airspace.Class B : 
ZZZ 
Aircraft : 2 
Reference : Y 
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Airspace.Class B : ZZZ 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not 
Flying Function.Flight Crew : 
Captain 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP) 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1593299 
Events 
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Other / 
Unknown Detector.Person : Flight Crew 










Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure 
Primary Problem : Ambiguous 
Narrative: 1 
On departure while level at 8000 feet I saw what appeared to be a drone at 
approximately 8500 feet about a mile to our left. It appeared to be somewhat large, dark 
in color and looked to have two propellers. The First Officer (FO) did not see it. I notified 
ATC and we continued the flight with no issues. 
Synopsis 




ACN: 1592641 (11 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201811 
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800 
Place 
Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.TRACON 
State Reference : US 
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 8000 
Aircraft : 1 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Flight Plan : IFR 
Flight Phase : 
Descent Route In 
Use : Vectors 
Airspace.Class E : 
ZZZ 
Aircraft : 2 
Reference : Y 
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ 
Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer 
Flight Plan : IFR 
Flight Phase : Final 
Approach Route In Use : 
Vectors Airspace.Class E : 
ZZZ 
Aircraft : 3 
Reference : Z 
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ 
Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft 
Manufacturer Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121 
Flight Plan : IFR 
Route In Use : Vectors 
Airspace.Class E : ZZZ 
Aircraft : 4 
Reference : A 
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ 
Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer 
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121 
Flight Plan : IFR 
Route In Use : Vectors 





Reference : 1 




Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 
1592641 Human Factors : Communication 
Breakdown Communication Breakdown.Party1 : 
ATC 
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Ground Personnel 
Events 
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types 
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne 
Conflict 
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : VFR In 
IMC Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control 
When Detected : In-flight 
Result.Air Traffic Control : Separated Traffic 
Assessments 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company 
Policy Contributing Factors / Situations : 
Procedure Primary Problem : Ambiguous 
Narrative: 1 
Unmanned MQ9s file IFR and depart to the resticted area, and then return, cancel IFR 
and land. Today low ceilings moved in after they departed, and they had to come back 
early. They had NO plan on what to do if they cannot cancel IFR, and they were flying 
around looking for a hole in the clouds to get down. They conflicted with the three IFR 
inbounds that I was vectoring. They also stated if they couldn't get below the clouds, 
that they would land. Ultimately they did find a hole in the clouds after getting 45 
degrees left and right of course, causing a conflict with a northbound aircraft on the 
localizer at 4000. I then had to vector the MQ9s at this point to follow one of the aircraft. 
Something needs to be done to alleviate a situation from happening in the future. I have 
heard that this has happened multiple times. This is adding inherent risk to the NAS that 
doesn't need to. It just seems that the [drone operators] says we will fly, and if bad 
weather happens, then we can do whatever we want. 
Synopsis 
Approach Controller reported airborne conflict between UAV and commercial aircraft being 




ACN: 1592543 (12 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201811 
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200 
Place 
Locale Reference.Airport : BOS.Airport 
State Reference : MA 
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 3000 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : 
VMC Light : Daylight 
Aircraft : 1 
Reference : X 
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier 
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed 
Wing Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2 
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 
121 Flight Plan : IFR 
Mission : Passenger 
Nav In Use : FMS Or FMC 
Flight Phase : Initial 
Approach 
Aircraft : 2 
Reference : Y 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91 
Flight Phase : Cruise 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying 
Function.Flight Crew : Captain 
Qualification.Flight Crew : 
Multiengine 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot 
(ATP) Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1592543 
Events 
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC 
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Object 









Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure 
Primary Problem : Ambiguous 
Narrative: 1 
On arrival into BOS, on what was effectively base leg prior to turning final for Runway 
22L, just as we were beginning a descent out of 3000 feet, I saw a blue and white UAV 
pass directly under the nose of the aircraft. I would estimate the distance below us to 
have been 300 feet. The encounter lasted less than 2-3 seconds from initial sighting to 
the UAV passing out of sight beneath our aircraft. Blue and white and 4-rotor, I think, 
though I only caught the brief glimpse of it. No action was taken on our part as the 
device was gone before we could do anything. I notified ATC of the encounter. I 
transferred control of the aircraft briefly to the First Officer so I could concentrate on the 
communication as any danger was past. The First Officer had been "heads down" for that 
brief moment "sequencing the approach", so she never saw anything. Her first knowledge 
of the event was when I started talking to ATC. The controller asked the usual questions, 
and then cleared us for the approach. Normal approach and landing. Taxied to the gate. 
No further action was taken. Neither the First Officer nor I had any contact with anyone 
other than company people about the incident. An idiot with a drone. Nothing we could 
have done. No way for the ATC people to know about it. Ban all drone use within 50 
miles of any airport. Arrest and jail anyone caught violating this rule. 
Synopsis 




ACN: 1591597 (13 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201809 
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200 
Place 
Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport 
State Reference : US 
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 75 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : 
VMC Light : Daylight 
Aircraft 
Reference : X 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Operating Under FAR Part.Other 
Flight Plan : VFR 
Mission : Photo Shoot 
Airspace.Class D : 
ZZZ 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person : Company 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Commercial 
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 30 
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 2 
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 30 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1591597 
Human Factors : Confusion 
Events 
Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types 
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / 
Policy Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR 
Detector.Person : Other Person 
When Detected.Other 
Result.General : None Reported / Taken 
Assessments 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human 
Factors Primary Problem : Human Factors 
Narrative: 1 
Looked at airspace on the morning and saw Temporary flight restrictions and was 








authorization. In review with drone coordinator, it appears I confused the TFR with the 
Class D Controlled Airspace for ZZZ. I have updated my airspace software to prevent 
from future incursions. 
Synopsis 




ACN: 1591241 (14 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201811 
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800 
Place 
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 15000 
Aircraft : 1 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZZZ 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Flight Plan : IFR 
Flight Phase : Cruise 
Airspace.Special Use : 
ZZZ 
Aircraft : 2 
Reference : Y 
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZZZ 
Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer 
Flight Phase : Cruise 
Airspace.Special Use : ZZZ 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Function.Air Traffic Control : Departure 
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 
1591241 Human Factors : Confusion 
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown 
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC 
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Ground Personnel 
Events 
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types 
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict 
Detector.Person : Air Traffic 
Control When Detected : In-flight 
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert 
Assessments 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human 
Factors Contributing Factors / Situations : 
Procedure Primary Problem : Ambiguous 
Narrative: 1 
I climbed a flight of 2 Hawks to 150 southbound and handed the flight off to [another 









hand off the aircraft to [the other sector], I performed other duties while my D-side 
attempted to establish communication. I shipped the aircraft and after he left my 
frequency, the flight of Hawks squawked 1200 and descended just in front of the aircraft. 
We informed [the next controller] of the flight of Hawks descending in front of the 
aircraft, so that a traffic alert could be provided. My mains/standby frequency was 
released and I was on a back-up frequency. This may have attributed to me not being 
able to hear the flight of Hawks read back the frequency change or the multiple attempts 
to cancel IFR. 
Synopsis 
Departure Controller reported an airborne conflict between a manned aircraft and a flight 




ACN: 1591153 (15 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201810 
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800 
Place 
Locale Reference.Airport : LHW.Airport 
State Reference : GA 
Relative Position.Angle.Radial : 180 
Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles : 15 
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4500 
Environment 
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 
10 Light : Daylight 
Ceiling.Single Value : 10000 
Aircraft : 1 
Reference : X 
Aircraft Operator : Personal 
Make Model Name : Light Sport 
Aircraft Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1 
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91 
Flight Plan : VFR 
Mission : Personal 
Flight Phase : 
Cruise 
Aircraft : 2 
Reference : Y 
Aircraft Operator : Military 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91 
Flight Phase : Cruise 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Reporter Organization : 
Personal Function.Flight Crew : 
Single Pilot 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Sport / 
Recreational Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 
510 Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 30 
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 510 





Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / 




Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Object 
Detector.Person : Flight Crew 
When Detected : Routine Inspection 
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented 
Assessments 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure 
Primary Problem : Airspace Structure 
Narrative: 1 
Flying south of Midcoast Regional airport, [I] saw a drone believed military less than 1 
mile from my heading, it then turned north and was gone. On my part better monitoring 
of MOA space was needed. 
Synopsis 




ACN: 1591117 (16 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201811 
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800 
Place 
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 100 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : VMC 
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 
10 Light : Daylight 
Ceiling.Single Value : 3900 
Aircraft 
Reference : X 
Aircraft Operator.Other 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Flight Plan : VFR 
Flight Phase.Other 
Component 
Aircraft Component : Electrical/Electronic Panel & 
Parts Aircraft Reference : X 
Problem : Failed 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person : Company 
Reporter Organization : 
Corporate 
Function.Flight Crew : Other / Unknown 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Private 
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 15 
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 8 
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 15 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1591117 
Events 
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : 
Critical Detector.Person : Other Person 
When Detected : In-flight 
Result.Aircraft : Aircraft Damaged 
Assessments 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft 





While performing an inspection of a building, a brand new DJI M-210 aircraft suffered a 
complete loss of power during flight, despite indications that there was sufficient battery 
time still remaining. The resulting aircraft fell directly to the ground due to the 
immediate loss of lift with the remote pilot unable to control its subsequent flight path. 
The small unmanned aircraft was damaged upon impact, with insignificant damage done 
to the property. The aircraft firmware was updated prior to the flight and new batteries 
were being used at the time of the incident. 
Synopsis 
UAV operator reported that the UAV suffered a complete loss of power during flight despite 




ACN: 1590911 (17 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201811 
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200 
Place 
Locale Reference.Airport : DEN.Airport 
State Reference : CO 
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 10000 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : VMC 
Aircraft : 1 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : 
D01 Aircraft Operator : Air 
Carrier Make Model Name : 
A320 Crew Size.Number Of 
Crew : 2 
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 
121 Flight Plan : IFR 
Mission : Passenger 
Flight Phase : Final Approach 
Route In Use : Visual Approach 
Airspace.Class B : DEN 
Aircraft : 2 
Reference : Y 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Flight Phase : Cruise 
Person : 1 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not 
Flying Function.Flight Crew : First 
Officer 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot 
(ATP) Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument 
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 548 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1590911 
Person : 2 
Reference : 2 




Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 




Function.Flight Crew : Pilot 
Flying Function.Flight Crew : 
Captain 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP) 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1590917 
Events 
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne 
Conflict Detector.Person : Flight 
Crew 
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 1000 
Miss Distance.Vertical : 500 
When Detected : In-flight 
Result.General : None Reported / Taken 
Assessments 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human 
Factors Primary Problem : Ambiguous 
Narrative: 1 
A drone passed us about 500-700 feet below us and about 1000 feet to the aircraft's 
right as we were doing a visual approach. 
Narrative: 2 
While approaching DEN from the SE, on a right base for Runway 35L, we saw what 
appeared to be a drone approximately 500 feet below and to our right. We were level at 
11,000 feet. The drone appeared to be in the shape of an octahedron, approximately two 
feet by two feet in size, and was heading east. We reported it to ATC. 
Synopsis 




ACN: 1589922 (18 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201810 
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200 
Place 
Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport 
State Reference : US 
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : VMC 
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 
10 Light : Daylight 
Ceiling.Single Value : 10000 
Aircraft : 1 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.UNICOM : ZZZ 
Aircraft Operator : Government 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91 
Flight Plan : None 
Mission : Training 
Flight Phase : Parked 
Route In Use.Other 
Aircraft : 2 
ATC / Advisory.UNICOM : ZZZ 
Make Model Name : SR22 
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 
91 Flight Phase : Taxi 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person : Company 
Reporter Organization : Government 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying 
Qualification.Flight Crew : 
Multiengine Qualification.Flight Crew 
: Commercial 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Flight Instructor 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument 
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 6200 
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 40 
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 2 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1589922 
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown 









Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Conflict, Less Severe 
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / 
Policy Detector.Person : Flight Crew 
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 
200 Miss Distance.Vertical : 
0 When Detected : Taxi 
Result.General : None Reported / Taken 
Assessments 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human 
Factors Contributing Factors / Situations : 
Procedure Primary Problem : Procedure 
Narrative: 1 
This report pertains to a situation involving an hq-90b UAS and a Cirrus SR22. We 
operated a transponder and ADS-B equipped hq-90b UAS. This aircraft is certified for 
operation under a certificate of waiver or authorization. A NOTAM was filed and was 
accessible by normal means. TRACON was informed of UAS operation prior to launching 
operation. We have VHF communications and we were close to launching the VTOL fixed 
wing aircraft from taxiway Bravo. The Cirrus approached from the ramp toward the 
taxiway. For safety reasons for all involved, one of my air vehicle operator ground team 
members, wearing a fluorescent shirt, gave a stop hand signal to the approaching Cirrus 
pilot to make him aware of the UAS that was sitting on the taxiway and which was ready 
to launch. The Cirrus pilot stopped and got on the radio (UNICOM) to inquire about why a 
lineman was stopping him. I politely told him my n-number and explained that we are a 
UAS that was about to depart for a local flight. The Cirrus pilot used unprofessional 
phraseology to assert his dissatisfaction. I explained that we will be in the air in less than 
1 minute and out of his way. He then went on a lecture about the lack of a NOTAM. I 
politely explained that a NOTAM was filed. I made my call for our aircraft to launch and 
we got it into a stable orbit at 400 ft AGL away from all runways and well inside and 
below the normal traffic pattern. As the Cirrus was taxiing to the runway, I made a call 
on UNICOM, indicating that we are in a stable left hand orbit, clear and south of both 
runways at 400 AGL (1100 MSL). The Cirrus pilot kept making a number of additional, 
very unprofessional calls indicating his dissatisfaction. In one call, he asked if he was 
going to hit the UAV. I am not sure if I replied but I think I simply stated that we were 
orbiting south of both runways. This pilot clearly did not read the pertinent NOTAMS as 
required by 91.103 because he should have found it without problem under the UAS 
section. As both a manned and unmanned operator and as a researcher who is focused 
on developing means to integrate UAS safely into US airspace, I can understand that 
some people who are unfamiliar with UAS may have questions or concerns. Our UAS is 
not a small UAS, it is a 100-lb aircraft with sophisticated capabilities such as VTOL, long 
endurance, transponder, dual data link, etc. The operation is performed under the 
umbrella of a coa (Certificate of Authorization) with significant oversight from the FAA. 
The learning point from this encounter with an unprofessional pilot is that we cannot 
assume that NOTAMs for UAS operations are being found or read. It would be good to 
have a way to put a short audible into the ASOS voice loop about this. At the same time, 
we should be able to rely on other pilots to refrain from unprofessional phraseology 
which has no place in aircraft radio transmissions and that safety should be the 
overriding concern at all times. Road rage like behavior and bullying is not a suitable 








UAS operator reported a conflict with a taxiing aircraft just prior to launch from an 
airport taxiway. The operation was published informing all users of the airport of the 




ACN: 1589625 (19 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201808 
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200 
Place 
Locale Reference.Airport : FNL.Airport 
State Reference : CO 
Relative Position.Angle.Radial : 062 
Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles : 
5.4 Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 75 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : VMC 
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 
10 Light : Daylight 
Aircraft 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.CTAF : FNL 
Aircraft Operator : 
Corporate 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1 
Operating Under FAR 




Route In Use : None 
Airspace.Class E : 
D01 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft.Other 
Reporter Organization : 
Corporate Function.Flight Crew : 
Single Pilot 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Commercial 
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 8 
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 1 
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 8 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1589625 
Human Factors : Training / Qualification 





Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types 
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR 
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / 
Policy Detector.Person : Other Person 





Result.General : None Reported / Taken 
Assessments 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human 
Factors Primary Problem : Human Factors 
Narrative: 1 
I thought I was in uncontrolled airspace. I later found out that I was 3 blocks into it. 
Now that LANC [Low Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability] is fully 
functional, I will get familiar with it and be sure to use it when doing inspections. 
Synopsis 




ACN: 1588688 (20 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201810 
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800 
Place 
Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport 
State Reference : US 
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 100 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : VMC 
Weather Elements / Visibility.Other 
Light : Daylight 
Ceiling : CLR 
Aircraft 
Reference : X 
Aircraft Operator : Personal 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Flight Plan : VFR 
Mission : Personal 
Route In Use : Visual Approach 
Airspace.Class C : ZZZ 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person : Hangar / Base 
Reporter Organization : Personal 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not 
Flying 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1588688 
Human Factors : Situational Awareness 
Events 
Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types 
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / 
Policy Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR 
Detector.Person : Other Person 
When Detected : Routine 
Inspection 
Result.General : None Reported / Taken 
Assessments 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human 
Factors Primary Problem : Human Factors 
Narrative: 1 




protocols & procedures to check airspace and confirm we are clear to safely fly. For this 





checked for TFR's in the area - all came back clear. However, we may have flown in or 
near the Class C airspace during this brief flight and it was discovered after flight was 
over. Moving forward, we will use https://skyvector.com/ and https://uas- 
faa.opendata.arcgis.com/ to check instead of B4UFly app. 
Synopsis 




ACN: 1588430 (21 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201810 
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800 
Place 
Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport 
State Reference : US 
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 20 
Aircraft 
Reference : X 
Aircraft Operator : Personal 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Operating Under FAR Part.Other 
Flight Plan : None 
Mission : Personal 
Flight Phase : Cruise 
Airspace.Class G : 
ZZZ 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person : Hangar / Base 
Reporter Organization : Personal 
Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot 
(ATP) Qualification.Flight Crew : Flight Instructor 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine 
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 50 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1588430 
Events 
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types 
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / 
Policy Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR 
Detector.Person : Air Traffic 
Control When Detected : In-flight 
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert 
Assessments 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure 
Primary Problem : Procedure 
Narrative: 1 
I was operating a DJI Mavic 2 in Class G airspace in the vicinity of ZZZ airport. All 
operations were conducted in coordination with the pilot of a manned aircraft on the 









the UAS in Class G airspace to the best of my knowledge. The local airport manager did 
approach me and asked me to land the UAS as he stated it was illegal to operate near an 
airport, and I did land and attempted to contact the local FSDO by phone. Later the 
airport manager made contact with the local [FAAST Program Manager] at the FSDO who 
stated by phone it was "illegal to operate a drone within 5nm of an airport". Despite that 
not being true under 14CFR107, we did not operate the UAS further, and left the airport. 
[Local] FSDO emailed me stating "I am attempting to contact you regarding UAS (drone) 
operation at the ZZZ airport yesterday. I have some questions I need to ask of you." 
FSDO requested the registration for the UAS I regularly fly and inquired if I had ever 
operated over people. I replied I had not ever operated over people and have always 
conducted operations in accordance with 14CFR107. FSDO responded: "I have been 
assigned by the office to conduct an investigation into the operation of your drone at the 
ZZZ Airport." At no point was any part of 14CFR107 violated, however, it is clear that 
local FSDO offices have inconsistencies in knowledge of 14CFR, and inspectors do not 
appear to be complying with FAA Order 8900.1. 
Synopsis 
UAV operator reported being advised by local FSDO that an investigation of recent 




ACN: 1588041 (22 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201810 
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200 
Place 
Locale Reference.Airport : JFK.Airport 
State Reference : NY 
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 1600 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : 
VMC Light : Daylight 
Aircraft : 1 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.Tower : JFK 
Aircraft Operator : Air 
Carrier 
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed 
Wing Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2 
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 
121 Flight Plan : IFR 
Nav In Use.Localizer/Glideslope/ILS : Runway 22R 
Flight Phase : Initial Approach 
Airspace.Class B : JFK 
Aircraft : 2 
Reference : Y 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Airspace.Class B : JFK 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier 
Function.Flight Crew : Captain 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot 
(ATP) ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 
1588041 Human Factors : Situational Awareness 
Events 
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC 
Detector.Person : Flight Crew 
Miss Distance.Vertical : 200 
When Detected : In-flight 








Contributing Factors / Situations : Human 
Factors Primary Problem : Human Factors 
Narrative: 1 
On approach in JFK for ILS 22R (may have been 22L), just past the Outer Marker 
(probably MATTR) I saw something small that didn't appear to be moving up ahead in 
the windscreen. We were descending on the glideslope. Once I determined the object 
appeared mostly stationary, while staying at the same altitude, I didn't feel that a course 
change or attitude change was necessary. I also only had several seconds to identify the 
object, determine its size, and even consider evasive action. The object appeared to be a 
small, quad-copter drone. It was grey in color with the rectangular body that seems 
ubiquitous to many designs. It appeared to fly 100 to 200 feet above our altitude of 
1600 feet MSL. We were on about a 4-mile final. I don't think the First Officer (Pilot 
Monitoring) ever saw it. We immediately reported it to ATC. We gave JFK Ground a more 
exact description than Tower received. If I had been scanning the flight instruments 
rather than looking outside, then I may have never seen the drone. There was nothing 
we could have done differently. Perhaps drone sightings and suggested procedures could 
be mentioned in one of the manuals. 
Synopsis 




ACN: 1587432 (23 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201810 
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200 
Place 
Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport 
State Reference : US 
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 3500 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : VMC 
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 
10 Light : Daylight 
Aircraft 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.Tower : 
ZZZ Aircraft Operator : 
Personal 
Make Model Name : PA-38 
Tomahawk Crew Size.Number Of 
Crew : 1 Operating Under FAR Part : 
Part 91 Flight Plan : VFR 
Mission : Personal 
Flight Phase : Cruise 
Route In Use : Direct 
Airspace.Class C : 
ZZZ 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Reporter Organization : Personal 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot 
Flying Function.Flight Crew : 
Single Pilot Qualification.Flight 
Crew : Private Experience.Flight 
Crew.Total : 375 
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 
1 Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 252 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1587432 
Human Factors : Situational Awareness 
Human Factors : Distraction 
Events 
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC 




Detector.Person : Flight Crew 
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 150 




When Detected : In-flight 
Result.General : None Reported / 
Taken 
Assessments 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human 
Factors Primary Problem : Human Factors 
Narrative: 1 
Before entering ZZZ Class C airspace, I was instructed by ZZZ ATC to remain at or 
above 2500 feet. During level cruise at 3500 ft., flying from north to south on 
approximate heading of 150 degrees, a four rotor drone with amber lights was sighted 
flying south to north off the right wing at the same altitude. The drone was sighted by 
the pilot and then witnessed by the passenger. The drone was flying to the north of but 
near the intersection of [two freeways]. I immediately reported the sighting to ZZZ ATC 
who commented that nothing showed on radar. Upon arrival at ZZZ1 I was asked by 
ZZZ1 Tower to call ZZZ ATC to discuss the situation further. 
Synopsis 




ACN: 1586244 (24 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201810 
Place 
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0 
Environment 
Light : Daylight 
Aircraft 
Reference : X 
Aircraft Operator : Personal 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Operating Under FAR Part.Other 
Mission : Photo Shoot 
Flight Phase : Cruise 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Reporter Organization : Personal 
Qualification.Flight Crew : 
Commercial 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1586244 
Human Factors : Situational Awareness 
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown 
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew 
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Other 
Events 
Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types 
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / 
Policy Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR 
Detector.Person : Other Person 
When Detected : Routine 
Inspection 
Result.General : None Reported / Taken 
Assessments 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human 
Factors Primary Problem : Human Factors 
Narrative: 1 
I was contacted by [an] FAA Aviation Safety Technician that he received a report of my 
UAS possibly involved in 107 violations from an anonymous report. Upon [the 
technician's] review of my videos on my [social media] account and website, he informed 
me of violations of section 107.39 being displayed in my [social media] account for 




Park]. Over the phone I stated that my interpretation of the rule is you must get an FAA 





participating in the operation of the UAS was meaning the individuals were will 
participants in the event or filming. I have violated this for non-paid work I do to 
promote veterans causes and initiatives being a veteran myself and still active member 
of the Army Reserve. Specifically, at the request of the [local] Fire Department and Police 
Department I operated my UAS above them in a standing formation. I also operated my 
UAS above [military] Recruiters working with local high school students at a leadership 
camp where they pushed a Humvee underneath a hovering UAS about 50-75 feet above 
them. I did not maliciously intend to violate the rule. [The technician] also mentioned my 
flight over a moving vehicle violated this rule as well. Additionally, I knew you could not 
operate a UAS on National Park Lands or boundaries from my study for my 107 license in 
2016. After talking with [the technician] informing me of a 0 AGL ban at the [National 
Park] grounds and my since research, I understand I cannot fly at all above the area. I 
operated a drone with line of sight from outside the NPS boundaries but crossed over 
them to film a shot of the [monument] from a side profile. I have since removed the 
video from my feed on Instagram after initially being contacted by [the FAA] in reference 
to it. My 107 certificate expired within the last month. I plan to retake and certify the 
107 test once I return from military duty. I have also enrolled with [pilot organization] 
for UAS resources and training since being full time military I fly so infrequently to 
ensure I stay abreast of changes to airspace rules concerning UAS safety and operation. 
In my reading of FAA literature, it seems there is a new safety training program called 
SMS I can also take, but I am unable to locate how to do so online. Any information for 
this training would be appreciated. 
Synopsis 
UAV pilot reported he was contacted by the FAA for a possible violation of FAR 107.39. 




ACN: 1584220 (25 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201810 
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800 
Place 
Locale Reference.ATC Facility : N90.TRACON 
State Reference : NY 
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 6500 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : VMC 
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 
30 Light : Daylight 
Aircraft 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : 
N90 Aircraft Operator : 
Personal 
Make Model Name : Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG 
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91 
Flight Plan : VFR 
Mission : Personal 
Flight Phase : Cruise 
Route In Use : Direct 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Reporter Organization : Personal 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying 
Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot 
Qualification.Flight Crew : 
Instrument 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot 
(ATP) Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine 
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 2400 
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 30 
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 400 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1584220 
Human Factors : Situational Awareness 
Events 
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne 
Conflict Detector.Person : Flight 
Crew 









Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors 
Primary Problem : Human Factors 
Narrative: 1 
Flight conducted VFR GPS Direct to [destination] with VFR Advisories along entire 
route. Drone sighted on right side side of aircraft at designated location and seen by 
both passenger and pilot. Drone was a black quadcopter. Sighting reported to NY 
approach. Flight condition was VFR on top above a solid overcast at 3500 FT. 
Synopsis 




ACN: 1583855 (26 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201810 
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400 
Place 
Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport 
State Reference : US 
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2500 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : VMC 
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 
10 Light : Daylight 
Ceiling.Single Value : 6000 
Aircraft 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.Tower : 
ZZZ Aircraft Operator : 
Personal 
Make Model Name : Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 
172 Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1 
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91 
Flight Plan : None 
Mission : Personal 
Flight Phase : Cruise 
Route In Use : Direct 
Airspace.Class G : 
ZZZ 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Reporter Organization : Personal 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying 
Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Private 
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 
1500 
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 
4 Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 1200 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1583855 
Human Factors : Situational Awareness 
Human Factors : Distraction 
Events 




Detector.Person : Flight Crew 
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 400 




When Detected : In-flight 
Result.General : None Reported / 
Taken 
Assessments 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related 
Primary Problem : Ambiguous 
Narrative: 1 
Approximately 7 miles east of ZZZ under control of tower, I was approaching ZZZ at 
2500 MSL cruise. Directly into hazy sunset. I noticed traffic at 2 o'clock at my altitude. I 
couldn't immediately make out the type aircraft or distance because of unfamiliar shape 
of craft. I then noticed that it appeared to be not moving (hovering) as I passed it. Then 
I realized it appeared to have LED NAV lights visible. Then I also realized that it was 
likely a drone because it didn't look like an airplane or a rotor craft. Then I realized that it 
was very close because I began to perceive its relative size. I immediately reported it to 
Tower and asked if he saw a drone at my 5 o'clock position. He said no. I wrongly 
reported it was about 400 yards off my wing. It was more like 400 feet off my wing. I 
lost track of it as I passed it but I think it was rather large, most likely a commercial size 
drone. I verified my reporting time by reviewing the transmission recording on ATC-Live 
on the internet and recorded the time and estimated the distance by the fact that I 
checked on at about 10 miles out and reported 2 minutes later. I would like to know the 
results of this investigation should there be one. I believe that if this object had been at 
12 o'clock instead of 2... I might not have seen it in the glare of the sun until it was too 
late and that would likely have been catastrophic based on my estimate of its size. 
Synopsis 





ACN: 1583538 (27 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201810 
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400 
Place 
Locale Reference.Airport : MMU.Airport 
State Reference : NJ 
Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles : 10 
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 6000 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : 
VMC Light : Night 
Aircraft 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : 
N90 Aircraft Operator : Air 
Carrier 
Make Model Name : Widebody 
Transport Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 
2 Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121 
Flight Plan : IFR 
Flight Phase : Final 
Approach Airspace.Class B 
: EWR 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier 
Function.Flight Crew : Captain 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot 
(ATP) Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 12711 
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 240 
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 7401 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1583538 
Human Factors : Situational Awareness 
Events 
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict 
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Object 
Detector.Person : Flight Crew 
When Detected : In-flight 









Contributing Factors / Situations : Human 
Factors Primary Problem : Human Factors 
Narrative: 1 
At 6,000 feet night VMC. About 10NM South of Morristown Airport. I noticed a possible 
drone about 500 to 750 feet above us moving in the opposite direction. It was very fast 
and I just noticed this off the corner of my left peripheral vision. There was no TCAS 
identification. We reported to NY Approach a possible drone sighting. 
Synopsis 




ACN: 1582733 (28 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201810 
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800 
Place 
Locale Reference.ATC Facility : NCT.TRACON 
State Reference : CA 
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 12200 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : VMC 
Aircraft 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : 
NCT Aircraft Operator : Air 
Carrier 
Make Model Name : B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model 
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2 
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 
121 Flight Plan : IFR 
Mission : Passenger 
Nav In Use : FMS Or 
FMC Flight Phase : 
Climb Route In Use : 
Vectors 
Route In Use.SID : 
TRUKN2 Airspace.Class E 
: NCT 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier 
Function.Flight Crew : Captain 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not 
Flying 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP) 
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 140 
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 1485 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1582733 
Human Factors : Situational Awareness 
Events 
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne 
Conflict Detector.Person : Flight 









Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related 
Primary Problem : Ambiguous 
Narrative: 1 
On a vector on TRUKN2 [SID] just north of fix COSMC passing 12,000 FT, I noticed target 
off nose and about a mile, small but big enough to spot, of unusual shape. It passed to 
our right at approximately 12,200 FT co-altitude, 2-3,000 feet laterally. Copilot had better 
look and had high confidence it was a drone due to odd flat shape and distinguishable 
protrusions downward. ATC notified of details. We were on a 040-degree vector north of 
SID, estimating 2-4 NM north of COSMC. 
Synopsis 




ACN: 1580222 (29 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201809 
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800 
Place 
Locale Reference.Airport : FSD.Airport 
State Reference : SD 
Relative Position.Angle.Radial : 015 
Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles : 
5 Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2500 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : VMC 
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 
20 Light : Daylight 
Ceiling.Single Value : 12000 
Aircraft : 1 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : FSD 
Aircraft Operator : Air Taxi 
Make Model Name : 
Helicopter Crew Size.Number 
Of Crew : 1 
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 
135 Flight Plan : VFR 
Mission : Ambulance 
Flight Phase : Cruise 
Route In Use : 
Direct 
Airspace.Class E : 
FSD 
Aircraft : 2 
Reference : Y 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Airspace.Class E : FSD 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Reporter Organization : Air Taxi 
Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot 
Qualification.Flight Crew : 
Instrument 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot 




Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine 
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 7150 
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 80 




ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 
1580222 Human Factors : Situational Awareness 
Events 
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC 
Detector.Person : Flight 
Crew Miss 
Distance.Horizontal : 200 
Miss Distance.Vertical : 0 
When Detected : In-flight 
Result.General : None Reported / Taken 
Assessments 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors 
Primary Problem : Ambiguous 
Narrative: 1 
While in cruise profile approximately 5NM N-NE of FSD, crew identified a blue & red 
drone passing by the right side of the aircraft. Aircraft Radar Altimeter was indicating 
1100 [AGL]. Drone passed within [estimated] 200 feet of the aircraft at the same 
altitude. No previous recognition of the drone and no evasive action was initiated. Event 
reported to FSD TRACON and subsequent followup with FSD ATCT personnel. No further 
information available to the crew. 
Synopsis 




ACN: 1578620 (30 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201809 
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200 
Place 
Locale Reference.ATC Facility : 
ZID.ARTCC State Reference : IN 
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 21000 
Aircraft : 1 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZID 
Make Model Name : PA-46 Malibu/Malibu Mirage/Malibu 
Matrix Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91 
Flight Plan : IFR 
Flight Phase : 
Cruise 
Airspace.Class A : ZID 
Aircraft : 2 
Reference : Y 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 0 
Airspace.Class A : ZID 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Facility : ZID.ARTCC 
Reporter Organization : Government 
Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute 
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully 
Certified 
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 13 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1578620 
Human Factors : Training / 
Qualification Human Factors : 
Situational Awareness 
Events 
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types 
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC 
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / 
Policy Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR 
Detector.Person : Flight Crew 
When Detected : In-flight 





Contributing Factors / Situations : Human 
Factors Contributing Factors / Situations : 





Aircraft X was level at FL210 and asked me if there was any known drone activity in the 
area. I responded, "Negative, why?" His response was, "We just went right by one. It 
was big and black". I asked the pilot if it was the type with 4 rotors to which he 
responded affirmative. I had an aircraft climbing in that same general area so I reported 
it to him two times. Upon leaving my sector the climbing aircraft said he never saw it. I 
immediately reported it to the FLM [Front Line Manager] and he proceeded to do his 
checklist and paperwork. Approximately 5 min after the incident the FLM had me ask the 
pilot if he could tell what direction the UAV was traveling and if he considered it to be a 
near miss. 
The pilot said it appeared to be hovering in one spot and that he came within 
approximately 50 feet of it, and he definitely considered it a near miss. I looked the 
situation up in the 7110.65 later and discover that advisories are supposed to be 
broadcast every 4 min after the last report, similar to a laser event. We have not 
had proper training on UAV activity so I was unaware of this requirement. 
[Recommend] proper training on unauthorized UAV activity. 
Synopsis 
Indianapolis Center Controller reported an NMAC between a Piper and a drone, and also 




ACN: 1578002 (31 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201809 
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800 
Place 
Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport 
State Reference : US 
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 500 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : 
VMC Light : Daylight 
Ceiling : CLR 
Aircraft : 1 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.CTAF : 
ZZZ Aircraft Operator : 
FBO 
Make Model Name : Single Engine Turboprop 
Undifferentiated Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1 
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 137 
Mission : Agriculture 
Flight Phase : Cruise 
Airspace.Class G : 
ZZZ 
Aircraft : 2 
Reference : Y 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Operating Under FAR Part.Other 
Flight Phase : Cruise 
Airspace.Class G : 
ZZZ 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Reporter Organization : FBO 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying 
Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot 
Qualification.Flight Crew : 
Instrument Qualification.Flight Crew 
: Commercial Experience.Flight 
Crew.Total : 10000 
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 









Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC 
Detector.Person : Flight Crew 
When Detected : In-flight 
Result.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action 
Assessments 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure 
Primary Problem : Ambiguous 
Narrative: 1 
On an 8 mile ferry back to my airstrip I suddenly had a windshield full of a drone. I 
immediately banked 90 to the right and then instantly back hard left to try to reacquire 
the drone. It was at that point I saw a van parked in the S.E. corner of a potato field. As 
I circled the van I noticed the shadow of the drone again as it landed. I noted my 
altimeter at 550 ft. When I asked the drone company about this I was told the drone 
operator climbed to avoid me. I don't believe this is true because I didn't notice anyone 
standing outside the van and I'm certain no one observed me approaching. This incident 
was 1.7 nm from my airstrip. This is the 3rd close call with a drone belonging to this 
company. This summer with either my airplane or the other airplane we operate we had 
had 3 close calls. My competitor has had 2 in the 300 ft - 400 ft range. 
Synopsis 




ACN: 1577960 (32 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201809 
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800 
Place 
Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport 
State Reference : US 
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 130 
Environment 
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 
10 Light : Daylight 
Ceiling.Single Value : 10000 
RVR.Single Value : 10000 
Aircraft 
Reference : X 
Aircraft Operator : Personal 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Operating Under FAR Part.Other 
Flight Plan : VFR 
Mission : Personal 
Flight Phase : 
Cruise 
Route In Use : Visual Approach 
Airspace.Class G : ZZZ 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person : Hangar / Base 
Reporter Organization : Personal 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying 
Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Private 
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 410 
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 10 
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 380 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1577960 
Human Factors : Situational Awareness 
Events 
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / 
Policy Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR 
Detector.Person : Flight Crew 
When Detected : In-flight 





Contributing Factors / Situations : Human 
Factors Primary Problem : Human Factors 
Narrative: 1 
Temporary loss of line-of-sight with drone. Shooting a video of skydiver. Although drone 
pilot and skydiver determined safest position for drone to hover, in GPS lock, was just 
above the tree that I (the pilot) was positioned underneath, I did not have line of sight 
of the drone while the skydiver landed in the open area. 
Synopsis 




ACN: 1577881 (33 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201809 
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400 
Place 
Locale Reference.Airport : HPN.Airport 
State Reference : NY 
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4000 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : VMC 
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 
10 Light : Dusk 
Ceiling.Single Value : 1000 
Aircraft 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : 
N90 Aircraft Operator : 
Corporate 
Make Model Name : Gulfstream Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model 
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2 
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91 
Flight Plan : IFR 
Mission : Passenger 
Flight Phase : Initial 
Approach Route In 
Use.STAR : BOUNO4 
Airspace.Class B : LGA 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Reporter Organization : Corporate 
Function.Flight Crew : Captain 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not 
Flying 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot 
(ATP) Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument 
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 9000 
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 60 
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 300 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1577881 
Human Factors : Distraction 





Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict 
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / 




Miss Distance.Horizontal : 
0 Miss Distance.Vertical : 
500 When Detected : In-
flight 
Result.General : None Reported / Taken 
Assessments 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather 
Related Primary Problem : Ambiguous 
Narrative: 1 
On BOUNO4 arrival traveling westbound on track Bridgeport (BDR) to ALIXX intersection, 
I spotted a small black drone roughly 500 ft directly above us roughly 2 miles east of 
ALIXX intersection. It appeared to moving slowly eastbound. I reported it to the New 
York Tracon. They notified the aircraft behind us who was also on the BOUNO4 arrival. 
Synopsis 





ACN: 1574558 (34 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201809 
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800 
Place 
Locale Reference.Airport : BWI.Airport 
State Reference : MD 
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : VMC 
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 
10 Light : Daylight 
Ceiling.Single Value : 3600 
Aircraft : 1 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.Tower : 
BWI Aircraft Operator : Air 
Taxi 
Make Model Name : Robinson R44 
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1 
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 
135 Flight Plan : SVFR 
Mission : Passenger 
Flight Phase : 
Landing Route In Use 
: None Airspace.Class 
B : BWI 
Aircraft : 2 
Reference : Y 
Aircraft Operator : Personal 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Mission : Photo Shoot 
Flight Phase : Climb 
Airspace.Class B : 
BWI 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Reporter Organization : Air Taxi 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot 
Flying Function.Flight Crew : 
Single Pilot 




Qualification.Flight Crew : Commercial 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument 
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 2039 
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 178 




ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1574558 
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown 
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew 
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Other 
Events 
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC 
Detector.Person : Flight 
Crew Miss 
Distance.Horizontal : 10 
Miss Distance.Vertical : 0 
When Detected : In-flight 
Result.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action 
Assessments 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human 
Factors Primary Problem : Human Factors 
Narrative: 1 
I was dropping off a groom and his best man for a wedding at a venue with a tight 
landing area. It was a short flight, and after communicating with Tower I began my high 
recon of the landing area. I had done both a satellite imagery review and a site visit prior 
to the landing, but there was a new obstacle I had not expected to encounter. One of the 
groom's friends had a drone that he was hovering in the parking lot. Not 100% sure of 
the type but it was a small four rotor system similar to DJI Phantom with a camera 
underneath. I had not thought to communicate to the groom ahead of time of the need 
to keep any small UAS on the ground during the landing. I did say to the groom during 
the flight, "He needs to keep the drone on the ground." As I shifted my focus back down 
to the ground I saw the UAS was in his hand and it looked like he was walking it back to 
his trunk. At the same time the groom was on the phone and I heard him say "the pilot 
said to keep it on the ground." I decided at that time to continue the approach, and 
conducted a steep approach into the landing area to remain clear of the trees and 
obstacles in the area. After landing, I rolled down the throttle to bring rotor RPM to idle 
and had the groom and his best man exit out of the helicopter walking forward of the 
helicopter. When I shifted my attention back forward I saw the drone back in the air, 
about 10 feet in front of me at or slightly above my rotor system. I leaned my head out 
of the aircraft and made eye contact with the operator while pointing at him, then the 
drone. I made a hand signal to back away from the aircraft, and the drone moved away 
from the helicopter and back down to a one foot hover before setting back down on the 
ground. At that point I contacted tower for takeoff clearance, brought my RPM back up to 
flight and exited the landing area using a max performance takeoff. 
 
It is possible communication with the groom prior to the event to keep any aerial 
videographers on the ground during the landing and takeoff would have prevented the 
occurrence, but it is possible the drone operator never communicated his intent to film 
the landing to the groom. What would have been far more effective would have been to 
have ground personnel there for the landing to directly communicate with the operator 
and stress the importance of keeping the drone on the ground to prevent either a mid-air 
collision or the drone being thrown by the rotor wash into people or objects. However, we 
had limited staffing due to the holiday weekend and all available company personnel 
were tasked. I have no way of determining if the operator was licensed, I consider it a 








this probability is the hope that a licensed UAS operator would know better than flying a 
UAS two miles from a class B Airport off the departure end of the runway. 
Synopsis 




ACN: 1573395 (35 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201808 
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200 
Place 
Locale Reference.Airport : 
DFW.Airport State Reference : TX 
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 200 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : VMC 
Aircraft 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.Tower : 
DFW Aircraft Operator : Air 
Carrier 
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed 
Wing Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2 
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 
121 Flight Plan : IFR 
Flight Phase : Initial 
Approach Airspace.Class B : 
DFW 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not 
Flying Function.Flight Crew : 
Captain 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP) 
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 25000 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1573395 
Human Factors : Situational Awareness 
Events 
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC 
Detector.Person : Flight Crew 
Miss Distance.Vertical : 125 
When Detected : In-flight 
Result.General : None Reported / Taken 
Assessments 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure 









On short final to RWY 18R at DFW at 200 ft AGL I saw a small white drone pass under 
our nose flying in the opposite direction. We took no action since it didn't pose as a 
threat. It was maybe 100-150 ft below us. It appeared to be flying over the construction 
area near the approach end of RWY 18R. I advised ATC and they had the next few 
aircraft land on RWY 18L. 
Synopsis 





ACN: 1573186 (36 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201808 
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800 
Place 
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4500 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : VMC 
Weather Elements / Visibility : Haze / Smoke 
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 30 
Light : Daylight 
Ceiling.Single Value : 25000 
Aircraft 
Reference : X 
Aircraft Operator : Personal 
Make Model Name : Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 
172 Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1 
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91 
Flight Plan : None 
Mission : Training 
Flight Phase : 
Cruise 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Reporter Organization : Personal 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not 
Flying Function.Flight Crew : 
Instructor Qualification.Flight Crew : 
Commercial 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Flight Instructor 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine 
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 8000 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1573186 
Human Factors : Situational Awareness 
Events 
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Other / 
Unknown Detector.Person : Flight Crew 
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 2000 
Miss Distance.Vertical : 200 
When Detected : In-flight 








Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure 
Primary Problem : Ambiguous 
Narrative: 1 
We saw a medium sized object perhaps 100-300 feet below us; we were at 4,500 feet 
MSL too small to be a plane. At first we thought balloons, but that didn't make sense 
with its track over the ground. It was headed into the wind fairly quickly. My student and 
I believed it was a drone of some type. There are no current [UAV] NOTAMS in the area 
we were operating. It was green, black, and silver in color. It had the appearance of a 
quad copter. 
Synopsis 




ACN: 1571254 (37 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201808 
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400 
Place 
Locale Reference.Airport : LAX.Airport 
State Reference : CA 
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2500 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : Marginal 
Light : Dusk 
Aircraft : 1 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : 
SCT Aircraft Operator : Air 
Taxi 
Make Model Name : Cessna Citation Undifferentiated or Other Model 
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2 
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135 
Mission : Passenger 
Flight Phase : Initial 
Approach Airspace.Class B : 
LAX 
Aircraft : 2 
Reference : Y 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Flight Plan : None 
Airspace.Class B : LAX 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Reporter Organization : Air Taxi 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not 
Flying Function.Flight Crew : 
Captain 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1571254 
Human Factors : Situational Awareness 
Events 
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC 
Detector.Person : Flight Crew 
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 25 









Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure 
Primary Problem : Ambiguous 
Narrative: 1 
On approach to Runway 24R at LAX, approximately 2.9 miles from JETSA at 2500 ft we 
encountered a drone at our altitude. The drone passed approximately 25ft on the right 
wing of the aircraft, slightly above the wing but at our altitude. We immediately notified 
ATC and provided a description of the drone and the approximate location and altitude. 
We did not have time to deviate and only saw the drone at the last second. Passengers 
were unaware and the flight landed normally. 
Synopsis 




ACN: 1570720 (38 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201808 
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200 
Place 
Locale Reference.Airport : STL.Airport 
State Reference : MO 
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2400 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : Mixed 
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 
10 Light : Daylight 
Ceiling.Single Value : 3000 
Aircraft : 1 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.Tower : STL 
Aircraft Operator : Air 
Carrier 
Make Model Name : B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model 
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2 
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 
121 Flight Plan : IFR 
Mission : Passenger 
Flight Phase : Final 
Approach Airspace.Class B 
: STL 
Aircraft : 2 
Reference : Y 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Flight Plan : None 
Flight Phase : Cruise 
Airspace.Class B : 
STL 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier 
Function.Flight Crew : Captain 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP) 





Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC 
Detector.Person : Flight Crew 




When Detected : In-flight 
Result.General : None Reported / 
Taken 
Assessments 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure 
Primary Problem : Ambiguous 
Narrative: 1 
When crossing the final approach fix to Runway 12R at 2400 ft on a visual approach, we 
spotted a black colored drone hovering approximately 400 ft below us and just to the 
right of our approach path. We then reported it to the STL Tower Controller upon landing. 
Synopsis 
B737 Captain reported sighting a drone 400 feet below and just to the right of final 




ACN: 1568419 (39 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201808 
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200 
Place 
Locale Reference.ATC Facility : PCT.TRACON 
State Reference : VA 
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4000 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : 
VMC Light : Daylight 
Aircraft : 1 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : 
PCT Aircraft Operator : Air 
Carrier 
Make Model Name : B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model 
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 4 
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 
121 Flight Plan : IFR 
Mission : Passenger 
Nav In Use : FMS Or FMC 
Flight Phase : Initial 
Approach Route In 
Use.STAR : HYPER7 
Airspace.Class B : IAD 
Aircraft : 2 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Operating Under FAR Part.Other 
Flight Phase : Cruise 
Airspace.Class B : 
IAD 
Person : 1 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier 
Function.Flight Crew : Captain 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not 
Flying 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot 
(ATP) Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 9656 
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 94 




ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1568419 
Human Factors : Situational Awareness 




Reference : 2 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier 
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot 
(ATP) Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 4516 
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 1553 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1568407 
Human Factors : Situational Awareness 
Events 
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne 
Conflict Detector.Person : Flight 
Crew 
Miss Distance.Vertical : 1000 
When Detected : In-flight 
Result.General : None Reported / Taken 
Assessments 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors 
Primary Problem : Airspace Structure 
Narrative: 1 
Hyper 7 RNAV (STAR) over YACKK @ 4,000 ft. First Officer stated as he was looking 
forward/down and something caught his attention. He stated "as we passed over it, 
looking down at approximately 1,000 ft below us" it appeared to be a drone. This 
was reported to Approach Control. After landing RWY 1R, IAD Tower requested a 
verbal description and the First Officer described seeing the cross pattern of the 
drone from above, half mile north of YACKK. 
Narrative: 2 
I was pilot flying approximately 1/2 mile N of YACKK fix on Hyper 7 Arrival. Saw what I 
thought was a small balloon just to the right of our flight path and below us 
approximately 1/4 mile ahead. I leaned forward to get a better view of the balloon as it 
passed below us and it was clearly a drone. I saw the X pattern and white fuselage that 
looked to me like a DJI Phantom drone (I fly drones and am familiar). The drone was 
below our flight path but MUCH higher than the 400 ft altitude restriction on them. I am 
just estimating but believe it was at approximately 2500-3000 ft. I could be off on 
altitude somewhat but it was well above 400 ft. The other pilots did not see the drone. 
By the time I realized what it was it was passing below us. 
Synopsis 
B-777 flight crew reported passing over a drone by 1000 feet while at 4000 feet on 




ACN: 1568336 (40 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201808 
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800 
Place 
Locale Reference.Airport : SAN.Airport 
State Reference : CA 
Environment 
Light : Daylight 
Aircraft : 1 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.Tower : SAN 
Aircraft Operator : Air 
Carrier 
Make Model Name : B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model 
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2 
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 
121 Flight Plan : IFR 
Mission : Passenger 
Nav In Use : FMS Or 
FMC Flight Phase : Taxi 
Flight Phase : Final 
Approach Airspace.Class B 
: SAN 
Aircraft : 2 
Reference : Y 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Flight Phase : Cruise 
Airspace.Class B : SAN 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying 
Function.Flight Crew : Captain 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot 
(ATP) Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine 
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 249 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1568336 
Human Factors : Situational Awareness 





Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Conflict, Less Severe 
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict 
Detector.Person : Flight Crew 
When Detected : In-
flight When Detected : 
Taxi 
Result.General : None Reported / Taken 
Assessments 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure 
Primary Problem : Ambiguous 
Narrative: 1 
We were on short final for 27 in SAN. A military aircraft seemed to be hovering one or 
two miles south of our path. I was hand flying the approach when the F/O (First Officer) 
mentioned that the craft could be a drone. It was, and therefore much closer to our path 
that what we originally believed. It stayed at a fairly safe distance and I refocused on 
landing the aircraft. An aircraft was cleared for immediate takeoff and separation was 
tight. During the landing roll, the drone reappeared in my peripheral vision as it passed 
us on the taxiway. When we cleared the runway, it was now hovering over an (other 
carrier) aircraft in our 12 o'clock position at [the] Terminal. I advised the Tower of the 
encounter and its present location. The drone was black, probably two or three feet 
wide. It was being flown in a very skilled way. The hovering and flight path was precise. 
It was a professional instrument, not a toy. In my opinion, the intent was commercial; 
perhaps filming. That is where I would lead an investigation. 
 
This encounter highlights a safety issue of the highest level. A drone that size can be 
used in a terminal area of a major US airport without the knowledge of ATC. One or 
more can be used to cause catastrophic damage to commercial aircraft. The skill level of 
drone operators as well as the maneuverability capability can be the greatest hazard we 
face. 
The same event at night would have been unknown from anyone. This is an eye opener. It 
needs to be addressed. 
Synopsis 
B737 Captain reported sighting a drone while flying a visual approach to runway 27 at SAN 




ACN: 1566714 (41 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201808 
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400 
Place 
Locale Reference.ATC Facility : I90.TRACON 
State Reference : TX 
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 5000 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : VMC 
Aircraft : 1 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : 
I90 Aircraft Operator : Air 
Carrier 
Make Model Name : Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng 
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2 
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 
121 Nav In Use : FMS Or FMC 
Flight Phase : Climb 
Route In Use.SID : 
STYCK6 Airspace.Class B 
: IAH 
Aircraft : 2 
Reference : Y 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Airspace.Class B : IAH 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier 
Function.Flight Crew : Captain 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP) 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1566714 
Events 
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict 
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Other / 
Unknown Detector.Person : Flight Crew 
When Detected : In-flight 









Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure 
Primary Problem : Ambiguous 
Narrative: 1 
During our climb out of IAH on the STYCK 6 departure our cockpit jumpseater said that 
we overflew a black quad copter drone. Our altitude was about five thousand feet and 
climbing, and we estimated that the drone altitude was about 3500-4000 feet. We 
reported this to ATC and continued on to our destination. 
Synopsis 
Air Carrier Captain reported sighting a quadcopter drone at approximately 4000 feet while 




ACN: 1562358 (42 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201807 
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400 
Place 
Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZOA.ARTCC 
State Reference : CA 
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 25000 
Aircraft : 1 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.Center : 
ZOA Aircraft Operator : 
Corporate 
Make Model Name : Small 
Transport Operating Under FAR 
Part : Part 91 Flight Plan : IFR 
Flight Phase : Climb 
Airspace.Class A : 
ZOA 
Aircraft : 2 
Reference : Y 
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZOA 
Aircraft Operator : Government 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Flight Plan : IFR 
Mission : Tactical 
Flight Phase : 
Cruise 
Person : 1 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Facility : ZOA 
Reporter Organization : Government 
Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute 
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified 
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 
3 ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1562358 
Human Factors : Confusion 
Human Factors : Human-Machine 
Interface Human Factors : Situational 
Awareness Human Factors : Training / 
Qualification Human Factors : Distraction 
Person : 2 
Reference : 2 




Reporter Organization : Government 
Function.Air Traffic Control : 
Instructor Function.Air Traffic Control 
: Enroute 




Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 
6 ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1562806 
Human Factors : Training / 
Qualification Human Factors : 
Situational Awareness Human Factors 
: Distraction 
Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface 
Events 
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types 
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne 
Conflict 
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / 
Policy Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control 
When Detected : In-flight 
Assessments 
Contributing Factors / Situations : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure 
Primary Problem : Procedure 
Narrative: 1 
I was working the R-side at Sector XX. I climbed Aircraft X and had a J-ring on Aircraft Y. 
At the time when I climbed Aircraft X I thought I had enough room to climb him with no 
problem. Aircraft Y was headed in a different direction. I got busy descending aircraft for 
ZZZ and ZZZ1. Training was going on at the D-side position and the trainee was having 
a hard time keeping up so I was doing a lot of the entries and telling the trainee what to 
do. I feel like if I had a CPC D side or someone more experienced helping it would have 
been easier to track everything. Aircraft Y was in a area of high traffic volume and 
density. 
Possibly traffic with ZZZ2 arrivals and departures and overflights in that area. Also with 
him maneuvering there in the future I will use vertical separation and assign a heading 
to Aircraft Y. My comfort level with Aircraft Y is low and thought he would be able to turn 
faster. 
Narrative: 2 
I was an instructor training on the Radar Associate (D-side) position of the sector. The R- 
side had been making some unusual and not very effective moves which made his 
workload much harder than it already was. There was weather deviations, and slow 
performing aircraft mixed in with his traffic. Aircraft Y was flying much of the middle 
portion of the sector at FL260. Aircraft X was climbing eastbound from the western part 
of the sector. The R-side had traffic for Aircraft X at FL250 and asked the pilot if he was 
able to climb to FL270, in which the pilot concurred. My trainee and I were discussing a 
lot of different things since there was much going on in the sector, and my trainee may 
have been doing landline coordination when the R-side gave the clearance to climb 
Aircraft X. Aircraft Y had been orbiting the sector for some time, and the R-side did not 
recognize Aircraft Y making the maneuver and turned into Aircraft X as it climbed. 
Conflict alert activated which prompted the R-side to execute turns, but I believe the two 
aircraft still lost proper enroute separation. With the advances in technology and having 
ERAM and DATACOMM, maybe we should be able to be given the option to change data 




surround the data block for datacomm (IE point outs, VCI, etc.). Most of what happened 
was strictly the R-side's own doing, but maybe it would've helped him more if the slow 











ACN: 1562024 (43 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201807 
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200 
Place 
Locale Reference.Airport : BOS.Airport 
State Reference : MA 
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 200 
Environment 
Light : Daylight 
Aircraft : 1 
Reference : X 
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier 
Make Model Name : B737-700 
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2 
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 
121 Flight Plan : IFR 
Mission : Passenger 
Flight Phase : 
Landing 
Aircraft : 2 
Reference : Y 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Flight Phase : Cruise 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier 
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not 
Flying Qualification.Flight Crew : 
Instrument 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot 
(ATP) Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine 
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 513 
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 1985 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1562024 
Human Factors : Distraction 
Events 
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC 
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / 








When Detected : In-flight 
Result.General : None Reported / 
Taken 
Assessments 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human 
Factors Contributing Factors / Situations : 
Procedure Primary Problem : Human Factors 
Narrative: 1 
Aircraft X had near miss with a small drone off right wing about 150 feet away at 200 feet 
AGL parallel to Runway 32 and the shore line. 
Synopsis 




ACN: 1561883 (44 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201807 
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200 
Place 
Locale Reference.Airport : SBP.Airport 
State Reference : CA 
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2500 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : VMC 
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 
10 Light : Daylight 
Aircraft : 1 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : 
SBA Aircraft Operator : 
Personal 
Make Model Name : Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 
172 Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1 
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91 
Flight Plan : None 
Mission : Personal 
Flight Phase : 
Descent 
Airspace.Class D : 
SBP 
Aircraft : 2 
Reference : Y 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Operating Under FAR Part.Other 
Flight Phase : Cruise 
Airspace.Class D : SBP 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Reporter Organization : Personal 
Function.Flight Crew : Single 
Pilot Function.Flight Crew : Pilot 
Flying Qualification.Flight Crew : 
Private Experience.Flight 
Crew.Total : 242 
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 




ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1561883 





Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC 
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Other / 
Unknown Detector.Person : Flight Crew 
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 50 
Miss Distance.Vertical : 50 
When Detected : In-flight 
Assessments 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human 
Factors Primary Problem : Human Factors 
Narrative: 1 
While descending towards San Luis Obispo, I noticed a drone pass over my left wing 
within 100 feet. I was descending through 2500 feet at the time, near Cal Poly 
University, roughly 4nm north of the San Luis airport. I only spotted the drone for a 
second before it disappeared past my wing and thus did not have enough time to 
maneuver away from it. 
Synopsis 




ACN: 1561479 (45 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201807 
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800 
Place 
Locale Reference.ATC Facility : LIMM.ARTCC 
State Reference : FO 
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 34000 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : VMC 
Aircraft : 1 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.Center : 
LIMM Aircraft Operator : Air 
Carrier Make Model Name : 
A330 Crew Size.Number Of 
Crew : 4 
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 
121 Flight Plan : IFR 
Mission : Passenger 
Nav In Use : FMS Or 
FMC Flight Phase : 
Cruise 
Aircraft : 2 
Reference : Y 
ATC / Advisory.Center : LIMM 
Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier 
Function.Flight Crew : Captain 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying 
Qualification.Flight Crew : 
Multiengine 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot 
(ATP) Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument 
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 20000 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1561479 
Human Factors : Situational Awareness 
Human Factors : Distraction 
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown 









Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict 
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / 
Policy Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Other / 
Unknown Detector.Person : Flight Crew 
When Detected : In-flight 
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / 
Clarification Result.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment 
Problem Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert 
Assessments 
Contributing Factors / Situations : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors 
Primary Problem : Environment - Non Weather Related 
Narrative: 1 
Enroute, at 34000 feet flying up the Italian peninsula in Italian airspace we were having 
great difficulty hearing center because of background noise. As Pilot Flying, I was helping 
the Pilot Monitoring by inserting new frequencies. There was much chatter on guard 
frequency. Guard frequency was so distracting both pilots were turning off the receiver 
for guard to better hear Center. All of us discussed the communication threat we were 
experiencing. I took a 10-minute break. The fourth pilot was in my seat and the First 
Officer remained working the radios. 
 
When I returned and was getting briefed, I noted what I first thought were balloons, 
then drones or possibly UAV's. They did not appear on TCAS. They came from below and 
passed below our left wing. While considering what this was, the Pilot monitoring 
realized the guard frequency had not been regained contact with ATC. They said we had 
been intercepted. 
 
After we regained contact, the two objects I had seen before were now off our left wing, 
and they peeled off in descending turns away from the aircraft. It is difficult to estimate 
how distant they were. We had no ACARS message or SATCOM call alerting us to our loss 
of communication. I estimate our loss of communication was about 10 minutes. No 
aircraft used ICAO procedures for intercept. It is possible the targets I saw were fighters 
who were observing our flight. ATC radio was difficult to hear and congestion on 121.5 
caused both pilots to silence 121.5 to hear center. I suggest expand the use of CPDLC 
(Controller Pilot DataLink Communication). 
Synopsis 
A330 Captain reported they lost communication with ATC and did not realize it until they 




ACN: 1561264 (46 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201807 
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800 
Place 
Locale Reference.Airport : CXP.Airport 
State Reference : NV 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : 
VMC Light : Daylight 
Aircraft : 1 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.CTAF : 
CXP Aircraft 
Operator.Other 
Make Model Name : Eurocopter AS 350/355/EC130 - 
Astar/Twinstar/Ecureuil Operating Under FAR Part.Other 
Airspace.Class G : CXP 
Aircraft : 2 
Reference : Y 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Operating Under FAR Part.Other 
Flight Phase : Cruise 
Airspace.Class G : CXP 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person : Hangar / Base 
Function.Ground Personnel : Airport Personnel 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 
1561264 Analyst Callback : Completed 
Events 
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Object 
Detector.Person : Flight Crew 
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 0 
Miss Distance.Vertical : 0 
When Detected : In-flight 
Result.General : Flight Cancelled / Delayed 
Result.General : Maintenance Action 
Result.General : Police / Security Involved 
Result.Flight Crew : Landed As Precaution 





Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors 
Primary Problem : Human Factors 
Narrative: 1 
Aircraft X, (AS350) Eurocopter experienced a drone strike approximately 1 nm south of 
CXP. Altitude unknown. Pilot in command (PIC) reported thought it was a bird strike, but 
did not find evidence of bird. Reported sound of an object striking the aircraft and 
subsequent vibration in tail section. PIC made an immediate landing on the CXP south 
ramp. Follow-up inspection by company mechanic reported bent trim tab and located 
dings on fuselage where object struck the aircraft. Repair conducted over next two days. 
Aircraft departed CXP after two days. FAA FSDO (RNO) notified on morning after two 
days. I was instructed to contact Carson City Sheriff's Office and request deputy to take a 
police report. 
Callback: 1 
Reporter reiterated details contained in original report and stated that the helicopter 
landed on the east circular landing zone on the south ramp at Carson City Airport (CXP). 
Synopsis 




ACN: 1561150 (47 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201807 
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800 
Place 
Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZBW.ARTCC 
State Reference : NH 
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 19200 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : 
VMC Light : Night 
Aircraft : 1 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.Center : 
ZBW Aircraft Operator : Air 
Carrier 
Make Model Name : EMB ERJ 190/195 ER/LR 
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2 
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 
121 Flight Plan : IFR 
Mission : Passenger 
Nav In Use : FMS Or FMC 
Flight Phase : Descent 
Route In Use.STAR : 
ORW7 Airspace.Class A : 
ZBW 
Aircraft : 2 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Flight Plan : None 
Airspace.Class A : ZBW 
Person : 1 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier 
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not 
Flying 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP) 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1561150 
Human Factors : Distraction 
Person : 2 




Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 




Function.Flight Crew : Captain 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot 
Flying 
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP) 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1561153 
Human Factors : Distraction 
Events 
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC 
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / 
Policy Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR 
Detector.Person : Flight Crew 
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 0 
Miss Distance.Vertical : 20 
When Detected : In-flight 
Result.General : None Reported / Taken 
Assessments 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors 
Primary Problem : Ambiguous 
Narrative: 1 
While descending through 19,200 feet MSL on the ORW7 arrival into BOS, I saw what I 
thought was a balloon coming towards our aircraft. A few seconds later as we flew 
directly under it, missing it by about 10-20 feet, we noticed it was a drone. It was 
directly above my windshield (the FO side) and probably about 2 feet wide. We were 
approx 24NM west of PVD VOR. I immediately notified BOS center and they proceeded to 
vector other aircraft away from that area. BOS center gave us their number to call them 
on the ground for further information. I called and spoke with BOS center managment 
and provided the information [they] requested in addition to my contact information. 
Narrative: 2 
We were flying the Norwich 7 (ORW7) arrival into BOS and we were approximately 24 
miles west of PVD on the arrival near the OUTTT intersection. I was the Pilot Flying but 
was heads down at the moment while I was giving a PA announcement to the 
passengers. As we were passing through FL192 in the descent I looked up and saw what 
appeared to be a black drone directly in front of us at the same altitude. I saw the drone 
out of the FO's windshield and it quickly passed over the top of us. It appeared to be 18-
24 inch in diameter, oval shaped, solid black in color, and I believe it missed our aircraft 
by about 20-50 feet. 
 
The FO was certain it was a drone. She reported to me that she saw what appeared to be 
a propeller on the top of it and something else hanging below it (possibly a camera). We 
reported this to BOS ARTCC who immediately began to vector other aircraft away from 
that area. The FO had a much better and longer visual look at the object and was certain 
it was a drone. BOS ARTCC asked us to call them on the phone after landing which we 
did. 
They said a report would be filed on their end. I also reported this to the Chief Pilot. 









ACN: 1559150 (48 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201807 
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800 
Place 
Locale Reference.Airport : 
ORD.Airport State Reference : IL 
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 1700 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : 
VMC Light : Daylight 
Aircraft : 1 
Reference : X 
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier 
Make Model Name : Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200) 
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2 
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 
121 Flight Plan : IFR 
Flight Phase : Initial Approach 
Aircraft : 2 
Reference : Y 
Aircraft Operator : Personal 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not 
Flying Function.Flight Crew : First 
Officer 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1559150 
Human Factors : Distraction 
Events 
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC 
Detector.Person : Flight Crew 
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 200 
When Detected : In-flight 
Result.General : None Reported / Taken 
Assessments 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure 









On final for Runway 28C in Chicago, at approximately 1700 feet and 5 DME from the 
localizer, we came in close proximity to a drone just south of the approach course. Drone 
appeared to be within about 200 feet of the aircraft. We did not have to take evasive 
action and landed without incident. Reported the drone to Tower who we then contacted 
via phone after arrival at the gate. 
Synopsis 




ACN: 1558327 (49 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201807 
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800 
Place 
Locale Reference.Airport : 
ARB.Airport State Reference : MI 
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 200 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : VMC 
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 
40 Light : Daylight 
Ceiling : CLR 
RVR.Single Value : 10000 
Aircraft : 1 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.Tower : 
ARB Aircraft Operator : 
Personal 
Make Model Name : Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 
172 Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1 
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91 
Flight Plan : VFR 
Mission : Personal 
Flight Phase : Final 
Approach Airspace.Class D 
: ARB 
Aircraft : 2 
Reference : Y 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Operating Under FAR Part.Other 
Flight Plan : None 
Flight Phase : Cruise 
Airspace.Class D : 
ARB 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Reporter Organization : Personal 
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot 
Flying Function.Flight Crew : 
Single Pilot Qualification.Flight 




Crew.Total : 500 
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 
3 Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 400 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1558327 





Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC 
Detector.Person : Flight Crew 
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 100 
Miss Distance.Vertical : 20 
When Detected : In-flight 
Result.General : None Reported / Taken 
Assessments 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure 
Primary Problem : Ambiguous 
Narrative: 1 
On final approach to ARB runway 24 flying a Cessna C172 I noticed initially at 1:00 o'clock 
position (horizontal) a bright "candy apple red and bright chrome" 4 engine drone. 
Continued on final approach passing drone. Drone remained stationary in 3D space as 
we passed. Notified ARB tower of drone hovering on ARB final approach. 
Synopsis 





ACN: 1549645 (50 of 50)  
Time / Day 
Date : 201806 
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800 
Place 
Locale Reference.Airport : HIO.Airport 
State Reference : OR 
Relative Position.Angle.Radial : 068 
Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles : 
4 Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 650 
Environment 
Flight Conditions : VMC 
Weather Elements / Visibility : Haze / Smoke 
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 10 
Light : Daylight 
Ceiling.Single Value : 5000 
Aircraft : 1 
Reference : X 
ATC / Advisory.Tower : HIO 
Aircraft Operator : Personal 
Make Model Name : 
Helicopter Crew Size.Number 
Of Crew : 1 
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91 
Flight Plan : None 
Mission : Passenger 
Flight Phase : Initial 
Approach Route In Use : 
Direct Airspace.Class D : 
HIO 
Aircraft : 2 
Reference : Y 
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial 
Vehicle Flight Phase : Cruise 
Airspace.Class D : HIO 
Person 
Reference : 1 
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X 
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck 
Reporter Organization : 
Personal Function.Flight Crew : 
Pilot Flying Function.Flight Crew 
: Single Pilot 




Instructor Qualification.Flight Crew : 
Instrument Qualification.Flight Crew : 
Commercial Experience.Flight Crew.Total 
: 2219 Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 




Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 255 
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1549645 
Events 
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC 
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Other / 
Unknown Detector.Person : Flight Crew 
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 100 
Miss Distance.Vertical : 50 
When Detected : In-flight 
Result.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action 
Assessments 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure 
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure 
Primary Problem : Ambiguous 
Narrative: 1 
After being cleared into Class Delta airspace for landing at HIO, and instructed to 
descend below 700 feet MSL, I had a near miss with a drone over highway 26, 4nm ENE 
of HIO. I was at approximately 650 feet MSL and the drone was above me, just to the 
right of my 12 o'clock. I turned left upon seeing it and got a good look at it. It appeared 
to be grey in color and possibly of the DJI Phantom type of quadcopter. I have seen 
plenty of these and it looked to be that style. I immediately reported to the Tower that I 
had a near miss at the edge of their airspace and gave them approximate location, 
altitude, and description of the UAV. I was traveling approximately 120 KTS IAS, with 
light winds and good visibility other than light smoke in the area from prescribed burns. I 
had two passengers on board, one in the front with me and one directly behind that 
passenger. 
Synopsis 
Helicopter pilot reported a NMAC with a quadcopter drone at approximately 650 feet MSL 
while inbound for landing. 
 
